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‘This book is a marvellous interdisciplinary synthesis, grounded in case examples 
and at once critical and constructive. As such, it is both instructive for policy 
practitioners as well as moving the scholarship of the field forward.’ – Vivian Lin, 
Professor of Public Health, La Trobe University, Australia
‘This is essential reading for anybody working on the smarter use of evidence 
by government. It catalogues the many biases twisting how research is used 
by  policymakers. It also addresses a vital challenge in our sector – a lack of 
 legitimacy. As well as the academic rigour of this book, there are practical tips 
on what we can do about these problems, and lessons from across the globe 
showing where we get it wrong – and how we might get it right.’ – Jonathan 
Breckon, Head of the Alliance for Useful Evidence, UK
‘This important book goes well beyond standard analyses of evidence informed 
policy with detailed discussions of the politics of evidence and the political 
 origins (and the cognitive psychology) of bias in the use of research evidence. 
It addresses a core and often overlooked issue of the governance of evidence 
use – including the need to consider the institutions and processes in place that 
can enable the appropriate use of evidence in decision making. This book will be 
a pretty essential read for anyone concerned with the policy, practice or study of 
using research to inform decision making.’ – David Gough, Professor of Evidence 
Informed Policy and Practice, Director of the EPPI-Centre, University College 
London, UK
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There has been an enormous increase in interest in the use of evidence for public 
policymaking, but the vast majority of work on the subject has failed to engage 
with the political nature of decision making and how this influences the ways in 
which evidence will be used (or misused) within political areas. This book pro-
vides new insights into the nature of political bias with regards to evidence and 
critically considers what an ‘improved’ use of evidence would look like from a 
policymaking perspective.
Part I describes the great potential for evidence to help achieve social goals, 
as well as the challenges raised by the political nature of policymaking. It 
explores the concern of evidence advocates that political interests drive the mis-
use or manipulation of evidence, as well as counter-concerns of critical policy 
scholars about how appeals to ‘evidence-based policy’ can depoliticise political 
debates. Both concerns reflect forms of bias – the first representing technical bias, 
whereby evidence use violates principles of scientific best practice, and the sec-
ond representing issue bias in how appeals to evidence can shift political debates 
to particular questions or marginalise policy-relevant social concerns.
Part II then draws on the fields of policy studies and cognitive psychology to 
understand the origins and mechanisms of both forms of bias in relation to politi-
cal interests and values. It illustrates how such biases are not only common, but 
can be much more predictable once we recognise their origins and manifestations 
in policy arenas.
Finally, Part III discusses ways to move forward for those seeking to improve the 
use of evidence in public policymaking. It explores what constitutes ‘good evidence 
for policy’, as well as the ‘good use of evidence’ within policy processes, and con-
siders how to build evidence-advisory institutions that embed key principles of both 
scientific good practice and democratic representation. Taken as a whole, the approach 
promoted is termed the ‘good governance of evidence’ – a concept that represents the 
use of rigorous, systematic and technically valid pieces of evidence within decision-
making processes that are representative of, and accountable to, populations served.
Justin Parkhurst is an Associate Professor at the London School of Economics 
and Political Science’s Department of Social Policy. This book was written while 
he was previously Senior Lecturer at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine’s Department of Global Health and Development.
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Part I
Evidence-based policymaking
Opportunities and challenges
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1 Introduction
Evidence matters (three examples)
 • For most of the second half of the twentieth century, new parents were 
advised by medical professionals to place babies to sleep on their fronts – with 
 advocates such as the popular paediatrician Dr Benjamin Spock explaining 
this could reduce the risk of infants choking in their sleep if they were to 
vomit (Howick 2011). This practice continued for decades while empiri-
cal studies were slowly accumulating evidence that, in fact, babies left to 
sleep on their fronts might be at higher risk of sudden infant death syndrome 
(SIDS) than back-sleepers. Finally, in 2005, a systematic review of the lit-
erature was published which identified the relative risk of SIDS to be nearly 
three times higher for front-sleepers. The authors of the review argued that, 
had a more rigorous review of evidence been done in the 1970s, this ‘might 
have prevented over 10,000 infant deaths in the UK and at least 50,000 in 
Europe, the USA, and Australasia’ (Gilbert et al. 2005, p. 874).
 • In the 1970s and 1980s, the oil company Exxon was undertaking extensive 
research on the effect of burning fossil fuels on the environment. According 
to a recently published investigation of the company’s internal documents, 
it was found that as early as 1977, Exxon was aware that carbon dioxide 
emissions from fossil fuel use could lead to significant and potentially harm-
ful climate change (Banerjee, Song and Hasemyer 2015). According to the 
investigators, rather than disseminating these findings, the company appeared 
to promote misinformation on the topic in the decades that followed, claiming 
that climate change science was ‘still controversial’ and funding organisa-
tions like the ‘Global Climate Coalition’ that disputed the science of climate 
change (Banerjee, Song and Hasemyer 2015; Hall 2015). Exxon’s response 
to the accusations was to argue that the company has had ‘a continuous and 
uninterrupted commitment to climate change research’ (Onthemedia 2015).
 • In January, 2003, just a few months before the US sent military forces into 
Iraq, US President George W. Bush built his case for invasion in his annual 
‘State of the Union’ address. In the speech, he presented evidence that many 
took to be illustrative of a compelling and imminent security risk posed by 
the Iraqi regime, including a particularly powerful 16-word statement that: 
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4 Introduction
‘The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought 
significant quantities of uranium from Africa.’1 President Bush’s case for war 
was particularly controversial, however, with accusations soon being made 
that the administration misled the public through inaccurate, or potentially 
even deceptive, uses of evidence (cf. Hartnett and Stengrim 2004; Jamieson 
2007; Pfiffner 2004). Indeed, only six months after President Bush made the 
statement above, George Tenet, the Director of the CIA, stated that: ‘These 
16 words [about uranium] should never have been included in the text written 
for the president’ (Tenet 2003).
Evidence matters for public policymaking. Advocates of greater evidence utilisa-
tion commonly point to examples like the first one given above to show how more 
rigorous or more widespread use of evidence could avoid unnecessary harms and 
help achieve important social policy goals. Evidence tells us ‘what works’. Yet 
these individuals also particularly fear and lament what is demonstrated in the 
other two cases – the potential for cherry-picking, obfuscation or manipulation of 
pieces of evidence, done to serve political goals. The misuse of evidence matters 
as well and, for evidence champions, the way to address these concerns has been 
through the use of evidence-based policymaking (EBP), in which policy decisions 
are expected to follow from rigorous and accurate uses of scientific evidence.
Such calls for policies to be evidence-based have proliferated so widely in the 
past few decades as to become a movement unto itself, with calls for increased 
EBP heard within government bureaucracies, academic institutions and the media 
alike. We also see the embrace of so-called ‘hierarchies of evidence’, which have 
been seen as ways to rank or prioritise different types of evidence for policy 
consideration (Nutley, Powell and Davies 2013). These ideas have further led 
to EBP becoming an expectation against which political actors can be judged, 
as seen when criticism has been levelled against governments in cases such as 
the following: the Canadian government pursuing criminal justice policies based 
on an ‘emotionally satisfying tough stance’ instead of an EBP (Adams 2015); 
the Indian government establishing a new Ministry of Yoga without evidence 
of effectiveness (Kumar 2014); or the British government pursuing immigration 
restrictions based on public perceptions of immigrants abusing the benefits sys-
tem rather than evidence showing migrants are less likely to claim benefits than 
nationals (Partos 2014).
We can also see an enormously wide range of policy decisions where calls are 
made to be ‘evidence-based’. Examples include the American Medical Association 
(AMA) arguing that: ‘Laws that regulate abortion should be evidence-based and 
designed to improve women’s health’ (Barnes 2016), the South African govern-
ment pursuing an ‘evidence-based’ approach to its employment tax policy, or a 
British Medical Journal commentary arguing that: ‘Dog ownership has unknown 
risks but known health benefits: we need evidence based policy’ (Orritt 2014).
1 Transcript available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/bushtext_ 
012803.html.
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Introduction 5
Critical voices
Despite this seeming ubiquity of the concept, there is a growing body of academic 
writing that is highly critical of the idea that social policies can somehow sim-
ply be ‘based’ on evidence alone. Authors informed by the policy sciences have 
long recognised that public policymaking is not the same thing as technical deci-
sion making. Rather, policymaking typically involves trade-offs between multiple 
competing social values, with only a very small proportion of policy decisions 
simply concerned with technical evidence of the effects of interventions (Weiss 
1979; Lin 2003; Russell et al. 2008). As early as the 1970s, Rittel and Webber 
declared that ‘The search for scientific bases for confronting problems of social 
policy is bound to fail’ (1973, p. 155), with the authors coining the term ‘wicked 
problems’ to distinguish what makes many social policy decisions particularly 
hard to solve. They explain that:
in a pluralistic society there is nothing like the undisputable public good; 
there is no objective definition of equity; policies that respond to social prob-
lems cannot be meaningfully correct or false; and it makes no sense to talk 
about ‘optimal solutions’ to social problems unless severe qualifications are 
imposed first. Even worse, there are no ‘solutions’ in the sense of definitive 
and objective answers.
(Ibid.)
Given this fundamentally contested nature of most public policy concerns, the 
use of evidence for policy has been described as ‘qualitatively different’ (Black 
2001) than its use in technical decision-making arenas (such as clinical medicine). 
Indeed, over half a century ago, political theorists noted that policymaking cen-
trally involves decisions about what a good society should look like – questions 
that science alone cannot answer (Brecht 1959). As such, calls for policy to sim-
ply be ‘evidence-based’ have been described as ‘naïve rationality’ – incorrectly 
assuming that policymaking is merely an exercise in ‘decision science’, when 
the policy process is, instead, a ‘struggle over ideas and values’ (Russell et al. 
2008, p. 40). As such, some have dismissed the entire idea of EBP as a ‘myth’ 
(Hammersley 2013) – nothing more than a ‘technocratic wish in a political world’ 
(Lewis 2003, p. 250).
These perspectives raise important challenges to many of the contemporary 
calls for public policy decisions to be ‘evidence-based’. This is particularly true 
for highly contested issues where multiple social values and concerns are at 
stake. The AMA’s call for abortion policy to be ‘evidence-based’ to improve 
women’s health, for example, appears to show a remarkable lack of recognition 
of the actual terms of the abortion debate in America. The debate over abortion 
in the US is not over whether or not it leads to health harms for women; rather, 
it is primarily discussed in terms of rights – rights of women over their bodies 
or rights of the unborn. Opponents to abortion do not oppose it because they 
think making it illegal will improve women’s health – they oppose it because 
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6 Introduction
they believe it to be fundamentally wrong to terminate pregnancies. Similarly, 
many supporters of abortion would likely continue to support it as a right even 
if evidence existed that found the procedure to be potentially harmful from a 
health perspective. What an ‘evidence-based’ abortion policy would be there-
fore depends on the social values or concerns one holds to be important – for 
the AMA, it might be health harms, but for many stakeholders, health is not the 
main issue.
A call for policies on dog ownership to be ‘evidence-based’ similarly shows 
how far the EBP concept has been stretched and how flimsy it can be when it is 
subject to some basic questioning. The author of that commentary argues that we 
need EBP based on the risks and health benefits involved. Yet what might such 
evidence look like? And would it naturally lead to an obvious policy choice? In 
the article, the risks are presented as the rare (but often severe) attacks by dogs on 
members of the public, while the benefits reflect psychological well-being of dog 
owners. But even knowing this information, does an obvious ‘evidence-based 
policy’ emerge? Would the risk of bites lead to a policy to ban dogs? To restrict 
their location? To require muzzles? To require licences? To require training? 
The evidence provided cannot decide this on its own. We can also ask if bites 
and psychological benefits are the only pieces of evidence that are relevant for 
an ‘evidence-based’ dog ownership policy. Many dog owners would say they 
love their pets regardless of any health benefits. Should some assessment of this 
be included as evidence as well? What about the carbon footprint of owning a 
dog, the stress levels on local cats or the noise complaints of neighbours? There 
is no obvious indication of which evidence is the right evidence on which to base 
such policy and, indeed, there is likely to be disagreement over the relevance or 
importance of different social policy concerns. Yet what is particularly concern-
ing is that such questions are typically not even asked within many modern calls 
for public policies to be ‘evidence-based’.
A politically informed perspective, then, must begin from a recognition that 
policies typically involve multiple social concerns, and there can be different evi-
dence bases relevant to each one. Many advocates of evidence see the embrace 
of evidence (particularly scientific evidence) as a means to transcend the corrupt-
ing nature of politics – as a means to avoid cases like those at the start of this 
chapter where political influence led to the misuse of evidence. Yet others have 
raised concern about how the EBP language can, in fact, obscure the relevant 
social values at stake when these should instead be transparent. Wesselink et al., 
for instance, explain that: ‘Overt deference to EBP does not remove the need for 
political reasoning; rather politics is introduced “through the back door” through 
debates on what is valid evidence rather than on what values should prevail’ 
(Wesselink, Colebatch, and Pearce 2014, p. 341).
In other words, rather than being apolitical, the appeal to evidence, or to 
particular forms of evidence, can be decidedly political by promoting a de facto 
choice amongst competing values. The politics comes in ‘through the back 
door’ by giving political priority to those things which have been measured or 
those things which are conducive to measuring (Barnes and Parkhurst 2014; 
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Introduction 7
Parkhurst and Abeysinghe 2016). Looking again at the AMA’s brief to the 
Supreme Court from this perspective, we can see that it is making a decidedly 
political argument couched in the language of EBP – specifically, the AMA is 
arguing that the basis of abortion laws should be the principle of medical harms 
to women. Yet while this may be an important social concern and the one on 
which we have the clearest quantitative evidence, others in the abortion debates 
may disagree that this evidence base means it is most relevant or the only issue 
on which such laws should be based.
Two (quite different) forms of bias
The competing perspectives on EBP have, at times, deeply divided individuals 
writing on the subject. Parsons explains that ‘there are profound ontological, 
epistemological and methodological differences between those who believe in 
[EBP] and those who have doubts as to its feasibility or the values it embodies’ 
(2002, p. 45). Some have even referred to the debates between camps as a ‘para-
digm war’ waged between ‘positivist empiricists’ on the one hand and ‘critical 
interpretevists’ on the other (Greenhalgh and Russell 2009).
The critical perspective therefore sees EBP as failing to address the realities 
of policymaking, with some seeing the term as nothing more than empty rhetoric 
(cf. Hammersley 2005, 2013). For evidence champions, the response to these 
arguments has been to dismiss them as overly theoretical and to reiterate the 
point that evidence-based decisions can ensure that we are doing more good than 
harm, pointing to those clear cases where evidence use ‘works in practice’ and has 
improved outcomes or even saved lives (cf. Chalmers 2005). Others who do not 
fall into one camp or the other are often left in the middle, questioning whether the 
realities of policymaking mean that we cannot say anything about how to improve 
evidence use, even if we wish to achieve social goals more efficiently.
Moving beyond this seeming impasse is possible, but it requires recognis-
ing that both perspectives have valid and useful insights to provide. Progress 
requires neither a blind embrace of EBP nor a complete rejection of it as a con-
cept. Instead, this book attempts to move these debates forward by recognition 
that a key problem for both sides lies in the politics of evidence, but their norma-
tive concerns are very different in nature. For champions of evidence, there is 
a problem with the politicisation of science – and the ways that political inter-
ests appear to drive the misuse, manipulation, or cherry picking of evidence to 
promote political interests (Pielke 2002; Wise 2006). This can be otherwise be 
defined as a concern over technical bias in the use of evidence – evidence utilisa-
tion that does not follow principles of scientific best practice (which can include 
invalid uses of individual pieces of evidence, as well failing to systematically 
include all the relevant evidence that best answers a particular question) and 
which therefore leads to poorer policy outcomes than would otherwise be pos-
sible. The critical policy perspective, on the other hand, points to the problems 
caused by the depoliticisation of politics – in particular the ways in which social 
values can be obscured or marginalised through the promotion of certain forms 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 1
94
.8
0.
22
9.
24
4 
at
 0
4:
48
 0
4 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
 
8 Introduction
or bodies of evidence. This is also a form of bias, but can alternatively be termed 
issue bias to capture how evidence utilisation can shift the political debate to 
particular questions or concerns in a non-transparent way. The first form of bias 
broadly reflects the value of scientific fidelity, while the second broadly reflects 
the value of democratic representation.
Defined as such, it becomes clearer that these positions need not be seen as 
mutually exclusive when they are considered based on their normative rather 
than their epistemological differences. In this way, this book takes a decidedly 
pragmatic approach, recognising that both sets of values are important goals 
to pursue within efforts to improve the use of evidence for policymaking. It 
therefore looks to identify ways to address both sets of concerns given the politi-
cal realities of policy processes. From this perspective, however, the goal of 
improving evidence use can no longer be seen as a simple question of doing 
‘what works’. Addressing both sets of issues – and reducing instances or the 
impact of both technical and issue bias – requires moving beyond past efforts 
to simply call for more EBP, greater evidence ‘uptake’ or the blind application 
of evidence hierarchies. Rather, it demands deeper investigation of the politi-
cal origins of bias to help guide efforts to avoid bias or mitigate its impact. 
Furthermore, an explicit desire to improve the use of evidence in policy will 
require the establishment of new principles of what would constitute good evi-
dence to inform policy, as well as considering what constitutes the good use of 
evidence within a policy process.
This approach does not reject the importance of evidence. It accepts that 
there can indeed be more or less technically accurate uses of evidence. Pieces 
of evidence can be manipulated or they can be presented faithfully to their 
findings. Bodies of evidence can be cherry-picked or they can be reviewed sys-
tematically. Research designs can be valid and rigorous or they can be created 
on flawed scientific foundations to achieve a pre-desired conclusion. These are 
all important to address if evidence is to have a future in informing policymak-
ing. Yet this book also understands that policymaking fundamentally involves 
competition between multiple social goals and the pursuit of social values. As 
such, there are additional concerns that this brings to the table, such as which 
social interests are addressed by evidence in the first place, whether these inter-
ests are more or less transparent in policy debates, or if they are pursued through 
more or less representative processes.
This book argues that efforts to improve evidence use will ultimately require 
building systems that work to embed key normative principles about evidence 
utilisation into policy processes – systems that can be said to govern the use of 
evidence within policymaking. Therefore, in order to move the EBP field for-
ward, it is necessary to consider how to establish evidence advisory systems that 
promote the good governance of evidence – working to ensure that rigorous, sys-
tematic and technically valid pieces of evidence are used within decision-making 
processes that are inclusive of, representative of and accountable to the multiple 
social interests of the population served.
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Introduction 9
From EBP to the good governance of evidence
Achieving this requires embracing the political nature of policymaking head-on. 
This book therefore applies a decidedly political perspective (informed by the 
academic fields of public policy and policy studies in particular) that highlights 
two key issues about the nature of public policymaking. The first is to recog-
nise that policy decisions are political because they involve trade-offs between 
multiple competing interests, as noted above. Politics is, as Lasswell famously 
described in the 1930s, about ‘who gets what, when, and how’ (Lasswell 1990 
[1936]). This is what particularly distinguishes policy decisions from technical 
exercises weighing up data on a single agreed outcome. Instead, it is common, or 
indeed the norm, for there to be disagreements in society about which social out-
comes are important or how to value different arrangements of social outcomes.
It is worth noting that from this perspective, evidence is not irrelevant. Evidence 
serves as a tool of measurement. It can help identify who will benefit from dif-
ferent choices or how much different benefits will accrue to different groups. But 
there will also be a fundamental need to have transparency over the different 
social concerns at stake, and recognition of the contestation over how to value 
different outcomes. Evidence cannot tell us which is the right choice between dif-
ferent arrangements of benefits or which social outcomes should be pursued over 
others. Such decisions must be made on the basis of some formal consideration of 
social values, which modern democratic principles would argue needs to be done 
in transparent and accountable ways that serve to represent the public.
The second key approach that the political perspective of this book utilises 
is the recognition that political decisions take place within contextually spe-
cific institutional structures that direct, shape or constrain the range of possible 
policy choices and outcomes. The field of policy studies known as institutional-
ism has developed out of a recognition that political institutional arrangements 
greatly affect policy processes and outcomes, including dictating which issues 
are considered by decision makers, whose interests are represented or the steps 
and processes through which decisions can or cannot be made (Rothstein 1996; 
Peters 2005; Lowndes 2010). All public policy decisions can therefore be seen to 
be made within some form of institutional arrangements, with evidence-informed 
policy decisions being no exception.
These insights provide the basic framework used by this book to address the 
politics of evidence, moving from the idea of ‘evidence-based policy’ and a depo-
liticised and decontextualised search for ‘what works’ to instead consider how to 
establish the good governance of evidence. The first section of the book addresses 
some of the principle issues covered. Chapter 2 explores the need and great poten-
tial of evidence use in public policymaking in more depth. It reflects on the origins 
of the modern EBP concept in the field of evidence-based medicine, the efforts 
made to date to promote evidence use through so-called ‘knowledge transfer’ 
efforts, and the limitations these approaches face given the political nature of poli-
cymaking. It reiterates the need for a political approach that considers multiple 
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10 Introduction
competing values as well as the political institutional context in which decision 
making takes place, particularly exploring what’s wrong with the simple idea of 
doing what works from a policy perspective.
Part II of the book addresses the ‘politics of evidence’ by exploring the politi-
cal origins of evidentiary bias in particular. Chapter 3 discusses the two forms of 
bias – technical bias and issue bias – in greater depth to construct a framework 
on the multiple politics of evidence, reflecting on empirical examples of how 
bias may manifest within the creation, selection or interpretation of evidence. 
Chapter 4 then considers what is termed the ‘overt politics of evidence’ to cap-
ture bias that derives from politically motivated groups pursuing their interests 
in a competitive political arena. It notes that if political debate is about com-
petition and contestation, then there is no reason to believe that adherence to 
scientific good practice will necessarily be a priority for those involved. The 
chapter provides a number of examples to reflect on how the competitive nature 
of policymaking can generate technical and issue bias, such as through pressure 
to show results, efforts to undermine science or appeals to ‘evidence’ as a purely 
rhetorical strategy to gain support. The chapter argues that understanding the 
nature of political competition should make such forms of bias not only more 
evident, but also more predictable.
Chapter 5 then follows with another exploration of the political origins of bias. 
Yet while Chapter 4 discussed what was termed the ‘overt politics of evidence’ 
arising from the direct pursuit of competing interests, Chapter 5 explores what 
is termed the ‘subtle politics of evidence’ that can arise through unconscious 
processes. The chapter draws on cognitive psychological research to provide 
a new perspective on how social values contribute to both technical and issue 
bias, providing a range of examples of how such processes affect politicians, 
laypersons and technical experts alike. The chapter concludes by developing 
a ‘cognitive political model’ of evidentiary bias that maps out how key fea-
tures of policy debates – such as their complexity, their contestation or their 
polarisation – can generate both technical and issue bias through differing mech-
anisms (both overt and subtle).
The final part of the book then turns towards the questions of how to improve 
the use of evidence, given our greater understanding of the origins and manifesta-
tions of technical and issue bias. It argues that this requires the establishment of 
new principles on which to guide such efforts. Chapter 6 begins this by exploring 
what constitutes ‘good evidence for policy’ in order to move beyond technical 
hierarchies that may be insufficient or inappropriately applied from a policy per-
spective. Instead, it draws on a set of academic disciplines (political studies, the 
sociology of knowledge and the philosophy of science) to construct a ‘framework 
of appropriateness’ through which to consider policy relevant evidence (based 
on an earlier discussion in Parkhurst and Abeysinghe (2016)). Within this frame-
work, appropriate evidence is identified as that which speaks to the multiple 
social concerns at stake in a policy decision, which is constructed in the ways that 
are most useful to achieve policy goals, and which is applicable in the local policy 
context. Good evidence for policy is subsequently defined as evidence which is 
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Introduction 11
appropriate according to these conditions and which further meets high quality 
standards from a scientific perspective.
Chapter 7 then addresses the question of what constitutions the good use 
of evidence from a policy perspective. Rather than an exploration of scientific 
principles, however, this chapter particularly engages with democratic theory to 
reflect on what is needed in order for policy decision processes – including those 
involving evidence use – to be seen as legitimate. It utilises three different aspects 
of political legitimacy – input, output, and throughput legitimacy – to construct a 
‘legitimacy framework for the good use of evidence’. This framework identifies 
factors necessary to ensure the democratic legitimacy of evidence advisory sys-
tems, such as requiring evidence providing bodies to have a formal mandate (e.g. 
from government), ensuring that final policy decision-making authority lies with 
representatives of the public, and ensuring public transparency and deliberation 
in evidence-informed policy processes.
Finally, Chapter 8 brings together the multiple concepts addressed in the book 
to consider how to guide efforts to improve the use of evidence in  policymaking. 
First, it discusses a range of institutional changes – both within and external to 
 government – that can potentially help to address the politics of evidence and over-
come bias. It then brings together the multiple normative discussions undertaken 
to construct a final framework of the good governance of evidence (see also an ear-
lier discussion in Hawkins and Parkhurst (2015)). Rather than promoting a single 
model of evidence advice, the chapter argues that in order to ultimately improve 
the use of evidence for policymaking, it is essential to explicitly consider how to 
embed key principles of the good governance of evidence into those institutional 
arrangements shaping how evidence is utilised. Examples from various countries 
are provided, but the chapter ultimately promotes a process of ‘guided evolu-
tion’ that reflects a process of making incremental changes within a local context, 
informed by the principles within the good governance of evidence framework.
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2 Evidence-based policymaking
An important first step and the  
need to take the next
The great potential for evidence to inform public policy
Chapter 1 explained that evidence matters. In many ways, of course, this is 
 self-evident. For any decision and for any course of action, we will want infor-
mation that tells us if we are achieving our goals, or to inform our selection of 
possible strategies to achieve our goals. Evidence is, by definition, what tells us 
these things (even if there may be debate over which goals to pursue in the first 
place). And so, in public policymaking, evidence can be useful for any number 
of decisions – from those as mundane as changing the timing of traffic lights 
to those as profound as a decision to go to war. And yet the rhetoric about the 
need for governments to do ‘what works’ under the banner of ‘evidence-based 
policymaking’ (EBP) has seen particularly widespread growth in recent years 
(Davies, Nutley and Smith 2000b; Nutley, Walter and Davies 2007).
However, this recognition of the usefulness of evidence is not exactly a new 
phenomenon. Some see the idea of EBP dating back at least to the 1950s, reflected 
in the work of American political scientist Harold Lasswell, who worked to iden-
tify the roles that research can play in addressing policy problems (Wesselink, 
Colebatch and Pearce 2014). Others trace a longer lineage. Hammersley, for 
example, claims that: ‘The idea that evidence should inform political and social 
practice can be traced back at least as far as Machiavelli’ (2013, p. 1), while 
Sutcliffe and Court explain that: ‘As far back as ancient Greece, Aristotle put 
forward the notion that different kinds of knowledge should inform rulemaking’ 
(2005, p. 1).
Yet, the modern engagement with the use of evidence to guide social policy 
grew significantly after the Second World War (Nutley, Walter and Davies 2007). 
Pawson and Tilley (1997) have described the growth of social policy evaluation 
and experimentation in the US in particular in this period. They reflect on large 
national programmes in fields such as early year education and crime prevention 
which were set up as experimental trials, as well as efforts to review evidence 
in order to draw lessons of ‘what works’ in these complex social policy realms. 
Berridge and Stanton (1999) similarly note the influence of social programme 
evaluation in the US in the 1960s, as well as other trends, such as the emphasis on 
planning and evaluation of international donor programmes seen in the 1970s, in 
shaping modern ideas of the role of evidence in policymaking.
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Evidence-based policymaking 15
Yet it was in the 1990s that many see the modern EBP movement taking shape. 
Some point to the explicit embrace of the concept by the UK Labour government 
of the time, which declared in its party manifesto of 1997 that ‘what counts is 
what works’ (Davies, Nutley and Smith 2000a; Parsons 2002). Others note the 
highly influential role of the establishment of the Cochrane Collaboration in 1993, 
which was developed to systematically organise and review evidence on medical 
and health interventions to provide a global repository for best practices in health 
care (Starr et al. 2009).
Indeed, the health sector is routinely cited as a key inspiration for many current 
calls for EBP today due to its development of the field of evidence-based medicine, 
which established how the choice of clinical interventions should be informed 
by rigorous research and a systematic review of effectiveness (cf. Berridge and 
Stanton 1999; Lin and Gibson 2003; Smith 2013; Wright, Parry and Mathers 
2007). The US Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy (2015) reflects this desire to 
emulate the medical model when it explains:
In the field of medicine, public policies based on scientifically rigorous evi-
dence have produced extraordinary advances in health over the past 50 years. 
By contrast, in most areas of social policy – such as education, poverty reduc-
tion, and crime prevention – government programs often are implemented 
with little regard to evidence, costing billions of dollars yet failing to address 
critical social problems.
Young further notes that: ‘The perceived success and value of [evidence-based 
medicine] stimulated an increasingly widespread interest in applying its funda-
mental principles to other fields and, indeed, to the realm of policy development 
in general’ (2011, p. 20).
One of the fundamental principles embraced from the evidence-based medicine 
movement has been the use of experimental methods to evaluate interventions 
and measure effect, which has been seen to have revolutionised the medical field 
by serving to identify ‘what works’ in medical treatment. Everything from aspi-
rin for migraines (cf. Boureau et al. 1994) to skin cancer treatments (cf. Robert 
et al. 2015) to the effectiveness of statins for heart disease (cf. Mills et al. 2011) 
have been tested through experimentation to judge their usefulness. Indeed, one 
of the simplest and cheapest medical interventions available – the use of oral 
rehydration solution (ORS) for diarrhoea – has been credited by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) with ‘saving over 50 million children’s lives’ in the devel-
oping world (WHO 2009) after rigorous evaluation showed its usefulness in the 
1970s (Munos, Walker and Black 2010).
And while research evidence can show the benefits of medical interventions, 
evidence can also stop the continued use of harmful treatments. In a historical 
reflection, Howick explains that until the mid-twentieth century, it was likely that 
most medical interventions ‘were no better than placebo or positively harmful’ 
(2011, p. 136). He argues that many medical procedures were only based on con-
ceptual ideas of how something might work and, as such, may have led to more 
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16 Evidence-based policymaking
harm than good. He gives examples such as the advice on the sleeping position of 
babies (based on a flawed theory of the risk of choking) discussed in the previous 
chapter, as well as the historical use of bloodlettings (based on a flawed theory of 
the need to balance the ‘blood humor’) to illustrate the risk of basing interventions 
on hypothetical reasoning alone.
Champions of EBP have argued that just as medical interventions should be 
tested or evaluated using rigorous standards of evidence, so too should inter-
ventions in other social policy realms. Indeed, the perceived successes of the 
evidence-based medicine movement has made the health sector the envy of many 
other policy areas, with calls to embrace the ‘medical model’ now heard in areas 
such as education (Davies 1999; Slavin 2008), criminal justice (Sullivan, Hunter 
and Fisher 2013; Welsh and Farrington 2001), homelessness (Seibel 2011) and 
international development (International Initiative for Impact Evaluation 2010; 
Sutcliffe and Court 2005), amongst others. These ideas have also supported the 
establishment of formal governmental and non-governmental agencies that work to 
increase the use of evidence in policymaking. Examples include: the Coalition for 
Evidence-Based Policy, a US non-profit formed in 2001 ‘to increase government 
effectiveness through the use of rigorous evidence about what works’ (Coalition 
for Evidence-Based Policy 2015),1 Pakistan’s Center for Economic Research 
(CERP), founded by international academic bodies in 2008 with the aim ‘to pro-
mote the use of evidence-based decision-making among actors working towards 
social and economic development’ (CERP 2013) or the UK’s Alliance for Useful 
Evidence, a network that works for ‘improving and extending the use of social 
research and evidence in the UK’ (Alliance for Useful Evidence 2016) – and which 
lobbied to establish the UK’s ‘What Works Centres’, a set of formal bodies cre-
ated by the government to emulate the health sector model in providing guidelines 
and reviews of evidence of public service effectiveness in areas such as education, 
policing, ageing and local economic growth (What Works Network 2014).
However, it is not just any evidence that is promoted by such groups, as it has 
been noted that the term ‘evidence’ can refer to a great many things, ranging from 
tacit knowledge and personal experience to more systematic findings from organ-
ised professional inquiries and the outcomes of experiments (Nutley, Walter and 
Davies 2007; Weiss 1991). Instead, the EBP movement has particularly champi-
oned scientific evidence (arising from research) as the form best suited to inform 
policymaking. The US National Research Council (2012), for example, argues for 
the policy value of scientific evidence as follows:
Science identifies problems – endangered species, obesity, unemployment, 
and vulnerability to natural disasters or bioterrorism or cyber attacks or bul-
lying. It measures their magnitude and seriousness. Science offers solutions 
to problems, in some instances extending to policy design and implemen-
tation, from improved weapons systems to public health to school reform. 
1 As of 2016, this agency has closed, with its core activities integrated into the Laura and John Arnold 
Foundation. See http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/initiative/evidence-based-policy-innovation.
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Evidence-based policymaking 17
Science also predicts the likely outcomes of particular policy actions and then 
evaluates those outcomes, intended and unintended, wanted and unwanted. In 
these multiple ways science is of value to policy, if used.
(2012, p. 7, emphasis in original)
Within these calls for increased use of scientific evidence, once-obscure terms 
such as ‘randomised controlled trial’, ‘systematic review’ and ‘meta-analysis’ 
have also become commonplace. Previously the reserve of clinical, epidemio-
logical or evaluation science, many now argue that controlled experiments and 
evidence syntheses in these forms represent the ‘gold standard’ of knowledge 
upon which policies should be based, sitting at the top of ‘hierarchies’ of evidence 
that are, we are told, best suited to guide decision making (cf. Bigby 2009; Boaz, 
Ashby and Young 2002; Haynes, Goldacre and Torgerson 2012). Later discus-
sion, particularly in Chapter 6, explores some of the challenges in applying such 
ideas to policymaking, but Box 2.1 provides a brief definition of some of these 
terms for readers who are unfamiliar with them.
Box 2.1 Selected evidence terminology
Randomised controlled trial (RCT) (also experimental trial, randomised trial 
or randomised clinical trial (in medicine)): these are experiments conducted in 
which an intervention is tested by randomly assigning some individuals, groups 
or regions to receive the intervention, and other areas not to do so (to be used as 
a ‘control’ group – either getting nothing or receiving another established inter-
vention). In medical trials, this can mean giving some research subjects a new 
drug and others a placebo, while in social policy interventions, it might mean 
giving some regions a new service to compare with other areas that have not yet 
been provided with the service. The RCT design particularly helps to identify 
if an intervention has had an effect on outcomes, because the only difference 
between the (randomly assigned) treatment and control groups should be the 
intervention itself.
Systematic review: a form of literature review that aims to look at all existing work 
published about a topic and that attempts to follow particularly rigorous and trans-
parent steps in doing so, such as identifying how materials will be found, which key 
words will be included and what types of literature will be included or excluded. 
Often these are applied to interventions to identify all possible data about a par-
ticular intervention in order to have the best information about its effectiveness  
(cf. Gough, Oliver and Thomas 2012; Petticrew and Roberts 2006).
Meta-analysis: related to systematic reviews, meta-analysis refers to the process 
of combining multiple studies of the same intervention in order to achieve greater 
certainty or clarity about its actual effect. Often this involves combining data from 
multiple randomised trials in order to essentially have a larger test population and 
larger body of evidence on which to judge intervention effect than would be pos-
sible from any single experimental trial alone.
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18 Evidence-based policymaking
The justification for the embrace of scientific evidence of this kind, of course, 
ultimately lies in the view that more rigorous and systematic uses of evidence 
will improve the effectiveness or efficiency of public policies, just as it has 
improved the effectiveness and efficiency of medical treatment. These forms 
of evidence are particularly placed at the top of so-called ‘hierarchies’ of evi-
dence because they utilise rigorous methodology that is specifically designed 
to test or demonstrate evidence of effect (in the case of RCTs and meta-anal-
yses in particular) and, as such, provide the best evidence of ‘what works’. 
Greater use of evidence such as this is assumed to make it more likely to 
achieve programme goals, to obtain better outcomes for the population and to 
save valuable limited resources by selecting more effective or cost-effective 
solutions to social problems (Chalmers 2003; Davies, Nutley and Smith 2000b; 
Shepherd 2007).
What’s wrong with ‘what works’?
As noted above, given the success of modern medicine, calls and efforts to emu-
late the medical model now abound. For example, in 1997, the President of the UK 
Royal Statistical Society, Adrian Smith, reflected on the Cochrane Collaboration’s 
successes in providing evidence to the medical field by stating:
But what’s so special about medicine? We are . . . confronted daily with 
controversy and debate across a whole spectrum of public policy issues. But, 
typically, we have no access to any form of systematic ‘evidence base’ – 
and therefore, no means of participating in the debate in a mature and 
informed manner. Obvious topical examples include education – what does 
work in the classroom? – and penal policy – what is effective in preventing 
reoffending?
(Smith 1996, pp. 369–370, emphasis in original)
The idea of finding ‘what works’ is no doubt intuitively appealing, yet this quote 
appears to be unaware of the fact that the fields of education and crime prevention 
specifically did attempt to answer these questions with increasingly large experi-
ments and reviews of data in the 1960s and 1970s, finding significant challenges to 
identifying any simple universal solutions (see Pawson and Tilley 1997: Chapter 1 
of which provides a useful historical overview of these efforts). Furthermore, a 
political perspective highlights two key problems with the idea that we can simply 
look for evidence of ‘what works’ to guide public policy. The first, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, is that evidence alone tells us nothing about social desirabil-
ity of that which is being measured, with the desired outcomes much less agreed 
upon for most social policy concerns than for clinical medicine. The second is 
that the language of doing ‘what works’ typically assumes and commonly implies 
a generalisability of effect that, while common in clinical medicine, is much less 
common in other policy relevant interventions.
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Evidence-based policymaking 19
What’s wrong with what works (1): evidence of effect does  
not equate to social desirability
The political perspective used in this book starts from a recognition that 
 policymaking is typically concerned with setting priorities and allocating scarce 
resources. In doing so, policy decisions typically involve choices between options 
containing multiple and competing sets of social values. From this perspective, 
when presented with evidence that something works, the natural response should 
not be to simply do it, but rather to ask: ‘Works to do what, exactly?’ In other 
words, presenting evidence that something is effective does not necessarily mean 
that it is socially important. And yet, in efforts to promote particular forms of 
evidence in order to prioritise policy options, there is a fundamental risk that the 
‘what works’ language confuses certainty of effect with desirability of outcome.
Even within the health sector, a simple example illustrates this point. Below is 
a figure representing the results of a meta-analysis of a drug treatment. It shows 
that this particular drug was tested in no less than 16 randomised controlled trials, 
every single one of which found statistically significant positive effects compared 
to placebo (as indicated by the total point estimate and confidence-interval bars to 
the right of the vertical line in the fourth column).
This is overwhelmingly strong evidence of what works. It is the best-quality 
‘gold standard’ evidence that many suggest should guide policymaking – not just 
one randomised trial, but 16 trials no less, every one of which showed significant 
positive results. So the provision of this drug should clearly be a high priority in 
health programmes and budgets . . . yes?
The answer, of course, is ‘it depends’. It depends on what this drug is for and 
if it represents a social or health service priority. The pharmacologically aware 
reader will have noted that Figure 2.1 below presents data for the drug Sildenafil. 
Figure 2.1 Results of a meta-analysis.
Source: Burls (2001), p. 1005, reproduced with permission.
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20 Evidence-based policymaking
This is sold under the brand name Viagra – a drug that has had a huge amount 
of money spent on it by corporate actors to prove through rigorous evaluation 
methods that it works for overcoming erectile dysfunction. The highest standard 
of effectiveness evidence exists for this drug. But if a government says ‘what 
counts is what works’ without asking ‘to do what?’, does this imply that what 
counts is fixing erectile dysfunction or that this goal should somehow have pri-
ority over the other important concerns the health budget might address, but for 
which there is weaker evidence? This may be an obvious case, but it is used to 
highlight the need to ensure that we do not sacrifice social priorities at the altar 
of methodological rigour.
What’s wrong with what works (2): what works there  
may not work here
The second problem with the ‘what works’ language is that it typically implies 
cer tainty of causality or impact. The allure of the scientific method and rigorous test-
ing of interventions through experimental trials is indeed intellectually seductive. 
Yet one of the most common errors made by those championing EBP is to assume 
that these evaluation methods tell us ‘what works’, with no further qualification 
 mentioned.
The error in such statements is a failure to appropriately consider generalis-
ability. There is a very big difference between finding that something works 
when and where it was done and the much larger (and often more important) 
question of whether it works everywhere and always. For policy relevance, evi-
dence is needed that can provide certainty that an effect can be produced in the 
context where it is implemented. Sometimes this is the case, but often it is not. 
Cartwright and Hardie (2012) elaborate on this point further when they map 
out the differences between the questions of ‘did it work somewhere?’, ‘will it 
work elsewhere?’ and ‘will it work for us?’. RCTs are designed to answer the 
first question, but policy decisions typically require evidence of the third ques-
tion in particular.
This distinction is more technically referred to as the difference between the 
internal validity and external validity of a study. Internal validity is the certainty 
we have that an outcome was, in fact, caused by our intervention. Experimental 
trials, particularly those with a randomly assigned control group (and ‘blinding’ 
to the intervention, such as through the use of a placebo in drug trials), are good at 
ensuring internal validity because they are set up to ensure that the only difference 
between the intervention and control group was the intervention itself. External 
validity on the other hand is the certainty we have that the effect we saw in one 
location would happen elsewhere (i.e. generalisability).
Crucially, external validity does not derive from the method of experimenta-
tion; rather, it is other information we already know that lets us judge whether 
an experiment would work in the same way elsewhere. Consider experiments 
testing new medicines. The reason why we expect generalisability of results is 
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Evidence-based policymaking 21
because drugs work through biochemical and physiological mechanisms, and 
humans share their biochemistry and physiology. There will of course be some 
variance – with factors such as metabolism, co-infections or sex of the individual 
potentially influencing how (or how much) a medicine works. But we have a large 
evidence base about the similarities of human biochemistry, anatomy and physi-
ology worldwide – an evidence base not necessarily derived from experiments, 
but rather from investigations of the human body and its functions. Medical drug 
trials are often assumed to be generalisable (externally valid) because we already 
know that many aspects of the human body function in the same way across a 
wide range of contexts.
However, at the opposite end of the spectrum, we can consider interventions 
where the effects are completely determined by local contextual elements that 
change according to place and time. In such cases, one can undertake experiments 
which are rigorously constructed, but which would not tell us anything outside 
the local context. An example might be in the area of fashion. Hypothetically, we 
could design an experimental trial to evaluate, for example, if changing the length 
of dresses from below or above the knee increases demand and hence sales. This 
experiment might be internally valid – we might have a good amount of certainty 
that any change in sales was due to our intervention. But would this experiment 
tell us ‘what works’ to increase dress sales? Would we expect the same results if 
we did it in different locations (say Sweden versus Saudi Arabia) or in the same 
place at different points in time (say the US in the 1950s versus the 1960s)? The 
external validity of an experiment on something as contextually driven as fashion 
would be very low, because the mechanism by which the intervention (altering 
dress length) causes the effect (sales) is determined by the context. This stands 
in contrast to biological interventions, whereby the biochemical mechanisms 
often remain the same (aspirin does, in fact, work through the same mechanism 
in Sweden as it does in Saudi Arabia and it worked in the same way in 1950s 
America as it did in 1960s America).
When the President of the Royal Statistical Society asked ‘what is so special 
about medicine?’, he apparently assumed the answer was ‘nothing’. But the actual 
answer is ‘quite a lot, really’. Medical interventions are based around biological 
and physiological mechanisms which are widely shared by humans. Many other 
interventions (like those to reduce crime or promote better educational outcomes) 
will function through socially embedded mechanisms that may not be common or 
that at least need some additional information to assume commonality across con-
texts. Medicine provides a great inspiration, but the human body is fundamentally 
different from a social environment.
The language of ‘what works’ therefore risks confusing internal and exter-
nal validity. This, in turn, risks policies failing in practice if an internally valid 
result is assumed to be generalisable without sufficient supporting information. 
The failure to recognise that interventions may work in some places, but not in 
others can also undermine efforts to learn from the mixed results of multiple 
social policy evaluations. Pawson and Tilley (1997) describe this in a classic case 
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22 Evidence-based policymaking
of a 1974 systematic review of efforts to rehabilitate criminal offenders. In this 
review, Martinson (1974) found only ‘isolated’ instances of success. The paper 
was widely interpreted as finding ‘nothing works’ in the field, yet Pawson and 
Tilley note that some crime rehabilitation efforts work for some people in some 
situations. What is critical to know, in those cases, is how mechanisms of effect 
work in different contexts (what works for whom and where) rather than simply 
conducting more and more experiments in the hope of finding the one magic bul-
let that will work for all people in all cases (Pawson and Tilley 1997).
While evaluations remain key to measure if something has an effect, under-
standing mechanisms of effect matter too. Indeed, modern medicine relies 
heavily on understanding mechanisms of effect to know what to evaluate in the 
first place. For example, the most effective treatments for people living with HIV/
AIDS are based on combinations of drugs that inhibit the virus in two or more 
different ways. Some drugs stop the virus attaching to cells, some stop the virus 
integrating into the cell, while some stop the virus replicating. Only by knowing 
mechanisms of how retroviruses (of which HIV is an example) propagate in the 
body could these different types of drugs be developed. So-called ‘mechanistic 
reasoning’ is incredibly important, yet evaluative evidence remains essential too. 
Only by rigorously testing the effectiveness of different combinations of anti-
retroviral drugs could we get to where we are today in HIV treatment, where a 
person receiving treatment for their HIV has a good chance of a long life expec-
tancy (and likely to die of something other than AIDS) (Antiretroviral Therapy 
Cohort Collaboration 2010).
Bridging the gap between research and policy
Despite these problems with the idea of simply doing ‘what works’, the idea has 
been highly influential in supporting a wide range of efforts that aim to increase 
the use of evidence within policy. Such efforts are particularly based around the 
belief that there is a ‘gap’ between research and policy that must be bridged in 
order to achieve the great potential of scientific research evidence (Bennett and 
Jessani 2011; Cairney 2015; Van der Arend 2014). The former director of the 
World Health Organization, for instance, explained that: ‘Scientifically excel-
lent public health guidelines and other reliable information sit inert in journals 
and databases unless there is political commitment . . . to turning knowledge into 
action that will get results on the ground’ (Lee 2003, p. 473). Similarly the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has developed rec-
ommendations for ‘bridging the gap between researchers and policy makers’ 
(UNCTAD 2006, p. 1), explaining that: ‘There tends to be a lack of commu-
nication between researchers and policy makers. Policy makers are not always 
informed about ongoing research and researchers often lack knowledge of the 
most pressing policy questions that they would need to make their research more 
relevant’ (2006, p. 2).
However, this idea of a gap to be bridged dates back at least to the 1970s, when 
Caplan explained that:
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Evidence-based policymaking 23
literature abounds with social scientists [sic] speculations about why informa-
tion they produce has little impact on policy matters . . . the most prevalent 
theory found in this literature may be characterized as the ‘Two-Communities’ 
theory . . . Authors who hold this view attempt to explain non-utilization in 
terms of the relationship of the researcher and the research system to the 
policy maker and the policy-making system.
(1979, p. 459)
This ‘two communities’ model has been the underlying concept behind a veritable 
cottage industry of work dedicated to some form of ‘knowledge transfer’, also 
referred to by linked terms such as knowledge mobilisation, knowledge trans-
lation, knowledge management, knowledge exchange and knowledge brokering 
(Davies, Powell and Nutley 2015; Shaxson et al. 2012). Common strategies under 
these headings particularly try to bring together researchers (or research results) 
and policy decision makers, including: ‘research-push’ efforts to improve the 
dissemination of evidence (such as by writing policy briefs and conducting sys-
tematic reviews); ‘policy-pull’ efforts to strengthen the capacity of policy makers 
to use research (e.g. by training decision makers on how to understand systematic 
reviews); or through ‘bridging the gap’ via linkage and exchange mechanisms that 
facilitate the transfer of information between sets of researchers and policy mak-
ers (Bennett and Jessani 2011; Lavis 2009; Start and Hovland 2004; SUPPORT 
Programme undated; UNCTAD 2006; World Health Organization undated).
There has even been at least one experimental evaluation of knowledge trans-
fer efforts. Structured as a randomised controlled trial, Dobbins and colleagues 
(2009) tested whether different efforts at knowledge brokering were more or 
less effective with decision makers within Canadian public health departments. 
However, the study’s findings were limited. They found no significant effect for 
their primary outcome (the extent to which research evidence was ‘used’ in a 
recent policy decision) and only a secondary effect from providing ‘targeted, tai-
lored messages’ in broader programmatic decisions. The authors explain that the 
impact seen was mediated by the organisational culture of the department, con-
cluding that there is a need for a greater understanding of organisational factors 
and of strategies that meet the needs of specific organisations.
Social science perspectives on evidence use and bridging the gap
The breadth and volume of work in this area has led to a number of attempts 
to review the literature to try to distil lessons of ‘what works’ for knowledge 
transfer, or to identify common ‘barriers’ or ‘facilitators’ to evidence use (cf. 
Contandriopoulos et al. 2010; Davies, Powell and Nutley 2015; Langer, Tripney 
and Gough 2016; Mitton et al. 2007; Oliver et al. 2014). Yet a number of aca-
demic authors have pointed to the conceptual challenges involved in the ways 
that evidence utilisation has been promoted or studied in this field. Oliver and 
colleagues, for instance, undertook a ‘critical analysis of the literature’, which 
concluded that: ‘Much of the research in this area is theoretically naive, focusing 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 1
94
.8
0.
22
9.
24
4 
at
 0
4:
48
 0
4 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
 
24 Evidence-based policymaking
primarily on the uptake of research evidence as opposed to evidence defined 
more broadly, and privileging academics’ research priorities over those of poli-
cymakers’ (2014, p. 1).
Similarly, Smith has synthesised a number of existing reviews to distil the 
most common recommendations to help improve knowledge use, such as ensur-
ing that research is accessible, supporting relationships between researchers and 
decision makers, improving communication channels and providing incentives 
for evidence utilisation (pp. 20–21). But in reflecting on this body of work, she 
also notes that ‘the most popular recommendations . . . focus on mechanisms 
for increasing the chances that particular research projects will be employed 
by policy makers. This is distinct from trying to improve the use of research 
in policy’. She further explains that ‘an assumption which is implicit within a 
great deal of the scholarship on the relationship between research and policy [is] 
that the use of research is a priori a positive outcome’ (2013, p. 23, emphases 
in original).
Indeed, one of the biggest challenges facing the knowledge transfer litera-
ture has ultimately been the fairly simplistic way in which evidence or research 
‘use’ is discussed. Typically ‘use’ is discussed as a single binary variable – as 
if evidence can be ‘used’ or ‘not used’, ‘taken up’ or ‘not taken up’. There is a 
further assumption that all actors would agree that research utilisation is a posi-
tive thing, as Smith explains in the above quote. However, as described in the 
previous chapter, critical authors note that there may in fact be many bodies of 
evidence relevant to a policy decision, with no simple agreement over which ones 
should be used or when. Social scientists have further explained that there can 
be many ways to conceptualise evidence use other than simply the direct uptake 
or implementation of findings from a particular research study. Much writing on 
this subject points to the work of Carol Weiss, who, in the 1970s, constructed a 
framework that classifies seven distinct models of ‘research utilisation’ for the 
social sciences, which are summarised below (Weiss 1979):
1 Knowledge-driven – research identifies problems, through basic science, to 
then solve using applied research (based on a natural science model).
2 Problem-solving – the most common model for ‘research utilisation’ think-
ing, which ‘involves the direct application of the results of a specific social 
science study to a pending decision’ (Weiss 1979, p. 427).
3 Interactive – a back-and-forth process of learning between policy makers and 
multiple sources of information, including research.
4 Political – research used as ‘ammunition’ for pre-decided policy positions.
5 Tactical – research undertaken to deflect criticism or to show that ‘some-
thing’ is being done, even if the findings are irrelevant.
6 Enlightenment – an indirect way through which social science research influ-
ences thinking more broadly or generally, including working to identify 
problems or convert them into ‘non-problems’.
7 Part of the social intellectual enterprise – social science research as an intel-
lectual pursuit of society, responding to the ‘fads and fancies’ of the time.
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In 2007 Nutley et al. further produced a comprehensive volume exploring the 
many ways through which research informs public services. They include Weiss’ 
seven meanings of research use, but similarly describe a number of other typolo-
gies that have been developed over the years. The authors note that a common 
distinction made in such typologies is between instrumental use – seeing research 
directly influence policy and practice – and conceptual use, which captures ‘the 
complex and often indirect ways in which research can have an impact on the 
knowledge, understanding, and attitudes of policy makers and practitioners’ 
(2007, p. 36). Nutley et al. explain that it is policy makers in particular who use 
research in strategic and technical ways, noting that: ‘Policy makers say that while 
research is often interesting and helpful . . . it most often “informs” policy, rather 
than providing a clear steer for action’ (2007, p. 37).
Despite this fairly extensive body of work mapping out the multiple ways in 
which research can be utilised in policy processes, the EBP literature still over-
whelmingly reflects the idea that evidence use is a technical problem-solving 
exercise (Greenhalgh and Russell 2009). However, this focus on problem solving 
shows its limitations quite quickly when considering how few policy decisions actu-
ally fit this model. Cairney, for example, refers to the EBP approach as capturing 
an idea of ‘comprehensive rationality’ of an ‘optimal’ policy process – a situa-
tion which rests on a large number of ‘rather unrealistic assumptions about who 
is involved, what they represent, and the best way to make policy’ (2015, p. 15). 
Similarly, Weiss herself explains that:
It probably takes an extraordinary concatenation of circumstances for 
research to influence policy decisions directly: a well defined decision situa-
tion, a set of policy actors who have responsibility and jurisdiction for mak-
ing the decision, an issue whose resolution depends at least to some extent 
on information, identification of the requisite informational need, research 
that provides the information in terms that match the circumstances within 
which choices will be made, research findings that are clear-cut, unambigu-
ous, firmly supported, and powerful, that reach decision-makers at the time 
they are wrestling with the issues, that are comprehensible and understood, 
and that do not run counter to strong political interests. Because [the] chances 
are small that all these conditions will fall into line around any one issue, the 
problem-solving model of research use probably describes a relatively small 
number of cases.
(1979, p. 428)
Yet, somehow, this ‘relatively small number of cases’ has become the template 
for the vast majority of work aiming to improve how evidence informs policy.
Applying theories of the policy process
To move beyond the simple problem-solving model, some academics have 
looked deeper into the field of policy studies to bring what Cairney (2015) calls 
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the ‘science of policymaking’ to the question of evidence use (see also Lin and 
Gibson 2003; Smith 2013). So, for example, in his recent book, Cairney employs 
a broad body of policy studies theories and concepts in order to help explain evi-
dence use within two specific policy areas – environmental policy and health and 
advocacy. Theories and approaches he draws on include the following:
• John Kingdon’s (1995) ‘multiple streams’ model of policy change and ‘punc-
tuated equilibrium’ theory, which emphasises the time dimension in evidence 
use and recognises that evidence may influence policy at key moments or 
alternatively only after long periods of time.
• ‘Social construction theory’ and the ‘narrative policy framework’, which 
emphasise the importance of the framing of a policy issue in shaping how 
evidence is used or what evidence is seen to be relevant.
• The ‘advocacy coalitions framework’, which highlights how evidence can be 
utilised within a process of policy change that reflects competition between 
rival groups and where policy stakeholders’ belief systems work to shape the 
relevance of evidence.
• Studies of ‘policy transfer, diffusion and learning’, which highlight the impor-
tance of local political context and the generalisability of efforts to replicate 
or emulate policy activities in other settings.
• ‘Complexity theory’, which particularly warns against assumptions of pre-
dictability across decision-making systems (including in the use of evidence). 
A number of features of complex systems that are seen to be relevant to 
shaping how evidence is used include the presence of positive and negative 
feedback processes, the importance of initial conditions and path depend-
ency, and emergent outcomes based on multiple interactions of actors within 
the system.
Smith follows a similar approach, drawing on many of these same policy theories to 
explore how research influences two particular public health case studies: those of 
tobacco control and health inequalities. In her review of policy concepts, she places 
particular emphasis on ideational theories that focus on how policy paradigms, 
policy frames and policy solutions all end up being constructed with reference 
to evidence. She concludes that, for her cases, ‘it makes more sense to study the 
political influence of ideas than evidence’ (2013, p. 108, emphasis in original).
A final example of authors applying policy studies theories to study evidence 
use can be seen in a slightly earlier volume edited by Lin and Gibson (2003), 
which explores evidence use in health policy. In one chapter, for instance, Gibson 
draws on a range of political theories, including David Dery’s idea of ‘organi-
sational epistemology’ and Michel Foucault’s ideas of ‘governmentality’, to 
critique the ‘two communities’ model of evidence use as failing to capture the 
nature of health policy change (Gibson 2003). In the same volume, Lewis utilises 
Kingdon’s ‘policy streams’ model to describe the process of policy change, while 
focusing on argumentation and framing theories to emphasise the importance of 
these discursive practices in shaping evidence use (Lewis 2003).
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It is, perhaps, remarkable to see just how large a number of theories are drawn 
upon to help us understand evidence use within policy decisions. Yet one expla-
nation for this is due to the fundamentally complex and multifaceted nature of 
the policy process into which evidence is expected to fit. Policy change involves 
individuals pursuing their interests, but it also involves networks working 
together, as well as the discursive construction of those interests in the first place. 
Policymaking can be driven by ideas, but it can also be shaped or constrained 
by institutional arrangements. All of these features can therefore be important 
with regard to evidence utilisation, and different theories and models may be 
applied to consider each of them. John (1998) provides a useful overview of 
the different approaches of the field of policy studies, noting that, in addition to 
well- established bodies of theories focusing on interests, ideas, institutions and 
networks, there are also cross-cutting theories of the policy process that have 
been developed to help explain policy change. However, he notes that no single 
one of these can explain all aspects of policymaking; rather, as Cairney (2007) 
has expressed, they provide ‘multiple lenses’ by which to understand different 
 features of the policy process.
Policy theories can therefore be immensely useful in understanding evidence 
use from the perspective of describing policy change. Yet while this book shares 
conceptual origins with some of these other recent works, the focus here is dif-
ferent in one key respect. Other authors have particularly drawn on policy studies 
theories to conduct analyses of the utilisation of evidence in specific case studies 
of policy change. In contrast, this book began from a concern over the political 
origins of the two forms of bias detailed in Chapter 1: technical bias, in which 
evidence is misused or manipulated for political reasons; and issue bias, in which 
appeals to evidence serve to obscure key social values or impose political priority 
in unrepresentative ways. Therefore, our focus here is not so much on empirical 
analysis of a case study of policy change, but rather on addressing the question of 
how to improve the use of evidence in policy more generally.
Taking the next steps to improve the use of evidence
However, improving the use of evidence is a decidedly normative goal. For the 
EBP field, a principal impetus lies in the belief that greater fidelity to scientific 
good practice, reduced manipulation or misuse of evidence and increased applica-
tion of science will lead to improved social policy outcomes – be it in terms of 
lives saved, better educational achievement or reduced criminal behaviour. Yet, 
the discussion above raises fundamental questions about what an ‘improved’ use 
of evidence actually looks like, given the political nature of policymaking. As 
noted by Smith (2013), the EBP movement has championed one particular idea 
which assumes that more use is better use, especially if that evidence comes from 
the top of particular hierarchies. However, previous discussions identified this 
approach as problematic due to the way in which it can, in the name of promoting 
technical effectiveness, work to depoliticise policy debates that need to reflect 
the multiple competing social values of a population. Both sides of this issue are 
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28 Evidence-based policymaking
concerned with the politics of evidence, but they reflect two distinct and equally 
important normative principles: fidelity to science on the one hand and democratic 
representation on the other.
The approach of this book is to consider how to improve the use of evidence 
in reference to both these principles, but with a more explicit recognition of the 
nature of politics that has been missing from much previous work promoting evi-
dence use. The book is therefore normatively oriented and conceptually informed, 
but also aims to be decidedly pragmatic. It does not reject the EBP movement 
in its entirety, even if it is critical of the way in which EBP has at times been 
promoted. Some approaches to evidence use may appear oversimplified or politi-
cally naïve, but this does not mandate a complete rejection of the ultimate goal 
of improving the way in which evidence is used to achieve policy goals. Instead, 
in order to address the politics of evidence – in all its forms – we need to move 
beyond past efforts focusing solely on knowledge transfer, recognising that social 
goals can be contested, and understanding how the pursuit of our values may 
manifest in biased uses of evidence. So while the EBP movement is recognised to 
have taken an important first step in thinking about the need to improve evidence 
use, it is argued here that it is time to take the next steps as follows:
The need to address the political sources of technical and issue bias
Given the EBP community’s concern with the political misuse of evidence, one 
of the most important limitations of current knowledge transfer efforts is their 
inability to actually address the political origins of many forms of evidentiary 
bias. When evidence is misused in technically biased ways, EBP champions decry 
politics as a corrupting influence and argue that if only more evidence were used 
appropriately, this could be avoided. Yet the strategy of providing more evidence 
to policy actors, training decision makers or linking the ‘two worlds’ cannot 
address political bias when such efforts are based upon a problem-solving model 
of evidence utilisation that assumes a universal desire to use evidence accurately. 
Similarly, knowledge transfer strategies are largely unable to address the concept 
of issue bias that can arise when promotion of evidence skews agendas to those 
issues which are measured rather than those which are important to affected popu-
lations. Indeed, from a political perspective, it is not surprising that the Canadian 
randomised trial of knowledge-brokering techniques was unable to definitively 
identify a knowledge transfer strategy as most effective (Dobbins et al. 2009). 
Different policy decisions will require different forms of evidence at different 
times. Nothing can be said to simply ‘work’ to inform policy when the policy 
involves more than a simple technical exercise.
When outcomes are not pre-agreed, the technical solutions promoted by knowl-
edge transfer efforts further risk not only ignoring, but also potentially imposing 
issue bias if they promote a hierarchy of evidence that only speaks to a limited 
selection of relevant policy concerns. Training decision makers about experimen-
tal trials, for example, and emphasising that such trials are the ‘best’ way to make 
policy decisions, can implicitly shift political priorities towards those things on 
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which experiments have already been done or which are conducive to experimen-
tation (things like Viagra). The need to more directly address the political sources 
of both technical bias and issue bias is critical and the second part of this book 
(Chapters 3–5) explores these issues in greater depth.
The need to understand ‘good evidence for policy’: beyond hierarchies
As already noted, one of the most fundamental conceptual holdovers from the 
field of medicine within the EBP movement has been the primacy given to par-
ticular forms of evidence, in particular the randomised trial (Haynes, Goldacre 
and Torgerson 2012; Shepherd 2007) and the embrace of evidence hierarchies. 
Indeed, Annex 1 of Nutley, Powell and Davies (2013) contains a list of 15 exam-
ples of hierarchies or ranking systems to judge evidence that are applied in a 
range of social policy spheres, including health care, education, criminal justice 
and youth services. The authors note that these hierarchies are designed to rank 
evidence based on the study design, but their application has been shown to raise 
a number of challenges in terms of how such hierarchies may ignore other impor-
tant evidence sources, may fail to recognise the need for local applicability or may 
provide an insufficient basis for policy decisions.
The main issue is not that RCTs and hierarchies are inherently flawed, but 
rather that they are being incorrectly applied in many cases if they are used to 
prioritise policy choices. As such, appeals to hierarchies can impose issue bias if 
they result in prioritising those social concerns conducive to experimentation or 
where stakeholders have already conducted experiments (Barnes and Parkhurst 
2014). Over-reliance on hierarchies can also obscure the importance of exter-
nal validity, often failing to explicitly address questions of the applicability 
of findings across contexts. While some authors have noted the limitations of 
hierarchies of evidence in terms of policy usefulness (cf. Cartwright and Hardie 
2012; Parkhurst and Abeysinghe 2016; Petticrew and Roberts 2003), these ideas 
have yet to be taken up widely in the EBP movement. There still needs to be 
critical reflection upon what hierarchies can be used for and what ‘good evi-
dence for policy’ would have to look like if single hierarchies do not meet the 
needs for evidence use within policy decisions. Chapter 6 in particular explores 
this question by defining good evidence for policy based on a concept of policy 
‘appropriateness’. Rather than promoting one hierarchy relevant to a single con-
sideration, appropriate evidence is defined as that collection of evidence which 
addresses the multiple relevant political concerns, which is created to best serve 
policy needs and which is applicable in the local context.
The need to consider the ‘good use of evidence’ with respect  
to political legitimacy
Another relevant challenge to the EBP movement in achieving its ultimate goal of 
having scientific evidence improve social outcomes is to recognise the importance 
of the legitimacy of the decision-making processes utilising evidence. Too often 
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the EBP literature seems to assume that evidence use is a universally embraced 
good thing – that using more evidence, or more of a particular form of evidence, 
will naturally be embraced by all the parties involved. Yet from a policy studies 
perspective, the process by which public policy decisions are made and social 
outcomes are achieved must be accepted as legitimate by the population.
Greenhalgh and Russell explain that: ‘The very expression “evidence-based 
policy making” suggests that there are technical solutions to what are essen-
tially political problems – an assumption that, some have argued, devalues 
democratic debate’ (2006, p. 37). This importance placed on democratic debate 
reflects an understanding that the legitimacy of the decision-making process 
itself can be important to ensure that final policy decisions are respected. Yet in 
the EBP world, almost no attention has been paid to the legitimacy of the pro-
cess through which evidence is applied. The focus has been on research ‘use’ 
or ‘uptake’, with competing political or cultural considerations simply classi-
fied as ‘barriers’ to be overcome, or with ‘resistance’ to evidence explained as 
being due to lack of understanding of the science by the potential beneficiaries 
(Oliver et al. 2014; Oliver, Lorenc and Innvaer 2014; Parkhurst, Chilongozi and 
Hutchinson 2015).
This is particularly striking given that some advocates of EBP have argued that 
evidence use can work to improve governance. The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), for instance, has stated that ‘good- 
governance practice suggests that policy should be based on sound evidence 
derived from rigorous analysis of the available facts on the issue that the policy is 
supposed to address’ (OECD 2013, p. 149). Duckett further notes that the emer-
gence of evidence-based health policy was in part driven by ‘the development of 
greater accountability in public sector management’ (2003, p. xv), and Davies, 
Nutley and Smith (2000b) argue that pressure to embrace EBP can come from an 
increasingly well-informed public. Indeed, the science author Ben Goldacre has 
gone so far as to state: ‘I think we can improve democracy by improving the way 
we use data’ (BBC Newsnight 2015).
But simply using evidence does not necessarily make a decision democrati-
cally legitimate. When pieces of technically valid evidence are used by corrupt 
authoritarian leaders, this illustrates the point. Indeed, the famous saying that 
Italian fascist leader Benito Mussolini ‘made the trains run on time’ serves as 
a warning that technical effectiveness is not a substitute for democratic govern-
ance. The distinction is important and Chapter 7 reflects on what principles of 
political legitimacy applied to evidence use might look like from the perspective 
of democratic representation in particular.
The need to build institutions to improve evidence use
Finally, if the EBP movement is ultimately driven by a concern to use evidence 
to help achieve social policy goals, there will be an obvious need to ensure that 
improvements will have lasting effects over time. However, the vast majority of 
work attempting to promote evidence use through knowledge transfer  mechanisms 
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has consisted of strategies targeting individuals: training researchers in how to 
provide information in more ‘usable’ ways; training decision makers in how 
to find or understand research evidence; or building links between them in a 
particular place and time (Mitton et al. 2007; Nutley, Walter and Bland 2002; 
Ward, House and Hamer 2009). The broader literature in this field similarly often 
focuses on the linking roles that individuals can play – serving as information 
intermediaries, knowledge providers, knowledge brokers and the like – although 
it should be noted that there are some authors who look further to identify how 
organisations might serve knowledge brokering-roles as well (Lavis et al. 2003; 
Lomas 2007; Shaxson et al. 2012).
A heavy focus on individuals as the driving force to improve the use of evi-
dence in policymaking raises two particular issues. The first has to do with the 
roles of researchers, who are under increasing pressure to ensure that the research 
evidence they produce is ‘used’ or ‘taken up’. This risks encouraging research-
ers to have political influence, a role that they are neither trained to do nor one 
that many feel they have the mandate to take on. The second problem is that such 
efforts can have a limited duration of impact, given that both researchers and deci-
sion makers will naturally change over time or move on from existing positions.
An alternative approach is to focus on the institutionalisation of changes 
that serve to improve evidence use, which Nutley and colleagues (2002) have 
similarly argued can help move beyond the individualistic focus of past strate-
gies to link evidence and policy. Indeed, the medical model is seen as being 
so widely successful not only because it trained individual clinicians in evi-
dence-based medicine, but also because it established broader institutional 
arrangements which could promote evidence use of a particular kind, and it 
further established norms and expectations of evidence use that have become 
commonplace in medical practice today.
This is not to say that there are no instances of institutional approaches to 
improving evidence use outside the health sector. The Cochrane Collaboration’s 
success in establishing a repository for evidence of medical effectiveness has been 
emulated in the formation of the Campbell Collaboration, which attempts to simi-
larly build an evidence base on the effectiveness of interventions in other social 
policy fields (Petrosino et al. 2001). There have also been examples of ‘toolkits’ 
designed to serve as good practice guidelines for either researchers or policy-
makers (cf. Bennett and Jessani 2011; Oxman et al. 2009; Start and Hovland 
2004), and there are authors who have explored the role of knowledge brokering 
structures such as think tanks or knowledge translation platforms (Lavis et al. 
2008, 2013; (Mendizabal and Sample 2009) that exist outside of any individual 
knowledge-brokering efforts. These represent important examples, but a much 
more explicit consideration of institutions will be needed by the EBP community 
to improve the use of evidence in social policymaking more broadly. Such an 
approach requires shifting thinking to consider systems of evidence advice rather 
than just targeting individuals as knowledge brokers.
Evidence-advisory systems can therefore broadly be conceptualised as the col-
lection of structural bodies, rules and norms of practice which serve to  govern the 
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ways in which evidence informs policy decisions. These systems can be designed 
to reduce particular forms of evidentiary bias, yet their functioning can also serve 
to embed key principles and best practices of evidence use more broadly as well. 
Chapter 8 concludes this book by reflecting on many of the institutional shapes 
and forms that such efforts can take, noting that no single system or body will fit in 
all countries. Instead it reflects on the need to take steps to incrementally improve 
evidence advisory systems within different country institutional contexts and in 
line with explicit consideration of the normative principles of the good governance 
of evidence developed throughout the book.
Conclusion
This chapter has reflected on how the embrace of EBP, growing from its origins 
in evidence-based medicine, has been an important first step in thinking about 
how to improve evidence use, but we are now at a point where it is necessary to 
move forward. The EBP movement has embraced the social potential of increased 
application of science, but has risked doing so with insufficient understanding of 
the nature of the policy process and the normative concerns inherent to political 
decision making.
This book takes the EBP discussion forward by considering how to improve 
the use of evidence in ways that serve to promote the key normative principles of 
both scientific fidelity and democratic representation. Achieving this will require 
several steps along the way. First, there is a need to understand and explore the 
political origins of both technical bias and issue bias within policymaking set-
tings. Once this is understood, we can then reflect more deeply about how to 
judge ‘good evidence’ within policymaking and the ‘good use of evidence’ from 
a perspective of the decision-making process. It is then necessary to reflect on 
how to achieve sustainable changes to improve evidence use over time in line 
with these multiple principles. This book argues that such an approach requires 
critically thinking about how to go about establishing evidence advisory systems 
that can ensure that rigorous, systematic and valid pieces of evidence are utilised 
within decision-making processes that remain representative of and accountable 
to local populations. This serves as an alternative way of thinking about how to 
improve evidence use, directly addressing the politics of evidence and moving 
from evidence-based policy towards the good governance of evidence.
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The politics of evidence
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3 Bias and the politics of evidence
Two forms of bias
Chapter 1 noted the criticisms levelled at the George W. Bush administration 
for its use of evidence to support the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Yet the 
controversy over the war was just one example of the accusations faced over 
evidence manipulation. The Bush administration was also accused of being 
‘anti-science’ in general, with critics arguing that it routinely ignored evidence 
that did not align with its ideological positions or that it deliberately invented or 
manipulated scientific evidence to suit political goals (cf. Duncan 2007; Mooney 
2006). This led, at the time, for the non-profit Union of Concerned Scientists to 
state: ‘There is a well-established pattern of suppression and distortion of scien-
tific findings’, concluding that the administration was manipulating science to 
‘an unprecedented degree’ (2004, p. 28).
Bush’s successor, Barack Obama, presumably laid out a different approach in 
his 2009 inaugural address when he stated:
The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too 
small, but whether it works – whether it helps families find jobs at a decent 
wage, care they can afford, a retirement that is dignified. Where the answer 
is yes, we intend to move forward. Where the answer is no, programs will 
end. And those of us who manage the public’s dollars will be held to account, 
to spend wisely, reform bad habits, and do our business in the light of day, 
because only then can we restore the vital trust between a people and their 
government.
(White House 2009)
Obama’s invocation of the ‘what works’ language could be seen in many ways as 
a rebuke of Bush’s approach, but the quote also illustrates the powerful ideas that 
appropriate use of evidence can better achieve social goals and, further, can be a 
critical requirement for trust in a democratic society.
Obama’s apparent embrace of evidence has not gone unnoticed. One British 
charity claimed that: ‘President Barack Obama and his administration have devel-
oped and are now implementing the most extensive evidence-based  initiatives 
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42 Bias and the politics of evidence
in US history’ (Haskins and Baron 2011, p. 4). And yet, despite this, the Obama 
administration has not been without its own controversies around evidence use. 
In 2013, for example, the President was criticised over a policy decision to 
impose a minimum age restriction of 15 years for access to emergency contra-
ception (the so-called ‘morning after pill’ or ‘Plan B’), even though the US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) stated that the pill was safe and effective for 
girls of all ages. According to one critical commentator: ‘the Obama administra-
tion stepped in to overrule the FDA – a political overreach that wasn’t based on 
the scientific evidence, but rather [signalled] a decision to disregard it’ (Culp-
Ressler 2013). Eventually a US District Court ordered the Obama administration 
to make the contraception available to younger individuals, claiming that the 
age restriction was ‘politically motivated’ and ‘scientifically unjustified’ (Dennis 
and Kliff 2013).
So what does this tell us when ‘politically motivated’ decisions can come 
from multiple sides of the political spectrum? In fact, the emergency contracep-
tion case highlights three fundamental, but distinct, challenges related to the 
politics of evidence. The first has to do with the concerns of evidence advo-
cates over the ways in which pieces of evidence can be misused in unscientific 
ways for political purposes. In the emergency contraception case, this can be 
illustrated when the White House defended the age limit by stating that ‘[the 
contraception] could be dangerous if misused’ (White House Office of the Press 
Secretary 2013) – a statement that appears to exaggerate the risks, considering 
it was judged no more harmful than other drugs available to teenagers without 
a prescription (e.g. non-prescription painkillers).
The second fundamental challenge has to deal with whether clinical 
evidence – in this case evidence about the safety and effectiveness of the morn-
ing after pill – should be the only criteria on which to base a decision to provide 
it. Those in favour of an age restriction on emergency contraception typically 
do so because they have concerns about governmental involvement in decisions 
that they feel should involve parents. Just because the contraception is safe 
for 14 year olds, there is still disagreement as to whether or not a government 
should make it readily available to 14 year olds without parental notification. 
Whatever one’s position on state versus parental responsibility, what is impor-
tant here is to recognise that this is a decidedly political question with multiple 
issues to consider. Yet a court explicitly ruled that the decision could not be 
political and that the contraception should be provided based on evidence of 
safety alone. However, justifying this position by reference to scientific evi-
dence appears to obscure and exclude the other relevant social concerns from 
the decision-making process.
Seen in this way, technical bias relates to problematic uses of evidence from 
the perspective of scientific best practice. In political settings, evidence advo-
cates see it as a particular problem when evidence is misused to serve political 
goals – what might be considered the politicisation of science. Issue bias, how-
ever, reflects the ways in which the invocation of particular forms of evidence can 
obscure the political nature of decisions and, in doing so, ‘bias’ decisions towards 
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Bias and the politics of evidence 43
particular outcomes – what can be described as the depoliticisation of politics. 
The fact that a choice of evidence can influence decisions is not necessarily a 
problem in and of itself – as policymaking fundamentally requires information to 
help value or measure various options. Yet it is important to recognise whether 
particular pieces (or uses) of evidence work to shift policy priority to one set of 
values over another. So while policy scholars would argue that choice between 
values is in many ways the nature of decision making, issue bias can be seen as 
problematic if it obscures or undermines the explicit consideration of the multiple 
sets of values that are important to the public (see similar points made in Barnes 
and Parkhurst 2014; Russell et al. 2008).
If issue bias systematically arises through practices or norms that routinely 
privilege particular types of evidence, it can further be understood as an exercise 
in political power. This interpretation reflects the work of political scientists Peter 
Bachrach and Morton Baratz, who studied power outside traditional decision- 
making processes such as legislative voting or elections. The authors coined the 
term ‘mobilization of bias’ specifically to refer to how power can be exercised 
through: ‘[a] set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures 
(“rules of the game”) that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of 
certain persons and groups at the expense of others’ (Bachrach and Baratz 1970, 
p. 43). Promotion of particular norms of evidence use can do just this – working 
to set these rules of the game in policy decisions informed by evidence – and 
 champions of EBP must be aware of the political implications of doing so.
Returning to the emergency contraception example, it is worth noting that the 
US presidency is a decidedly political role, tasked with representing the public’s 
views and values as such. The FDA, on the other hand, is a technical agency 
tasked with the regulation and provision of expert advice on issues of public 
health, while the courts are judicial bodies tasked with overseeing or hearing chal-
lenges about the legality of particular policy decisions. It is also worth recognising 
that the US Constitution provides many of the rules by which these branches 
of government interact, and determines when and how courts can over-rule the 
executive. In other countries with differing governance arrangements, there will 
naturally be differences in how evidence is brought to bear in political decision 
making and the roles that courts or technical agencies can play.1
In the emergency contraception case, a court ruled that a social policy decision 
must not be ‘politically motivated’. But while this may have been done under the 
rubric of embracing evidence, the political result was that the court effectively 
took two social concerns – safety and effectiveness – and ruled that these alone 
should be the basis of the decision, thereby forcing the administration to disre-
gard any other political concerns (such as parental involvement for contraceptive 
choices of minors). When viewed from a technical perspective, the administra-
tion’s claims that it might be ‘dangerous’ for youth to have access to the drugs 
1 More on the governing arrangements shaping evidence use is discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, and 
interested readers can see the work of Jasanoff (1987, 2006) for greater exploration of how political 
cultures and constitutional structures affect science policymaking.
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44 Bias and the politics of evidence
appears to be biased, but viewed from a political perspective, the court appears to 
have made a decision over which social values to prioritise, introducing a differ-
ent form of bias over the issues considered.
However, a third key challenge that this example illustrates is the question 
of whether it is within the authority of the courts to make such a decision in 
the first place. This reflects a concern with the legitimacy of the process through 
which evidence is used – which includes issues of who should be making the deci-
sions over which evidence to use and when particular forms of evidence should 
determine policy decisions. This chapter begins our exploration of the politics of 
evidence by exploring the nature of both technical bias and issue bias. The follow-
ing chapters will investigate the origins and mechanisms by which those forms 
of bias arise. Subsequently, the final section of the book will discuss the systems 
that govern evidence use, which includes consideration of the legitimacy of the 
evidence-to-policy process.
Technical bias
The previous chapter noted that one of the biggest challenges to the EBP move-
ment is how it has typically assumed that evidence can have specific and direct 
implications to inform policy action. This reflects what Carol Weiss (1979) has 
described as a ‘problem-solving’ role for research (more recently described as 
‘instrumental’ use in Weiss 1998). However, as detailed in Chapter 2, Weiss is 
widely cited for having described a number of other ways in which research influ-
ences policy, noting that the problem-solving role of research will only be relevant 
to a fairly limited number of cases where there is already agreement on policy 
goals (Weiss 1979). For years, Weiss’ framework has been applied to critique 
the idea that evidence can simply tell us ‘what works’ to solve policy problems. 
Yet even with this limitation in mind, there remain a number of valid concerns 
about the problematic uses of evidence voiced by EBP advocates. Indeed, while 
evidence may not tell us what is the right thing to do at all times, there are still 
more or less valid ways to use evidence. Pieces of evidence can be scientifically 
robust or they can be methodologically flawed. Findings from research can be 
interpreted in ways that are true to their methods or that are inconsistent with 
their conclusions. And bodies of evidence can be reviewed rigorously or cherry-
picked strategically. All of these examples of poorer practice can genuinely be 
problems for policymaking, and the set of ways in which scientific best practices 
are contravened provides the overarching conceptualisation of what is referred to 
here as technical bias.
However, technically biased uses of evidence can actually take a number of 
forms, and in the following we highlight three particular stages where these can 
arise: in the creation of evidence, in the selection of evidence and in the inter-
pretation of evidence. Distinguishing these is not only important in helping us 
identify and classify instances of technical bias, but it can also be useful to help 
explore the various origins of bias and, as such, to guide efforts aiming to reduce 
its incidence or impact (this is explored in greater depth in Chapters 4 and 5).
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Bias and the politics of evidence 45
Technical bias in the creation of evidence
In some cases, research evidence may be judged as biased simply due to the way 
in which it was created. According to established ideas of good scientific prac-
tice, research should be conducted from an impartial position, designed to test 
hypotheses or create new ones, without any personal or political goal influenc-
ing the research design (Begley 2013; Douglas 2015). Yet we can see numerous 
cases where policy-relevant research is undertaken in ways that are structured to 
provide a particular answer or are strategically manipulated to produce desired 
outputs. Some of the most obvious examples of this can be seen when corporations 
or private sector actors have undertaken research designed to produce favour-
able results to support their products. In their 2001 book, Rampton and Stauber 
provide a sweeping depiction of the ways in which industry actors manipulate 
science and research for their own interests. They argue that there is a ‘systemwide 
bias that industry funding creates among researchers in commercially profitable 
fields’, further noting that ‘a host of techniques exist for manipulating research 
protocols to produce studies whose conclusions fit their sponsor’s predetermined 
interests’ (2001, p. 217).
One corporate sector particularly renowned for its manipulation of research 
has been the tobacco industry. In 1998, a landmark court case in the US state of 
Minnesota forced six tobacco companies to place millions of pages of internal 
documents and correspondence in publicly accessible repositories for a period of 
ten years (Hurt et al. 2009). A number of studies were subsequently conducted to 
analyse these documents, revealing a range of strategies taken by tobacco compa-
nies to create and manipulate research evidence in order to deliberately mislead 
the public on the harms of smoking (Bero 2005; Cummings, Brown and O’Connor 
2007). In one example, Wertz and colleagues (2011) found evidence showing 
how the Phillip Morris company undertook research on the harmful effects of cig-
arette flavour additives, revealing that the company adjusted its data and changed 
its study protocols after initial statistical findings showed harmful effects. The 
authors claim that the company specifically designed studies to be underpow-
ered to reduce the number of significant findings that could arise. In another case, 
Tong and Glantz (2007) describe ‘design bias’ in industry-sponsored research 
that looked at whether spouses of smokers had higher rates of heart disease. By 
strategically choosing how exposure was defined, the research found no statistical 
association between second-hand smoke and heart disease.
The tobacco industry example is perhaps the most striking because it is a clear 
case of where an industry has produced a product known for years to be harm-
ful (Cummings, Brown and O’Connor 2007), but deliberately undertook research 
designed to sow doubt about this in order to resist policies of regulation. Yet stra-
tegic creation of evidence is not unique to this case. Rampton and Stauber (2001) 
and Goldacre (2014) have both accused the pharmaceutical industry, for example, 
of strategically manipulating research to produce favourable results or to hide 
unfavourable results in order to maximise their profits. In theory, pharmaceuticals 
are designed to be beneficial to health, and new drugs should be rigorously tested 
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46 Bias and the politics of evidence
to ensure they are more beneficial than other alternatives. Yet Goldacre argues: 
‘Drugs are tested by the people who manufacture them, in poorly designed trials, 
on hopelessly small numbers of weird, unrepresentative patients, and analysed 
using techniques which are flawed by design, in such a way that they exagger-
ate the benefits of treatments’ (2014, p. xi) Such claims may appear bold, but 
they appear to have some empirical validation. Fries and Krishnan (2004), for 
example, conducted a study which analysed research presented to a rheumatology 
conference. They looked to see whether drug trials supported by industry funding 
were more likely to show positive results, finding that 100 per cent of the included 
studies funded by the industry were positive. The authors concluded that it was 
not simply selection bias, whereby favourable studies were presented at the con-
ference, but also design bias, indicating that the trials themselves may have been 
specifically constructed to produce these results. This finding corresponds to other 
reviews that have consistently found that industry sponsorship of drug research 
increases the likelihood of positive findings being reported (Bekelman, Li and 
Gross 2003, Lundh et al. 2012).
Another example that has appeared in popular media can be seen in the 
case of the anti-depressant drug paroxetine – sold as Paxil by the company 
GlaxoSmithKline. According to news-magazine The Economist: ‘By the early 
2000s [Paxil] was earning the firm nearly $2billion a year. It was being pre-
scribed to millions of children and teenagers on the basis of a trial, called Study 
329, which suggested it was a good treatment for depressed youngsters’ (2016, 
p. 82). Yet according to a 2015 re-analysis of the trial data, the drug had actually 
showed no significant improvements over placebo in all its primary or second-
ary outcomes of interest (Le Noury et al. 2015). Rather, GlaxoSmithKline has 
been accused of ‘outcome switching’ in which researchers kept looking for new 
outcomes mid-trial to find something to show statistically significant results, 
which were then published as if they were the original goals all along (The 
Economist 2016). However, also particularly worryingly in this case was an 
apparent miscoding of serious suicide attempts in the trial, making the drug 
appear no more risky than placebo when, in fact, it may have increased suicidal 
episodes (Le Noury et al. 2015). While the company has not admitted liability, 
articles describing the case paint a picture of a drug company manipulating data 
to make billions of dollars from a drug that is no more beneficial than placebo, 
but that potentially increased the risk of attempted suicide amongst millions of 
depressed young persons for more than a decade. The case led to the largest ever 
regulatory fine of a pharmaceutical company in the US (US$3 billion) and led 
one journalist to comment that this case ‘appears to be a direct demonstration 
of how a company and researchers can misinterpret the data to make a bad drug 
look good’ (Dobbs 2015).
Yet it is not only corporate actors who may create evidence in biased ways. 
There have always been cases of individual scientists undertaking flawed 
research or following unscientific practices as well – driven by career ambi-
tions, financial interests, or ideological goals. Indeed, one systematic review 
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Bias and the politics of evidence 47
found that, in anonymous surveys, nearly 2 per cent of scientists admitted hav-
ing ever falsified data, with nearly 34 per cent admitting other forms of research 
misconduct such as ‘modifying results’ to improve outcomes (Fanelli 2009). 
There can even be entire fields of research that are controversial and judged 
as technically biased by the nature of their approach. ‘Creation research’, for 
example, is a body of work that has grown in recent years (particularly in the 
US) that seeks to provide evidence that supports the belief that the earth was 
created by a divine power a few thousand years ago (the ‘young earth’ hypoth-
esis). However, this field of work has been criticised as fundamentally flawed, 
in part due to its explicit goal to prove a pre-determined position – that is, to 
prove biblical literalism – rather than to use evidence without prejudgement 
(Pigliucci 2002).
Technical bias in the selection of evidence
While the above cases illustrate how the research process can be manipulated to 
create biased evidence, technical bias can also occur in the selection of evidence, 
when a body of (potentially technically valid) evidence is cherry-picked so as to 
only highlight those pieces of evidence which support a desired outcome. This is 
particularly a problem in policy debates touching on complex or uncertain issues, 
as in such situations there can be many pieces of relevant information, and such 
information may be contradictory. Indeed, it is very rare to have all evidence 
and all studies showing the same outcomes or the same direction of effect in any 
scientific field of enquiry. Often there is a range of findings, and it is necessary 
to look at the totality of the evidence to discern a pattern or overall trend. This is 
frequently why systematic reviews of research are so important in the EBP field, 
as they aim to follow explicit steps to ensure that all relevant evidence is consid-
ered. Yet in contested political debates, we often see the opposite occurring. The 
selective use of pieces of evidence allows groups to focus on different facts in line 
with their political needs and goals.
Biased selection of evidence is perhaps no more apparent than in the debates 
over climate change, where accusations of cherry-picking have appeared on all 
sides of the policy spectrum. The Institute of Climate Studies, for instance, has 
argued that global warming sceptics cherry-pick data to select limited range 
time periods of eight, ten or 12 years that might show no increase in global 
surface temperature, yet it argues if one includes all data from 1970 to the pre-
sent day, a very clear increasing trend can be seen (Institute of Climate Studies 
2013). Alternatively, in a post for the ‘Global Warming Policy Forum’ (an 
organisation that defines itself as sceptical of climate change data), Whitehouse 
(2014) makes almost the identical critique of the Committee on Climate 
Change, claiming it cherry-picked data by choosing start years for a trend anal-
ysis which over- emphasise increasing temperature trends. In effect, both sides 
are accusing each other of the same strategy to select evidence in technically 
biased ways.
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48 Bias and the politics of evidence
There are, of course, more or less systematic and robust ways to interpret 
 climate data, and a number of professional scientific bodies have put their voice 
behind claims that climate change is indeed real (cf. Joint Academies of Science 
undated). Yet it is not only complex problems such as this that can demonstrate 
biased selection of evidence. The same can also be seen in more mundane cases 
and, indeed, may be a routine approach taken by policymakers at times. The 
oft-lamented concept of ‘policy-based evidence making’, for instance, captures 
the way that politicians have (at times) actively called for evidence to support 
pre-existing policy plans or ideas. The Chief Scientific Officer to the European 
Commission, Professor Anne Glover, specifically criticised this phenomenon 
when, speaking in 2014, she stated: ‘Let’s imagine a Commissioner over the 
weekend thinks, “Let’s ban the use of credit cards in the EU because credit cards 
lead to personal debt”. So that commissioner will come in on Monday morning 
and say to his or her Director General, “Find me the evidence that demonstrates 
that this is the case”’ (EurActive.com 2014).
While Professor Glover presented a hypothetical case, one does not need 
to look far to find examples of political officials accused of doing this in prac-
tice. Chapter 1 discussed the case of the George W. Bush administration being 
criticised for apparently cherry-picking or manipulating evidence to justify the 
2003 Iraq war (cf. Hersh 2003; Pillar 2006; Van der Heide 2013). The admin-
istration was also accused of selective uses of evidence and the appointment of 
biased advisors to justify policy positions on issues ranging from sexual health to 
environmental protection (Gordon, Smyth and Diehl 2008; Union of Concerned 
Scientists 2004).
Clearly, it is not just in the US that this can occur. In the UK, for instance, 
the Labour government of 1997–2010 explicitly embraced the language of evi-
dence, famously stating in its party manifesto that ‘what counts is what works’. 
Yet even under this rhetorical banner to embrace evidence, a report of the House 
of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology found that civil serv-
ants serving the Labour government were ignoring data that did not suit policy 
objectives (Giles 2006). The report gives a particularly poignant example of how 
commissioned research by civil servants could illustrate both biased creation and 
selection of evidence, stating:
we were extremely concerned to hear allegations from certain academics that 
departments have been commissioning and publishing research selectively 
in order to ‘prop up’ policies. Professor Tim Hope, a criminologist from the 
University of Keele who has worked with the Home Office, told us: ‘it was 
with sadness and regret that I saw our work ill-used and our faith in govern-
ment’s use of evidence traduced’. Of two case studies looking at burglary 
reduction commissioned by the Home Office, Professor Hope told us that 
the department decided to only write up one: ‘Presumably . . . because the 
area-wide reduction was greater here than elsewhere.’ Professor Hope also 
accused the Home Office of manipulating the data so as ‘to capitalise on 
chance, producing much more favourable findings overall’, despite the fact 
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Bias and the politics of evidence 49
that ‘for individual projects, the [Home Office] method produces consider-
able distortion’. Furthermore, Professor Hope alleged that the Home Office 
had interfered with presentation of research findings by other researchers.
(House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee 2006, pp. 49–50)
Strategic uses of evidence and ‘policy-based evidence making’ can therefore be 
seen as a problem cutting across party ideologies and national borders alike.
Technical bias in the interpretation of evidence
The third way in which technical bias can arise is in the interpretation of evidence, 
whereby invalid conclusions are drawn from an otherwise comprehensive body of 
existing data or evidence. More simply, this would reflect cases where evidence is 
taken to say something that it, in fact, does not.
Correlations interpreted as causal
Such errors are incredibly widespread and do not necessarily have political origins. 
We seem to need constant reminding, for instance, that ‘correlation does not equate 
Figure 3.1 Correlation does not mean causality: example.
Source: Obtained from http://www.venganza.org/images/spreadword/pchart1.pdf, reproduced with 
permission.
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50 Bias and the politics of evidence
to causality’ – as it is so common that individuals make this error of interpretation. 
Indeed, a widely distributed graph developed by the ‘Church of the Flying Spaghetti 
Monster’ serves as a reminder of the fallacy of assuming causality, as it illustrates 
that average global temperature shows a strong statistically significant correlation 
with falls in the global number of pirates since the early nineteenth century. 2
This is a humorous example, yet inaccurate causal assumptions can have very real 
consequences in public policy realms. One example of this can be seen in the field 
of HIV/AIDS prevention. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, AIDS grew to be one 
the biggest causes of premature death in Africa and one of its greatest development 
challenges. As such, there has been a tremendous amount of work undertaken to try 
to understand how to prevent the spread of HIV, along with searches for examples 
of ‘what works’ for HIV prevention. In the 1990s and 2000s, the two most famous 
cases of HIV success in Africa were Uganda and Senegal – Uganda for being the 
only African nation to see falling HIV prevalence over time and Senegal for keep-
ing its HIV rates low in the first place. As such, it has been natural to look to these 
countries for lessons of success, but some of the resultant claims in these cases have 
been shown to be based on incorrect assumptions of causality (Parkhurst 2013).
In the early years of Uganda’s success, for instance, claims were often made that 
it was particular programmes of the government, such as the national  ‘multisectoral 
approach’ launched in 1993, that explained the falling HIV rates of the 1990s. This 
helped support a rapid emulation of this approach elsewhere, with multisectoral 
HIV/AIDS programmes being particularly popular in the 1990s and early 2000s 
in many countries (Putzel 2004). Yet epidemiological models of HIV show that 
population prevalence rates will only fall several years after any change in people’s 
behaviour (UNAIDS and Wellcome Trust 1999). As such, declines in prevalence 
beginning in Uganda in the early 1990s could not have been due to policy inter-
ventions occurring at the same time. Rather, they would have reflected a range of 
population-wide behaviour changes that occurred several years earlier – i.e. they 
could not have been due to the 1993 programme (Kirby 2008; Parkhurst 2002). 
So even though Uganda saw falls in its HIV prevalence rates, the policy lessons 
learned could be technically inaccurate when temporal correlations (policies occur-
ring at the time of prevalence falls) were assumed to be causal (Parkhurst 2002).
Senegal has widely been presented as the other African HIV success story due 
to the country maintaining a low HIV prevalence over time. As with Uganda, there 
have been claims about the policy actions that ‘worked’ in this case, with the for-
mer head of the UNAIDS programme and colleagues explaining: ‘An important 
factor in Senegal’s success at keeping HIV prevalence low, contrary to much of the 
surrounding region, is the active involvement of religious leaders as part of a sus-
tained effort at society wide mobilization’ (Piot, Seck and Marie 2001, p. 1108). 
Senegal’s success was also particularly credited to an early and active response by 
the government by the UNAIDS programme (UNAIDS 1999).
2 Many other ‘spurious correlations’ can be seen in a book by Vigen (2015), including how bedsheet 
suffocation and strangulation deaths are highly correlated with US cheese consumption, and acciden-
tal swimming pool drownings are correlated with the number of films made by actor Nicolas Cage.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 1
94
.8
0.
22
9.
24
4 
at
 0
4:
48
 0
4 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
 
Bias and the politics of evidence 51
If we look more specifically at the Senegalese data, we can indeed see how 
it appears particularly remarkable if compared to some of the other countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa facing much larger HIV epidemics. Figure 3.2. below 
illustrates this, comparing Senegal’s HIV prevalence over time to a set of higher-
prevalence countries.
Comparing Senegal to countries such as Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia 
would naturally give the impression that it must have done something that 
‘works’ – and the early and inclusive political response from the Senegalese 
government would be a natural explanation as the cause. Unfortunately, a com-
parison such as that presented in Figure 3.2 would reflect a technically biased 
interpretation of the data based on an incorrect counterfactual. The assumption 
implied in this figure, and within the statement of Piot and colleagues quoted 
above, is that HIV rates would naturally have been much higher. However, none 
of these African countries with very high HIV prevalence are anywhere near 
Senegal geographically. Senegal is located in West Africa, while the highest 
HIV rates on the continent have occurred in East and Southern Africa. If we 
instead compare Senegal’s HIV prevalence to the countries that border Senegal 
(which did not have notable early or widespread political responses), we see that 
Senegal, 0.7
Tanzania, 6.1
Zambia, 13.0
Botswana, 26
0.0
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
Adult HIV prevalence (%), select countries
A
d
u
lt
 H
IV
 p
re
va
le
n
ce
 e
st
im
at
e
2010 estimates (%)
Figure 3.2 Senegal’s HIV prevalence over time compared to other select countries.
Source: Based on data from www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/datatools; figure updated and adapted 
from Parkhurst (2013).
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52 Bias and the politics of evidence
most of these countries also had low HIV prevalence and one (Mauritania) had 
almost identical prevalence to Senegal.
This figure gives a much more realistic presentation of Senegal’s success. 
It illustrates that while Senegal did indeed see low prevalence rates, there is 
simply not a lot of HIV in that part of West Africa. Tanzania is shown for com-
parison, but it lies almost 6,000 km away from Senegal, slightly farther than 
the distance from Senegal to Iceland. Senegal and neighbouring Mauritania, on 
the other hand, had nearly identical prevalence rates over this period. Guinea-
Bissau shows the highest levels of the group, but it is also worth noting that 
these data are estimates as of 2016. In fact, when many claims of Senegal’s 
success were being made, the estimates of most of its neighbours were sig-
nificantly lower, which would give even less reason to think that Senegal was 
successful at the time (e.g. a UNAIDS document on Senegal’s success was 
published in 1999, when none of Senegal’s neighbours experienced HIV preva-
lence higher than 2 per cent). Compared to most of its neighbours, Senegal does 
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Figure 3.3 Senegal’s HIV prevalence over time compared to its neighbours.
Source: Based on data from www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/datatools; figure updated and adapted 
from Parkhurst (2013).
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Bias and the politics of evidence 53
have slightly lower HIV prevalence in the early years, but these differences are 
reasonably small – and it makes it harder to hold Senegal’s political response as 
a strong example of ‘what works’ in African HIV prevention, as has often been 
done (cf. UNAIDS 2012).
Misinterpreting risk statistics
Another example of biased interpretation of evidence that can have important 
policy implications is in the misunderstanding of risk statistics. A particularly 
persistent example of this can be seen in the regular confusion between absolute 
risk and relative risk of an outcome occurring. Absolute risk is the chance of 
something actually happening, while relative risk is the difference in the chances 
of it occurring between two comparison situations. Members of the public may 
not be so clear on this distinction, and while research studies often report relative 
risk in their findings, media coverage of research findings can often be unclear. 
So, for example, a recent news story reported that people who drink one sugar-
sweetened beverage per day have ‘an 18 percent increased risk of developing 
[Type 2 diabetes] over a decade’ (Aubrey 2015). This does not mean that 18 per 
cent of the people who drink these beverages will contract diabetes; rather, it 
means that the chance of contracting diabetes was 18 per cent higher (Imamura 
et al. 2015). If someone already had a 10 per cent chance (absolute risk) of con-
tracting Type 2 diabetes, then the daily drinking of sugar-sweetened beverages 
would raise their absolute risk to 11.8 per cent (11.8 per cent being 18 per cent 
higher than 10 per cent).
However, confusion in risk statistics can be critical for policymaking, as the 
perceived chance of something occurring is particularly important to help decide 
the political priority of an issue. If a condition is very rare, then a large increase 
in relative risk still may not actually warrant a high priority policy response – 
e.g. if we imagine we have a one-in-a-million chance of contracting a rare life-
threatening disease, this is a risk of 0.0001 per cent. A news story that reports 
on a 50 per cent increase in risk might sound dramatic, but if that were the rela-
tive increase, it would mean our absolute risk of contracting the disease rises to 
0.00015 per cent – or one-and-a-half-in-a-million. We would then justifiably 
need to ask if such a change warrants significant policy attention.
It is unfortunately common to see no distinction between relative and absolute 
risk, even though the implications can be huge for how important the issue is 
for public action. Indeed, at times we are simply told that something ‘increases 
risk’, without specifying either the relative or absolute figures. An example of this 
can be seen when the UK’s BBC News reported that there was ‘cancer risk even 
from light drinking’ (Roberts 2015), giving no specific figures on the risk levels 
involved. The article did link to the original research (see Cao et al. 2015), but 
without any indication of the relative and/or absolute risks involved, a headline 
about alcohol leading to cancer risk serves simply to invoke an emotional reaction 
and prohibits an informed analysis of the actual situation, perpetuating ignorance 
or confusion over the various meanings of ‘risk’.
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54 Bias and the politics of evidence
There are of course a number of other ways in which evidence can be inter-
preted in a technically biased fashion. Non-significant statistical findings may be 
understood incorrectly as if they are somehow significant. Alternatively, results 
that do show statistical significance may be assumed to represent ‘fact’ when the 
result still could be due to chance. Indeed, if a research study does many tests on 
its data at a 5 per cent level of significance, one would still expect one out of 20 
such tests to show significance through random chance alone. However, the use of 
technically biased evidence, of all the kinds discussed, can have obvious negative 
implications for policymaking. It can mislead the public, it can serve to promote 
the interests of powerful groups controlling information and it can result in less 
effective or potentially harmful policy choices than if technically valid evidence 
were utilised. These are fundamental concerns within the EBP movement in their 
calls to improve evidence use and, given the frequency of technical bias, there is 
good reason for such concerns.
Issue bias
A second form of bias to consider, however, is that of issue bias. Albert Einstein 
is often quoted as having said ‘not everything that can be counted counts, and not 
everything that counts can be counted’. Unfortunately, this seems to be an incor-
rect attribution,3 as the quote actually appears to come from sociologist William 
Cameron, who wrote:
It would be nice if all of the data which sociologists require could be enumer-
ated because then we could run them through IBM machines and draw charts 
as the economists do. However, not everything that can be counted counts, 
and not everything that counts can be counted. 
(Cameron 1963, p. 13, emphasis added)
Such an error in attribution could be seen as an example of technical bias. It is 
technically incorrect if we say that Einstein was the origin of this expression. But 
the implication of the quote, regardless of who said it, takes us to the heart of issue 
bias. Fundamentally, calls for policy to follow or be based on particular forms of 
evidence risk insisting that policy be directed based on what has been counted, not 
necessarily what counts. However, issue bias can also manifest itself in different 
ways – in either the creation, the selection or the interpretation of evidence.
Issue bias in the creation of evidence
As with technical bias, the first manifestation of issue bias can be in the creation 
of evidence itself. Nancy Krieger, a social epidemiologist, has noted that: ‘If you 
don’t ask, you don’t know, and if you don’t know, you can’t act’ (1992, p. 412) – 
fundamentally capturing the importance that the choice of research question can 
3 See http://quoteinvestigator.com/2010/05/26/everything-counts-einstein.
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Bias and the politics of evidence 55
have in shaping future policy action alternatives. In contrast to the previous con-
cern over scientifically flawed research design, then, this section reflects on how 
choices made over what issues to research, how to study them and what ques-
tions to ask within a study can have political implications, even if the research is 
 conducted in rigorous and valid ways.
Generating evidence through research takes time and money, both of which 
are finite. As such, the choice of what social issues to study requires some level 
of prioritisation or selection between alternatives. Decisions over when and 
where to do research will, accordingly, be a fundamentally value-based exer-
cise, even if it is not commonly discussed in such terms (Douglas 2015). In the 
field of global health, for instance, there is increasing concern about so-called 
‘neglected tropical diseases’ that afflict poorer parts of the world which have 
not received nearly as much attention (from governments and billionaire philan-
thropists alike) as the ‘big three’ of HIV, tuberculosis and malaria (Hotez and 
Kamath 2009; Remme et al. 2002). If global health policy were simply to follow 
evidence of ‘what works’, then policies addressing malaria, tuberculosis or HIV 
would clearly dominate political agendas and neglected diseases would remain 
neglected simply because those controlling research funds have not yet made 
efforts to conduct investigations on these diseases.
There is also typically a dearth of evidence about the social needs of hidden 
or so-called marginalised populations in various settings. In some cases, there 
may be a deliberate societal bias against studying the needs of a particular group. 
Ethnic minorities, the poor, immigrants, the homeless or other stigmatised groups 
may face systemic discrimination, which means that they are less likely to be the 
subject of research in the first place. There may also be groups in great need of 
policy attention, but for whom evidence generation is nearly impossible. Research 
on victims of human trafficking, for example, is plagued by challenges due to the 
hidden and illegal nature of the subject (Di Nicola 2007; Tyldum and Brunovskis 
2005). If political choices or agendas were driven exclusively by availability of 
evidence about a problem, this would result in issue bias in the ways in which the 
specific needs of these groups were excluded from attention.
Even when a topic is being investigated, issue bias can still arise from the 
choice of which outcomes to measure within the evaluation of a project or pro-
gramme, as the selection of outcomes serves as a de facto indication of what 
‘success’ looks like and hence what social values are seen to be important. The 
emergency contraception case above provides one example. The FDA in this 
instance was mandated to evaluate drug safety and effectiveness, but not social 
acceptability. But, as shown, in practice this meant that the evidence base only 
incorporated some of the potentially relevant social concerns. A similar example 
can be seen in the evaluation of harm reduction programmes to assist individuals 
who inject illegal drugs. Supporters of harm reduction typically see drug users as 
ill and in need of treatment, and are primarily concerned with health risks such as 
overdoses or the spread of infections like HIV from needle sharing. Opponents, 
on the other hand, often see drug users as criminals and typically are concerned 
that harm reduction sends the ‘wrong message’ about drugs or diverts funds from 
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56 Bias and the politics of evidence
other preferred strategies (like programmes to arrest drug sellers or to stop the 
initiation of drug use in the first place). Given the differences of values at stake, 
the choice of how to evaluate harm reduction programmes can, in effect, indicate 
which social concerns are deemed to be important and, as such, can introduce 
issue bias if outcomes of interest to only one side of the debate are included.
Such a situation can be seen in the evaluation of a Canadian harm reduc-
tion programme called InSite, which provided safe injecting sites and access to 
medical care for drug users in Vancouver. Harm reduction was controversial in 
Canada at the time, with the conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper saying 
in 2006 that he was ‘philosophically opposed to safe-injection sites but would 
wait for evidence of InSite’s effectiveness before making a decision’ (Ottawa 
Citizen 2006). An evaluation of the programme was indeed conducted, finding 
that InSite had ‘an array of community and public health benefits’ (Wood et al. 
2006, p. 1399), including reduced needle sharing and decreased public discarding 
of needles. This led to the Canadian Supreme Court to rule in 2011 that the clinic 
was not in violation of drug laws and should stay open, arguing: ‘InSite saves 
lives. Its benefits have been proven’ (CBC News 2011).
So does that mean that Prime Minister Harper embraced the ruling of the 
Supreme Court as ‘evidence-based’? Perhaps unsurprisingly, this was not the 
case. Harper’s response was instead to state: ‘I’m disappointed . . . The prefer-
ence of this government in dealing with drug crime is obviously to prosecute 
those who sell drugs and create drug addiction in our population and in our youth’ 
(MacQueen and Patriquin 2011).
Advocates of EBP might throw their hands up and see this as an example 
of politics ‘ignoring’ evidence. Yet what is critical to recognise is that in the 
programme evaluation, a choice was made to measure needle sharing, overdoses 
and publicly discarded needles, but not to measure things like whether InSite 
has an overall impact on ‘drug crime’ (presumably selling of drugs) or the cost-
effectiveness of InSite in comparison to interventions to increase prosecution of 
drug sellers. As in the case of the morning after pill in the US, it was a court that 
judged on the legitimacy of a programme, citing the scientific evidence base to do 
so – yet also as in the US case, the scientific evidence base only measured some 
of the concerns that were being debated.
Issue bias in the selection of evidence
Issue bias can also be introduced in the selection of evidence, when a supposedly 
‘evidence-based’ argument is made by reference to the bodies of evidence that 
only represent a limited number of relevant social concerns. Indeed, while EBP 
advocates often speak as if evidence can somehow overcome political divisions, 
when a policy can have multiple social impacts and outcomes, then groups on 
both sides of a political debate can make claims that their preferred solution is 
‘evidence-based’ simply by choosing different outcomes of interest.
A simple hypothetical example of this can be reflected in an infrastructure pro-
ject, such as building an additional airport runway to increase capacity. There may 
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Bias and the politics of evidence 57
be a robust (and presumably technically valid) evidence base about the economic 
growth that is associated with such projects. There may also be a robust (and also 
technically valid) evidence base about the noise or environmental harms that these 
projects also engender. Therefore, supporters and opponents of the programme 
can both appeal to facts to support their case, both making claims that their policy 
choices are ‘evidence-based’.
A real-life example can be seen in the seemingly intractable debates over gun 
control in the US, which has been a highly charged political topic for decades 
(Bruce-Briggs 1976; Kleck 1986). However, it is difficult to identify any obvi-
ous ‘evidence-based gun control policy’ due to the fact that there are many social 
concerns raised within these debates. There is no single right answer on whether 
gun control laws should address how armed citizens behave, how armed criminals 
behave, accidental deaths, social attitudes towards violence, the public’s views of 
gun rights, jobs or tax revenue arising from gun ownership, or the host of other 
concerns that are at times raised by debates over gun control laws. As such, the 
use of evaluation evidence can clearly have policy implications simply based on 
which outcomes were evaluated. If one reviews evaluations of how criminals 
behave in relation to armed citizens or whether being armed affects how much 
victims lose during a theft (cf. Kleck 1986; Southwick 2000), this would support 
policies of gun liberalisation. Alternatively, if one reviews the studies that evalu-
ate the risk of death from the widespread availability of guns (cf. Burger 2002; 
Leenaars and Lester 1997), this evidence base would alternatively support policy 
positions for greater control. These bodies of evidence may be used systematically 
and in technically valid ways, but they impose issue bias if claims are made for 
an ‘evidence-based gun policy’ when only some social concerns are considered.
Issue bias in the interpretation of evidence
Erroneous interpretations of findings would usually represent examples of techni-
cal bias. However, in theory, there can also be cases where a piece of evidence is 
incorrectly interpreted in a way that prioritises a particular social outcome to the 
exclusion of others. If a programme evaluation spoke to multiple social concerns, 
for example – perhaps considering costs, environmental impact, public interest 
and economic growth – but was incorrectly interpreted as only speaking to some 
of those outcomes, this might be such a case.
Issue bias and the prioritisation of randomised controlled  
trials and evidence hierarchies
More relevant, however, is how the concept of issue bias captures the problematic 
idea that evidence generated by randomised controlled trials (RCTs), (or from the 
top of particular hierarchies) should be prioritised to inform policy decisions. As 
noted in the previous chapter, RCTs are fundamentally designed to measure inter-
vention effect, but they do not necessarily indicate the value of what is measured 
from a policy perspective. The prioritisation of particular forms of evidence based 
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58 Bias and the politics of evidence
on their methodological features is, in effect, interpreting methodological rigour 
as a measure of policy relevance. This can therefore generate issue bias if it leads 
to a de facto policy priority for those concerns for which there have been attempts 
to undertake RCTs or for policy solutions that are conducive to RCTs (Barnes and 
Parkhurst 2014).
The previous chapter gave the example of the robust evidence on the effective-
ness of Sildenafil (Viagra) not necessarily equating to the social importance of 
the provision of that treatment. Yet the health sector, which particularly embraces 
RCTs, illustrates a range of other cases where deference to hierarchies of evidence 
might lead to issue bias. One example is in the ongoing health debates about 
how much to focus on prevention versus treatment of health problems. Medical 
treatments are typically much more conducive to testing in RCTs – with all 
new pharmaceuticals and surgical interventions typically evaluated in this way. 
However, prevention efforts may be much harder to evaluate experimentally, 
especially when they aim to address broader social or structural determinants of 
ill health. In such cases, causal links are less direct, individuals can rarely be 
isolated from populations, and interventions may work differently in different set-
tings. So while it may be conceptually simple to undertake an experiment to test 
the efficacy of bypass surgery or stents for heart disease (cf. Cohen et al. 2011), it 
may be much harder to test experimentally social interventions aiming to reduce 
heart disease in a population through increased exercise or improved nutrition, for 
example. It is not impossible to undertake social experiments that address disease-
related factors such as obesity (cf. Ludwig et al. 2011), but it is less common, 
more complicated and, notably, less in the interests of private health care provid-
ers, insurance companies or drug manufacturers. As such, imposing a hierarchy of 
evidence, even in the field of health care, risks the introduction of issue bias if it 
leads to the prioritisation of treatments over prevention simply because the former 
are more conducive to experimental evaluation.
Discussion
There is a fundamental difference worth reiterating between using evidence for 
technical planning, where goals are agreed, and using evidence to inform polit-
ical choices, where goals are contested. A political approach to public policy 
typically begins from a premise that policymaking involves choosing between 
competing values, objectives or social outcomes. This perspective has led Lin 
(2003) to describe policymaking as a situation of ‘competing rationalities’, with 
technical evidence serving as only one of the multiple concerns that must be 
considered in the policy process.
Advocates of EBP can of course find this perspective frustrating. The idea that 
evidence is only one factor in the decision-making process appears to excuse the 
dismissal, misuse or manipulation of scientific evidence, or it seems to imply that 
fidelity to science does not matter because policy makers have other concerns. 
This chapter, however, has aimed at clarifying the oft-muddied waters between 
these two sides to show that both the advocates of EBP and their critics have 
legitimate concerns over bias – but with two very different forms of bias in mind.
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Bias and the politics of evidence 59
The chapter has further noted that establishing rules that impose hierarchies of 
evidence to direct political decisions can be a particularly important form of issue 
bias for the EBP movement to recognise. Imposing such rules can potentially 
‘mobilise bias’, to use Bachrach and Baratz’s (1970) term, by systematically giv-
ing priority to particular policy choices and options, such as where experimental 
trials or rigorous evaluations have been conducted. However, doing so privileges 
those groups whose interests are served by trials in particular – be they corporate 
actors selling treatments or population groups whose needs are more visible and 
more easily measured than others.
The multiple politics of evidence
These concerns work to illustrate why distinguishing between technical bias and 
issue bias can be particularly important. Unpacking these concepts has shown that 
not only are there concerns over the politics of evidence, but also that there can, 
in fact, be multiple politics of evidence. Technical and issue bias can arise in the 
creation, selection and interpretation of evidence, and Table 3.1 below presents a 
basic framework bringing these insights together.
Table 3.1 A multiple politics of evidence framework
Technical bias 
(Politicisation of the 
scientific process)
Issue bias 
(Depoliticisation of the policy process)
Creation of 
evidence
Designing a study to 
advance a desired 
policy goal.
Altering study design 
mid-stream to produce 
positive findings. 
Obfuscation of the value choices or of 
the value implications arising from 
the:
 • choice of topic to research (e.g. 
HIV/tuberculosis/malaria research 
versus neglected tropical diseases);
 • availability of data or feasibility to 
generate evidence (e.g. marginalised 
or hidden populations);
 • selection of outcomes to include 
(e.g. ‘harms’ of injecting drugs 
measured as health outcomes, 
or the ‘message’ it sends about 
appropriate behaviour).
Selection of 
evidence
‘Cherry-picking’ and 
strategic review of 
data to justify a pre-
determined position.
Presenting a policy option as ‘evidence-
based’ while utilising evidence from 
a sub-set of relevant policy concerns.
Interpretation 
of evidence
Erroneous interpretations 
in policy debates, e.g. 
premature causal claims 
about a preferred 
strategy; confused 
understandings of risk.
Unwarranted interpretations of the 
importance of evidence, e.g. 
interpreting methodological rigour as 
an indication of policy relevance.
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60 Bias and the politics of evidence
Delineating between these multiple politics of evidence is important for a num-
ber of reasons. First, it helps to overcome the apparent debates between champions 
and critics of the EBP movement by illustrating that both have valid concerns and 
clarifying the different normative ideals these groups embrace. The framework 
further helps to illustrate when and how such forms of bias may arise. This can 
subsequently allow us to ask much more direct questions about how political fac-
tors serve to drive different forms of bias, which can inform thinking of how to 
improve the use of evidence in policymaking by overcoming both forms of bias. 
It is to these questions that we now turn in the next two chapters.
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4 The overt politics of evidence
Bias and the pursuit of political interests
Politics as competition and contestation
As has already been discussed, a common critique of the EBP movement is how 
many discussions under this heading seem to address evidence use without any 
direct engagement with the concept of politics. This is despite numerous authors 
explaining that the nature of policymaking is inherently political, and the role 
of evidence in such cases will therefore be fundamentally different to instances 
of technical problem solving (cf. Cartwright and Hardie 2012; Davies, Nutley 
and Smith 2000; Greenhalgh and Russell 2009; Nutley, Walter and Davies 2007; 
Parsons 2002; Weiss 1991). This chapter, however, presents the first of two explo-
rations into how the political nature of policymaking may result in different forms 
of technical and issue bias. Specifically, it describes instances of bias that arise 
from the pursuit of political interests within a contested and competitive political 
environment.
For academics within the field of public policy (and political science more 
broadly), the fact that policy decisions are contested is not only recognised, but 
can also be a principal reason to study policymaking in the first place. Many 
date the origins of the modern field of public policy, for example, to the work 
of Harold Lasswell (cf. DeLeon 2006), who has been described as the father 
of a ‘policy sciences’ movement that aimed to develop scientifically informed 
efforts to provide political solutions to social needs (Lasswell 1971; Lerner 
and Lasswell 1951). This is a decidedly goal-oriented approach, but even so, 
Lasswell recognised that the process by which those social needs were deter-
mined would involve trade-offs between interest groups (Lasswell 1990 [1936]). 
David Easton, writing in the 1950s, similarly noted that: ‘[The] essence of a 
policy lies in the fact that through it certain things are denied to some people 
and made accessible to others. A policy . . . consists of a web of decisions and 
actions that allocates values’ (1971 [1953], pp. 129–130). In more recent years, 
Heywood has explained that: ‘Politics is . . . inextricably linked to the phenom-
ena of conflict and cooperation . . . the existence of rival opinions, different 
wants, competing needs and opposing interests guarantees disagreement about 
the rules under which people live’ (2007, p. 2, emphasis in original).
From a public policy perspective, then, what makes something political is 
the existence of disagreement over values and competition between groups. 
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66 The overt politics of evidence
The seemingly ubiquitous phenomena of policy advocacy and lobbying illus-
trates this point. These are typically understood as representing organised 
efforts to shift governmental policies to the desired outcomes of particular 
interest groups (cf. Baumgartner and Leech 1998; Baumgartner et al. 2009). 
The policy process thus serves as an arena of competition in many cases. This 
recognition is also reflected in contemporary conceptual frameworks that aim 
to describe processes of policy change. One of the most widely applied of 
these is that of the Advocacy Coalitions Framework, which describes policy 
change as occurring through an ongoing and continuous process of competition 
between separate coalitions who differ in their sets of policy-relevant beliefs 
(Sabatier 1988, 2007).
Seeing policymaking as defined by competition over interests and beliefs, and 
conceptualising the policy process as the arena through which that competition 
occurs, has fundamental implications for our understanding of the politics of evi-
dence, however. In particular, it becomes much more obvious that participation 
in policy debates is not driven by a desire to be technically accurate, but rather 
by a need for political success or even survival. And it is this reality that can 
provide the first pillar on which to explore when, why and how technical and 
issue bias can manifest themselves in political processes. These manifestations 
are described here as representing an overt politics of evidence, not necessar-
ily because every instance of bias is easily recognised, but as they derive from 
deliberate strategies taken in the pursuit of political interests (in the next chapter 
we examine a second way in which politics can engender bias that may be less 
deliberate and, as such, much more subtle).
Interests and technical bias
Achieving a desired policy decision
One of the most basic ways in which political interests can drive technical bias is 
when groups strategically manipulate evidence in order to increase the chance that 
a policy decision results in a favoured outcome. Examples provided in the previ-
ous chapter illustrated a number of cases where corporate actors used evidence 
in such ways in order to result in a favourable decision being made about their 
product (whether it is to promote use of a drug or to avoid regulation or restriction 
of a product). The reasons why this happens, of course, are not hard to understand. 
Businesses are not typically driven by a motivation for scientific accuracy or good 
evidentiary practice; rather, businesses pursue profit.
It is often said that not only do businesses pursue profit, but they are also legally 
mandated to maximise shareholder value. Whether this is true or not may depend 
on the laws of particular countries (and, indeed, how those laws are interpreted; 
cf. Stout 2008). Yet even if there is no official legal requirement for corporate 
profit maximisation, basic economic theory tells us that in perfectly competitive 
markets with free entry and exit, any firm not maximising profit risks being sup-
planted by another that will. However, taking the profit motive as the principal 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 1
94
.8
0.
22
9.
24
4 
at
 0
4:
48
 0
4 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
 
The overt politics of evidence 67
goal of corporations makes their political strategies with regard to evidence much 
more predictable.
As in the previous chapter, we can again look at the tobacco industry for easy-
to-find examples. In 2013, for instance, the UK government was considering 
passing legislation that would remove branding from cigarette packages – requiring 
so-called ‘standardised packaging’ (or ‘plain packaging’) which had been piloted 
previously in Australia as a smoking reduction measure. One large tobacco com-
pany, Japan Tobacco International (JTI), which opposed this measure, went so far 
as to place full-page advertisements in British newspapers claiming that the pro-
posal was not ‘evidence-based policy’, but rather ‘policy-based evidence’ (although 
the adverts were subsequently banned by advertising regulators for making false 
claims, Thomas 2013).1 Nevertheless, the irony of the tobacco industry making 
such claims can quickly be seen when considering the results of academic inves-
tigations of the industry’s tactics. Ulucanlar et al. (2014), for instance, found 
a number of problematic aspects of the tobacco industry’s use of evidence to 
argue against standardised packaging, including insisting on unrealistic method-
ological perfection of evaluations, misquoting published studies and withholding 
evidence, in order to push their case in the UK.
Yet we can ask if we should be surprised by such findings. Tobacco compa-
nies are clearly taking the role of an interest group and, indeed, how this affects 
their use of evidence has been explained by Bero (2005) after investigating 
tobacco company manipulation of research. She states that ‘an interest group is 
an organized group with a narrowly defined viewpoint, which protects its posi-
tion or profits . . . Interest groups can be expected to construct the evidence about 
a health risk to support their predefined policy position’ (2005, p. 200, emphasis 
added). She then lists the following set of strategies the tobacco industry has par-
ticularly utilised to do this:
1 Fund research that supports the interest group position.
2 Publish research that supports the interest group position.
3 Suppress research that does not support the interest group position.
4 Criticize research that does not support the interest group position.
5 Disseminate interest group data or interpretation of risk in the lay press.
6 Disseminate interest group data or interpretation of risk directly to policy 
makers.
(2005, p. 200)
One of Bero’s points is that we should expect the strategic use of evidence by 
interest groups pursuing policy positions rather than seeing it as an aberration 
or somehow surprising. However, this expectation arises from the understanding 
that policymaking is characterised by competition. In a competitive environment, 
1 As of April 2016, pdfs of the adverts can be found at: http://www.jti.com/files/4313/4910/2125/
JTI_Ads_July.pdf.
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68 The overt politics of evidence
lobbyists would be acting ‘rationally’ to use whatever evidence they can (and in 
whatever way they can) to achieve the desired outcome. As such, the competitive 
nature of policy decision making provides the incentive structure driving techni-
cal bias in key ways.
And it is not only corporate actors pursuing financial interests that this affects. 
The field of political advocacy reaches well beyond financial interests, yet is simi-
larly driven by a desire to achieve preferred goals and social outcomes. Perfectly 
selfless individuals working in areas of policy advocacy can similarly face situa-
tions where pieces of evidence conflict with a desired outcome, thereby producing 
pressure towards bias. In these cases, a conflict of interest exists – not a financial 
conflict per se, but one that still can result in pieces of evidence being used strategi-
cally to pursue desired political goals. Indeed, writing in the journal Nature, Pielke 
argues that: ‘Political advocates will always selectively use and misuse scientific 
data to support their agendas’ (2002, p. 368), giving examples of climate change, 
nuclear power and biodiversity as particularly illustrative cases in point.
Pressure to show results
An alternative way in which the competitive nature of policymaking can engender 
bias arises not just from individuals attempting to achieve a policy decision in their 
favour, but also when those already in positions of authority use evidence in biased 
ways to demonstrate positive programme results or, alternatively, to hide unwanted 
findings. The pressure to do so can again arise from the competitive nature of the 
political system, but in this case it can be competition for officials to maintain 
their position, status or support from those to whom they are held accountable. 
So elected officials will be under pressure to gain votes to be re-elected; politi-
cally appointed bureaucrats need to be successful in order to keep their jobs; and 
heads of social programmes are regularly asked to show evidence of success in 
order to justify and maintain their budgets in the face of competing demands for 
resources. However, such pressures can obviously create incentives for biased uses 
of evidence, and it is not difficult to find cases where public officials in positions 
of authority have been accused of manipulating evidence to show better results.
In 2015, for example, the New York Times reported that: ‘The Pentagon’s 
inspector general is investigating allegations that military officials have skewed 
intelligence assessments about the United States-led campaign in Iraq against the 
Islamic State to provide a more optimistic account of progress’ (Mazzetti and 
Apuzzoaug 2015). In the US there have been a fair number of accusations of 
evidence manipulation in the education sector as well. Recent media attention, 
for instance, focused on the court conviction and sentencing of 11 educators in 
the city of Atlanta on felony charges for altering student standardised test results 
(Blinder 2015) – and this was just one of a range of ‘cheating scandals’ in recent 
years. In other cases, teachers were found directly changing students’ exam 
answers or excluding poor-performing students from tests to improve results (cf. 
Beckett 2013; Vogell 2011). The frequency of educator ‘cheating’ by manipulat-
ing evidence of student performance has even been estimated by Jacob and Levitt 
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for the city of Chicago. Their analysis concluded that ‘serious cases of teacher or 
administrator cheating on standardized tests occur in a minimum of 4–5 percent of 
elementary school classrooms annually’ (Jacob and Levitt 2003, p. 843).
The pressure to show results can drive evidentiary bias in international public 
agencies as well. Hickel, for instance, has described how an agency of the United 
Nations appears to have changed the metrics by which it measures the number of 
hungry people in the world in order to look more successful in the achievement 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs – a set of globally agreed devel-
opment goals to be reached by 2015). He explains that up until 2012, data were 
showing a trend of increasing global hunger rates, but:
at the end of 2012, the news changed. With only three years to go before the 
expiry of the MDGs, the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) 
announced an ‘improved’ methodology for counting hunger. And the revised 
numbers delivered a rosy tale at last: while 23% of the developing world was 
undernourished in 1990, the UN was pleased to announce a reduction down 
to 15%. The goal still wasn’t in reach, but at least the millennium campaign 
could finally claim some progress.
(Hickel 2015; see also Hickel 2016)
Such examples – manipulating evidence on a war’s progress, on children’s 
educational outcomes or on the number of hungry people in the world – may 
seem particularly egregious, and it may seem surprising to consider these 
were done by public servants, not corporate actors. But it is important to 
understand how such bias can arise if there is a desire to prevent it in the 
future. The nature of competition within policy sectors naturally incentivises 
bias in cases such as these. Indeed, Stephen Levitt, co-author of the Chicago 
cheating study (as well as the popular book Freakonomics), has argued that 
the rewards placed on doing well in standardised testing naturally produces 
incentives to manipulate evidence, explaining: ‘The way teachers respond to 
incentives is just human nature . . . To quote W. C. Fields: “Anything worth 
winning is worth cheating for”’ (Levitt 2005).
Finally, a slightly different manifestation of the pressure to show results can 
also arise when evidence is hidden or not released because it is politically sensi-
tive. Examples seen in 2015 alone include: the Indian government being accused 
of failing to release health survey data results, presumably because it showed 
particularly poor results in Gujerat (where the Prime Minister previously served 
as State Chief Minister) (BBC News 2015); the UK government being accused of 
failing to release data on the number of people who have died within six weeks 
of having their government benefits stopped (Brown 2015); and the Chinese gov-
ernment being accused of hiding urban pollution data from the public to protect 
polluting industries (Chen 2015). Again, each of these cases can be seen as a case 
of technical bias that has arisen from a competitive political environment in which 
support, or even political survival, may be undermined by a robust or systematic 
provision of evidence.
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Undermining science as a political strategy
While there may be an abundance of cases of governments, corporations or inter-
est groups hiding or manipulating individual data, there can also be cases where 
political interests are so challenged by bodies of evidence that affected stakehold-
ers decide to pursue a strategy to undermine the whole of the scientific exercise. 
Chapter 1 gave as an example the accusations levelled against the Exxon corpora-
tion that it supported groups challenging scientific consensus after early research 
showed the potential harms of climate change (Hall 2015). In their recent book 
Merchants of Doubt, Oreskes and Conway (2011) explore further how organised 
corporate interests construct doubt, manipulate the scientific process or under-
mine the credibility of research processes to advance political goals for issues 
such as tobacco, ozone depletion, acid rain and strategic defence.
One particularly common strategy in these efforts has been to make calls for 
scientific ‘proof’ before political action can take place. This can particularly be 
seen in climate change debates, although it also arises at other times – such as in 
debates over teaching evolution in schools when proponents of creationism criticise 
evolution as ‘only a theory’. Yet ‘proof’ is typically not what science provides and 
is not the point of appealing to evidence. Oreskes (2004) explains: ‘In all but the 
most trivial cases, science does not produce logically indisputable proofs about the 
natural world. At best it produces a robust consensus based on a process of inquiry 
that allows for continued scrutiny, re-examination, and revision’ (2004, p. 369).
Undermining aspects of the scientific exercise might appear to some as 
a short-sighted means to political ends. Yet when the survival – financial or 
ideological – of an interest group is at stake, it may be a perfectly ‘rational’ strat-
egy to try to undermine the power or influence of scientific evidence in policy 
deliberations. The tobacco industry’s products are known to be harmful and, as 
such, any scientific research on the harms of smoking or, alternatively, on the 
effectiveness of smoking cessation interventions will have negative impacts on 
the industry’s future economic survival. Thus, it is quite reasonable to consider 
whether creating a culture of doubt or scepticism over science would better serve 
the industry’s goals than embracing evidentiary best practice.
Again, however, it is not just corporate actors who may do this. There are, 
of course, historical cases where religious authorities have challenged the scien-
tific establishment as well (Russell 1997). Religious institutions have served as 
dominant centres of power for millennia, and their legitimacy has, in many ways, 
relied on being seen as an accurate authority on how the world (and the heavens 
above) functions. Historians of science and religion now reject the widely held 
‘conflict thesis’, which argues that religion and science are fundamentally irrecon-
cilable (Brooke 1991) – yet there are clearly cases where scientific findings have 
proved threatening to institutionalised theological centres of power. So whether it 
is observations of the phases of Venus indicating that planets orbit the sun, radio-
metric dating indicating that the earth is billions of years old or fossil analyses 
illustrating the evolution of hominids, there will be some who will see these out-
comes of scientific enquiry as an existential threat, providing a strong incentive to 
challenge scientific practice itself.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 1
94
.8
0.
22
9.
24
4 
at
 0
4:
48
 0
4 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
 
The overt politics of evidence 71
Interests and issue bias
The pursuit of competing interests within the political arena can also drive exam-
ples of issue bias, whereby the creation, selection and use of evidence directs 
policy attention to a limited number of key concerns and acts to obscure other 
relevant policy considerations. Indeed, while lobbyists and advocates may face 
pressure to manipulate or hide evidence at times, as discussed above, a great deal 
of advocacy is primarily aimed at increasing the weight or priority that decision 
makers give to their interests, or to convince policy makers that their concerns are 
the most relevant for policy action. Simply pursuing an interest or promoting one 
set of values over another is not necessarily issue bias, however; rather, the term 
more specifically reflects cases when political prioritisation is obscured by the 
language and rules of evidence utilisation.
The previous chapter identified issue bias in a number of contemporary policy 
issues. The example of gun control in the US was one such case demonstrating 
that there can be many social concerns at stake in political debate and, as such, 
many bodies of potentially relevant evidence to draw upon. It is unsurprising, 
then, that gun control advocates routinely point to evidence speaking to their core 
concerns over individual and societal harms, such as research showing relation-
ships between gun ownership and homicide or suicide deaths (cf. Fleegler et al. 
2013). However, gun control opponents typically espouse the values of personal 
choice or freedom, and it is equally unsurprising that they instead point to evidence 
speaking to these interests, such as surveys that indicate a general public opposi-
tion to the idea of banning guns (cf. Jones 2011). Both sides use their preferred 
evidence to try to influence policy decisions and both may claim to therefore be 
pursuing an ‘evidence-based policy’ in their opposite policy positions.
It is from this perspective that critics of the EBP movement raise concerns 
about how the promotion of evidence can, at times, depoliticise the policymak-
ing process. This is because there is a strong assumption at times that evidence is 
somehow apolitical, and the terminology of ‘evidence-based policy’ has a clear 
implication that there must be a single correct policy choice that the evidence 
legitimates or justifies. Yet, as the gun control example shows, opposing coa-
litions may both present ‘evidence-based’ policies. Issue bias arises when this 
fundamentally normative debate over social values becomes confused as an eval-
uation of evidence – allowing political interests to be introduced through what 
Wesselink and colleagues (2014) described as the ‘back door’ – hiding debates 
over values within the language of evidence utilisation. Values and evidence may 
both be important to decision making and there is a clear need not to get them 
confused in such cases.
Selective knowledge transfer and evidence-based advocacy
However, the recognition that pieces of evidence can reflect particular interests 
raises questions about many of the common knowledge transfer efforts in which 
specific pieces of evidence are promoted for ‘uptake’ into policy and practice. 
While there are some authors who have reflected more broadly on systems or 
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72 The overt politics of evidence
structures in place to provide evidence to decision makers (cf. Chew, Armstrong 
and Martin 2013; Lavis et al. 2013; Ongolo-Zogo et al. 2014), a large propor-
tion of the knowledge transfer literature has been concerned instead with trying 
to identify ways to get specific pieces of research evidence ‘used’ by decision 
makers (Langer, Tripney and Gough 2016). This approach typically embraces 
efforts of knowledge brokering as a way to get past the ‘messiness’ of political 
decision making (cf. Ward, House and Hamer 2009), with knowledge brokers or 
intermediaries seen as conduits through which policy ‘impact’ can be achieved 
for specific pieces of research (cf. Chew, Armstrong and Martin 2013, Dobbins 
et al. 2009, van Kammen, de Savigny and Sewankambo 2006). Yet once knowl-
edge brokering shifts from a service that informs multiple potential considerations, 
or that provides evidence on request for a representative authority, to one of a 
strategy to achieve change by getting specific pieces of research ‘into’ policy, it 
can become an advocacy strategy in all but name.
Most discussion in the knowledge transfer literature fails to recognise that 
the decision over which evidence to promote will be a political choice (Liverani, 
Hawkins and Parkhurst 2013; Smith 2013). Rather, such work often rests on the 
widely critiqued assumption that evidence use is inherently an uncontested ‘good 
thing’, with ‘politics’ seen to be a negative ‘barrier’ to research utilisation – a bar-
rier that needs to be overcome (cf. Oliver et al. 2014; Oliver, Lorenc and Innvaer 
2014, Rutter, Hawkins and Parkhurst 2013). However, starting instead from an 
understanding that policy decisions are characterised by competition over values 
and interests alternatively sees politics as the mechanism by which political pri-
orities are set. Politics, from this perspective, is not something to overcome, but 
rather something that enables appropriate consideration to be given to relevant 
social concerns.
Yet, at times, evidence is explicitly used as a tool for the promotion of 
political interests. Mably (2006), for instance, uses the term ‘evidence-based 
advocacy’ to refer to the work done by international non-government organisa-
tions (NGOs) in providing research to influence policy in line with their agendas 
in the field of international trade. The United Nations Children’s Emergency 
Fund (UNICEF) has similarly produced an ‘advocacy toolkit’ in which one strat-
egy promoted is to generate ‘evidence for advocacy’ so as to influence decisions 
in line with their interests in ‘improving children’s lives’ (UNICEF 2010). The 
World Health Organization (WHO 2012) has also used the term ‘evidence-based 
advocacy’ to explain how analyses of local country level data can be developed 
into advocacy materials to ‘build stakeholder commitment’ for policy actions to 
improve reproductive, maternal and newborn health. The UNICEF toolkit report 
explicitly justifies its approach by referring to its mandate from the UN General 
Assembly to advocate for children’s rights, needs and opportunities, while the 
WHO’s strategic use of evidence is more implicitly justified in terms of achiev-
ing progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. But in both cases, the 
organisations are promoting the use of issue-specific evidence to shape national 
government policy decisions towards preferred interests. Even though many 
readers may see goals such as improving maternal or child health as laudable, 
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The overt politics of evidence 73
it is important to recognise that if there is a need to raise the priority of the issue 
or to build commitment in the first place, there are likely to be other competing 
interests or concerns at stake in the political decision-making process (whether 
socially desirable or not) that, in these cases, the use of evidence is strategically 
aimed to defeat.
Appeals to evidence as a rhetorical strategy
It is also increasingly common to see strategic appeals to evidence serving as 
a rhetorical device in order to make a particular interest group appear more 
legitimate. In UNICEF’s advocacy toolkit, for example, the organisation states: 
‘Evidence for advocacy provides credibility and authority to the organization, 
allowing us to convince decision makers to support an issue’ (UNICEF 2010, 
p. 11). The credibility that comes from embracing scientific evidence, then, is seen 
to be useful to convince policymakers as much as any argument about the need 
to improve children’s rights and social outcomes in and of themselves. However, 
a contrasting example can be seen in the case discussed earlier of the tobacco 
company JTI claiming that UK government proposals on standardised packag-
ing, labelling an unwanted proposal as ‘not evidence-based’ to try to diminish its 
perceived legitimacy.
These examples show just how strategic and malleable the term ‘evidence-
based policy’ can be when used in policy debates. In the JTI case, the corporation 
used this language to resist a smoking reduction strategy based on plain packag-
ing, claiming that such an intervention did not have a strong evidence base about 
whether it would reduce smoking rates. Yet, given the abundant evidence of the 
health harms of tobacco smoking, many would equally claim an ‘evidence-based 
tobacco policy’ could be to ban it outright or perhaps to instigate any and all 
restrictive measures possible. Authors like Myers (2013) have used language in 
this way to discuss the use of ‘evidence-based policies’ to achieve a tobacco ‘end-
game’ that eliminates the tobacco epidemic completely.
Clearly there is no single or indisputable answer to what an ‘evidence-based 
tobacco policy’ actually is or what the final goals should be. There is an abun-
dance of evidence about the health harms of smoking. There are various pieces of 
evidence about the efficacy of different intervention strategies that might reduce 
smoking. And there are other pieces of evidence speaking to concerns about the 
social acceptability of smoking, the importance of personal freedom to population 
groups, or the economic benefits or costs of smoking to different sectors of society 
(from tax revenue to retail sales to health expenditure). Any piece of this agglomera-
tion of evidence might be selected on which to ‘base’ a policy (or base opposition to 
a policy), and in competitive policy environments, there can be a range of rhetorical 
uses of ‘evidence’ that serve to frame the debate so as to include or exclude particu-
lar social concerns (Bacchi 2009; Fischer 2003; Schön and Rein 1994).
Recognition of the rhetorical nature of policy debates can therefore help us 
to understand how the language of ‘scientific evidence’ proves useful in and of 
itself. Science is recognised as having particular authority in policy debates due 
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74 The overt politics of evidence
to its perception as objective and its ability to accurately represent the world 
(Jasanoff 1987), with Freedman (2006) describing a ‘fetishizing’ of scientific 
data within the media to reflect the authority that arises from appeals to data. 
This privilege given to research evidence makes it a particularly useful rhetorical 
strategy to invoke and has led to authors such as Hammersley to argue that call-
ing something ‘evidence-based’ now serves as nothing more than a slogan used 
to ‘discredit opposition’ (2013, p. 15). While this may not always be the case, and 
many evidence advocates would respond by pointing back to the need to ensure 
that scientific best practices are followed to achieve social goals, there is clearly 
an important recognition to be made about how discursive use of the language of 
evidence can frame issues in ways that construct particular interests or ideas into, 
or out of, policy debates.
Expecting instances of bias
The principal goal of this chapter has been to illustrate that the fundamentally 
political nature of policymaking, which involves competition between different 
sets of beliefs or interests, provides incentives that can generate both technical 
bias and issue bias alike. This is because in political arenas, interest groups will 
compete for policy attention, and those in positions of power will compete for 
public support (or resources), with significant implications if they fail to achieve 
their goals. In such a system, there is no reason to assume that fidelity to science 
or accurate presentations of evidence will be a primary value amongst groups in 
political competition and, as such, unless these things are somehow required to 
obtain political or public support, they will inevitably be sacrificed when doing so 
can help in winning (or surviving) political competitions.
However, understanding this means that many forms of bias are likely to be 
predictable or at least can be expected when the political stakes are high enough. 
The pressure to show results (or to hide negative results) also captures what in 
more popular language might be referred to as political ‘spin’. Yet spin (applied 
to evidence) can take two forms. It can involve the manipulation of evidence to 
show better results (or minimise problematic ones) – effectively representing tech-
nical bias – or it can involve selecting and focusing on technically valid pieces of 
evidence that only highlight those issues or outcomes where the political actor is 
doing well – effectively representing issue bias. What is key to recognise is that 
spin should be expected as a natural result of a highly incentivised and competitive 
political system.
Returning to Weiss’ (1979) description of the various ways in which research 
can influence policy (detailed in Chapter 2), we can assume that her conceptu-
alisation of strategic uses of evidence would in fact be a norm rather than an 
exception in many such environments. Weiss herself, for instance, has stated:
Politicians and officials have ideological convictions and constellations 
of interests that largely set the course they steer. The place of information 
generally, and of research information particularly, is best seen as helping 
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The overt politics of evidence 75
policy makers decide which policies are best suited to the realization of their 
ideologies and interests.
(1991, p. 308)
Hoppe similarly draws on Weiss to explain that an ‘adversarial’ model of policy-
making makes it evident when we might see strategic uses of scientific expertise. 
He explains that:
Politics is the non-violent power struggle between political parties and/or 
organized interest groups . . . The struggle between group interests func-
tions as variety generator and selection environment for scientific arguments 
that underpin political positions and decisions. Every interest involved will 
look for the type of scientific expertise that harnesses and legitimizes its 
 pre-formed political stance.
(Hoppe 2005, p. 210)
Evidence champions have long bemoaned the manipulation of evidence in ways 
that are not scientifically valid, but clearly a more nuanced understanding of 
political debate is required to also explore concepts of issue bias that can occur 
through rhetorical framing. Political rhetoric, argumentation, discourse and 
framing are particularly the subjects of the sub-field of critical policy studies, 
which explores how policy power is structured or exercised through the construc-
tion of ideas and meaning (cf. Fischer and Forrester 1993; Stone 2002; Susskind 
2006). From this perspective, for instance, Bacchi (2009) argues that we are 
‘governed by problematisations’ rather than by problems, by which she means 
that those things that are considered to be ‘policy needs’ are, in fact, constructed 
by how issues are represented. As such, she particularly takes issue with the EBP 
movement for obscuring the process by which the issues are constructed, which 
assigns value and fixes the concerns taken to be relevant to the policy problem. 
She explains:
in evidence-based policy, objective ‘problems’ are presumed to exist, sepa-
rate from power and contestation, waiting only upon ‘evidence’ about ‘what 
works’. So long as ‘problems’ are considered to sit outside the political 
process (exogenous) in this way, waiting to be ‘solved’ through ‘relevant’ 
‘evidence’, the necessarily political contestation around competing represen-
tation of ‘problems’ is displaced and hence ignored.
(Bacchi 2009, p. 253, emphasis in original)
This reiterates the concerns raised in previous chapters over how certain uses of 
evidence can depoliticise the policymaking process. Not only do we need to be 
aware of how the language of EBP may obscure the nature of political debate, 
we also need to be aware of how pieces of technical evidence can be used stra-
tegically to frame the terms of the debate itself. Within policy argumentation, 
evidence can get used in ways that can shape just what policies are ‘represented 
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76 The overt politics of evidence
to be’ (to use Bacchi’s language) so as to legitimate particular policy choices 
and to exclude competing interests.
Understanding the problem to consider solutions
Identifying so many forms of evidentiary bias and conceptualising the politi-
cal nature of policymaking as inherently driven by competition may, to some, 
appear to support a conclusion that bias is inevitable within policy debates. Yet 
understanding the origins and manifestations of bias makes instances of bias 
more understandable and, indeed, even predictable. This in turn permits consid-
eration of whether particular types of policy debates may be more susceptible 
to bias emerging and further enables reflection on where to target strategies 
to reduce or mitigate the bias that is expected to arise. In particular, here we 
note three features of policy problems that appear relevant to engender bias: 
the complexity of the problem, the level of contestation (or importance) and the 
polarisation of the issue.
Problem complexity
Obviously many of the policy problems that rely on evidence can be described as 
complex. Yet ‘complexity’ is a broad term which can capture multiple features 
that can manifest in different sources of bias. One useful distinction of the concept 
comes from the field of complexity theory, which distinguishes between what are 
termed complicated as opposed to complex problems (Snowden and Boone 2007; 
Snyder 2013).2 Complicated problems, in this distinction, are said to include mul-
tiple interacting or mutually interdependent elements, each one of which may be 
solvable or knowable. The stereotypical example is sending a rocket to the moon 
(cf. Glouberman and Zimmerman 2002): rocket science may be difficult, and getting 
a rocket to the moon requires multiple pieces of expertise, but the process is essen-
tially predictable and repeatable in most cases. Complex issues, on the other hand, 
are seen to contain elements of uncertainty in terms of cause–effect relationships, 
many of which can only be identified after the fact. This can make the prediction 
of outcomes difficult or can lead to different outcomes if the same actions are taken 
in subsequent iterations (even with ‘perfect’ evidence available). Raising a child 
is often given as an example of this, but many policies and interventions designed 
to bring about social change in context-specific settings would also fall under this 
category (Glouberman and Zimmerman 2002; Kurtz and Snowden 2003).
Complicated problems are typically multifaceted, which can be seen as 
increasing the opportunity for issue bias, as multiple interests are likely to be 
2 There are further ways to explore complexity as well. Snowden and Boone (2007), for exam-
ple, delineate between simple, complicated, complex and chaotic contexts, adding two additional 
considerations (in chaotic cases, for example, rapid response is said to be needed in ways that 
eliminate the ability to even consider a rational or comprehensive assessment of evidence). We have 
limited the number of features of complexity to two here, as these capture the principal political 
 mechanisms of bias that are explored here and in the next chapter. 
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The overt politics of evidence 77
relevant to the policy debates. Issue framing will also likely be important in com-
plicated problems and can lead to some bodies of evidence being seen as relevant 
to the exclusion of others. The previous example of gun control can be considered 
particularly complicated given that gun restrictions may affect a range of social 
concerns, including accidental deaths, citizen resistance to armed criminals, tax 
revenues from gun sales and a host of other outcomes. Some of these have been 
estimated or measured in individual cases, but they each may speak to a different 
interest or social value.
However, in complex situations, the uncertainty involved provides opportuni-
ties for different forms of evidentiary bias. The sowing of doubt as a political 
strategy to undermine scientific credibility, for example, would likely be more 
effective for a complex policy issue with a number of scientific unknowns. 
Climate science may be a particular extreme case, where there are a huge num-
ber of variables that lead to specific outcomes at a given place and time. This 
might compare with different social policy debates, such as those over abortion or 
homosexual rights, which are highly contested but where there are significantly 
fewer scientific unknowns.
Contestation/importance of the issue
The level of contestation – reflected in the importance of the policy decision to the 
stakeholders involved – provides a second feature of policy that can influence the 
mechanisms through which bias arises. Some policy decisions will simply not be 
that highly contested and we would hardly expect to see evidence manipulation 
as a political strategy for fairly mundane decisions such as what day a municipal-
ity should collect recycling, or whether fire engines should be painted yellow or 
red. In these cases, the interests involved would not be strong enough to justify 
sacrificing scientific credibility to gain political advantage. Yet clearly the more 
important a policy decision is to interest groups, the stronger the incentive will be 
to manipulate evidence in pursuit of key goals – whether it is a policy affecting 
the profits of a corporation, the likelihood of re-election or simply the progress 
achieved towards a desired social objective.
Problem polarisation
A final feature of policy problems that may drive instances of bias can be the 
polarisation of the issue, reflecting how many policy choices are available to 
balance the multiple interests at stake. At one extreme would be policy decisions 
that can choose from a large number of intermediary positions – for instance, 
decisions over what teacher–student ratio to use in classrooms or how much a 
government should regulate free markets. A large number of options exist in 
these cases, and while there may be some extreme opinions on market regula-
tion, for instance, most people would fall along a spectrum of middle-ground 
positions about when markets should be regulated to ensure public safety or 
address market failures. Highly polarised issues, on the other hand, have few 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 1
94
.8
0.
22
9.
24
4 
at
 0
4:
48
 0
4 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
 
78 The overt politics of evidence
middle-ground positions. Abortion or gay marriage, for instance, are typically 
debated over a single binary division. It is conceivable that highly polarised 
policy issues such as these could involve greater incentives for evidence manipu-
lation, as the implication of an unfavourable policy decision would be extreme 
for the losing side of the debate. Decisions over the validity of creationism 
(which play out in policies regarding science curricula in schools) provide one 
example of a polarised issue that has little scope for compromise – either it is 
valid to teach creationism as science or it is not. In such cases, polarised policy 
debates may be seen as a ‘winner take all’ scenario, increasing the incentive to 
create or use evidence in biased ways.
Alternative conceptualisations
The choice of three policy features – complexity, contestation and polarisation – 
is, of course, only one way to identify potentially important aspects of policy 
problems. But this classification was chosen because it can be directly applied 
to think about the political origins of bias (as shown above and as will be further 
explored in the next chapter). However, other potentially useful classification sys-
tems are worth mentioning, as they provide alternative ways to think about policy 
features and their implications for evidence use. For example, Matland (1995) 
has developed an ‘ambiguity-conflict’ model which describes political issues in 
terms of their level of uncertainty and their level of contestation. This model was 
developed to consider the political resources required to improve policy imple-
mentation in different cases, but we can clearly see parallels in our discussions 
of complexity and contestation that could inform thinking on the use of evidence. 
Hisschemöller and Hoppe (2001) alternatively describe policy problems depend-
ing on whether there is consensus on the relevant norms and values at stake, and 
certainty about the relevant knowledge to apply to solve the problem. They use 
a four-way classification system, seeing problems as: structured; moderately 
structured in terms of the ends; moderately structured in terms of the means; and 
unstructured. Shaxson (2009) has built on Hisschemöller and Hoppe’s framework 
by linking it more directly with complexity concepts from Snowden and Boone 
(2007) to reflect on how the way in which a problem is structured (badly, well, 
partially or unstructured) has implications for the relationship between science 
and policy – e.g. with science ‘leading’ policy in structured cases, providing only 
one of many voices in some unstructured cases, or helping to shape debates in 
‘badly’ structured situations. These alternative frameworks can thus provide addi-
tional insights and ways of thinking about the relationship between science and 
policy. Yet here our choice ultimately reflects the desire to develop a system that 
allows for more direct engagement with the political origins of evidentiary bias.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored how the origins of many sources of bias lie in the 
inherently competitive nature of policy debates. However, the idea that policy 
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The overt politics of evidence 79
arenas may inherently incentivise biased uses of evidence may be disconcerting to 
those who believe that faithful uses of scientific evidence can and should work to 
improve social outcomes. Of importance to this audience is to recognise that hav-
ing a better understanding of the political origins of various forms of bias can also 
enable reflection on strategies to mitigate them. So, for example, Bacchi criticises 
the EBP movement for its failure to recognise how political problems are rhetori-
cally constructed in ways that dictate which evidence is seen to be relevant, but in 
response, she has developed a set of questions that can be used by policy analysts 
to make problem constructions more visible, directly asking what the problem 
is represented to be, what is excluded from the representation, how the problem 
representation can be questioned, etc. (Bacchi 2012). Oreskes and Conway, on the 
other hand, who discuss the strategies corporate actors use to undermine science, 
have alternatively recommended the scientific community to pursue particular 
approaches, such as building consensus and increasing the clarity of messages, to 
counter the ‘merchants of doubt’ who promote uncertainty around issues such as 
climate change (Oreskes and Conway 2010).
And there are a range of other potential approaches that might mitigate one 
or more manifestations of bias identified in this chapter. For example, when pro-
gramme officials are incentivised to ‘cheat’ to show better results, governments 
can establish rules or practices that separate those who measure success of pro-
grammes from those who stand to benefit from them (e.g. having schools not test 
their own pupils or not hold their own students’ answer sheets). Alternatively, 
when there is widespread pressure for the ‘uptake’ of selective pieces of research 
evidence, governments can establish official knowledge- brokering bodies that can 
serve as entry points for researchers to present their findings, working to include 
evidence across a range of considerations in policy debates.
Some of these possible responses can be embodied in government bureaucratic 
structures. Others may be ‘best practices’ that can be embraced by researchers, 
technical advisors, the media or the public. Still others may reflect changes in 
rules and practice over how evidence is created or provided to inform decision 
making. The potential list of strategies is vast and Chapter 8 will return to these 
examples and others in its discussion on the need to build institutional structures, 
rules and norms that can help to address the origins and manifestations of bias. 
However, before this, we next turn to a second way in which politics can manifest 
in bias – not through the overt pursuit of political interests, but through more sub-
tle unconscious cognitive processes.
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[T]he human understanding is like a false mirror, which, receiving rays irregularly, 
distorts and discolors the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it.
Francis Bacon (1620)
While the preceding chapter discussed the origins of evidentiary bias that arise 
from the pursuit of political interests within a fundamentally competitive policy 
arena, this chapter explores a second, less immediately observable, origin of bias. 
Here we particularly draw on the field of cognitive psychology to explore the 
ways in which common, yet often unconscious, mental processes may also induce 
technical and issue bias. As will be shown, many of these instances can be directly 
linked to our existing values and beliefs, thus making them political in origin. Yet 
these biases may be less easily recognisable than those explored in the previous 
chapter and can thus be termed the subtle politics of evidence.
Human cognition: a missing explanatory link?
The field of cognitive psychology has developed rapidly over the past few decades 
in its investigation and description of how the human mind processes information. 
Within this field, there is often reference made to two different modes of cogni-
tion, referred to as ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’ thinking, or what Daniel Kahneman 
(2011) has popularised as ‘thinking fast’ and ‘thinking slow’. System 1 cap-
tures automatic and intuitive judgements about information we encounter, made 
unconsciously without voluntary control, while System 2 captures the controlled 
conscious mental activities demanding deliberate effort, for instance, in under-
taking calculations or solving complex problems. Reliance on fast thinking can 
lead to particular errors, such as the selection of intuitive, but inaccurate, answers 
to problems. Yet, particularly when situations of uncertainty arise, the human 
mind has been shown to rely on a number of simplifying ‘heuristics’, even when 
more conscious or deliberate calculations are being made (De Martino et al. 2006; 
Kahneman and Tversky 1974; Sternberg 1996).
The utilisation of these (often unconscious) heuristics to aid judgement can 
themselves result in a set of associated biases (Gilovich and Griffin 2002). 
5 The subtle politics of evidence
The cognitive-political origins of bias
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The term ‘bias’ in this literature refers to a broad range of errors in informa-
tion processing that diverge from classic ideas of ‘rational’ decision making. 
These include the inaccurate assessment of statistics or probability data, such 
as people’s tendencies to over-estimate the risk of dying from rare diseases 
and under-estimate the risk of death from more common causes (Lichtenstein 
et al. 1978), but they further include tendencies towards other errors such as 
stereotyping, selective information review, drawing premature conclusions, and 
constructing erroneous causal explanations (Baron 2000; Gilovich, Griffin and 
Kahneman 2002; Kahneman 2011).
In recent years, we have begun to see a range of authors applying these insights 
to social issues as well, including to the popular understandings of science and 
public thinking about politics. Ben Goldacre, for instance, dedicates a chapter of 
his book Bad Science (2010) to the question of ‘why clever people believe stupid 
things’, in which he describes how cognitive processes help explain phenom-
ena such as public belief in medical hoaxes, misunderstandings of health data or 
faith in disproven solutions (like homeopathy). George Lakoff (2008) and Drew 
Westen (2007), on the other hand, have both applied cognitive theories to under-
stand political thinking in the US, reflecting on how political argumentation, and 
the public’s processing of politically relevant information, is likely to be biased 
by our existing beliefs and affinities.
Of course, despite the modern growth and application of the cognitive  sciences, 
the quote at the start of this chapter illustrates that there has been a much longer 
recognition that humans can be prone to errors. Writing in the early seventeenth 
century, Francis Bacon described a number of common human tendencies to 
perceive information inaccurately in his Novum Organum Scientarium [New 
Instrument of Science]. He defines a set of four ‘Idols’ that capture aspects of 
biased human perception:
 • The Idols of the Tribe – reflecting tendencies to distort or exaggerate 
 information.
 • The Idols of the Cave – including errors based on prejudices arising from past 
experiences.
 • The Idols of the Marketplace – capturing the ambiguity of meaning within 
words and language.
 • The Idols of the Theatre – encompassing false learning embedded in philoso-
phies or religions that are taken without question (Bacon 1908 [1620]; see 
also Hall undated).
Bacon’s Novum Organum has been described as laying some of the key founda-
tions to the scientific method in its discussions of logic and means to discovering 
truth, providing one of the early contributions to the ‘Age of Enlightenment’ that 
took hold in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (New World Encyclopedia 
2015). Yet while the ideals of the scientific method are still widely espoused, 
Lakoff (2008) has noted that some other ideas from this era may be more prob-
lematic. In particular, he has taken issue with the ‘Enlightenment view’ of human 
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86 The subtle politics of evidence
reasoning based in the ‘18th century brain’. Specifically, he critiques the way 
in which human reasoning was believed to be fundamentally conscious, logical, 
unemotional and value-neutral – a perception that still endures today, explaining:
If this were right, politics would be universally rational. If the people are 
made aware of the facts and figures, they should naturally reason to the right 
conclusion . . . [but] Enlightenment reason does not account for real political 
behaviour because the Enlightenment view of reason is false.
(Lakoff 2008, p. 8)
However, the idea that evidence can, or should, be understood and utilised 
‘rationally’ remains an implicit assumption behind many calls for evidence-based 
policymaking today. As such, there remains a large gap in our efforts to apply 
our knowledge of human cognition to the problems of evidence use for policy-
making. This gap was similarly identified by the US National Research Council, 
which reviewed the use of scientific knowledge in public policy and concluded 
that while:
There is an extensive literature in cognitive social psychology and behav-
ioral decision theory on how people make judgments, decisions, and 
choices . . . These sciences have not . . . been applied to collective reasoning 
and group decision making in public policy settings at anything close to the 
level needed.
(National Research Council 2012, p. 57, 
emphasis in original)
This chapter attempts to address this gap by exploring how cognitive heuris-
tics and biases may explain a number of instances of technical and issue bias 
described previously. It further considers the political nature of these cognitive 
sources in terms of how they derive from value positions we hold and how they 
play out in competitive policy arenas. The chapter then works to build a ‘cogni-
tive-political model of evidentiary bias’ that considers how the nature of different 
political issues may be likely to engender in one form of evidentiary bias or 
another, given the understandings of origins of bias outlined in both this and the 
preceding chapter.
Policy-relevant heuristics and biases 
The policy process often involves making choices about which courses of action 
to follow in specific settings, with reference to multiple competing social values 
and concerns. Typically, this is also done in time-constrained circumstances and 
may be based on complex or partial information being available. Described in 
this way, a number of common simplifying heuristics can be identified that would 
be particularly relevant to explain how individuals understand and use scientific 
evidence within such environments, such as:
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 • The availability heuristic, which describes when decision making is aided by 
reliance on the memory of similar cases or the ease with which similar situa-
tions come to mind (Schwarz and Vaughn 2002),
 • Attribute substitution, defined by Kahneman as ‘when confronted with a dif-
ficult question people often answer an easier one instead, usually without 
being aware of the substitution’ (2002, p. 53).
 • The representativeness heuristic, which refers to cases where pieces of infor-
mation are assumed to go together because we perceive similarity between a 
given situation and a prototypical (or stereotypical) one (Gilovich and Griffin 
2002; Kahneman and Tversky 1974).
 • The affect heuristic, which captures the process by which judgments are 
influenced by existing positive and negative (‘affective’) feelings (Finucane 
et al. 2000).
These heuristics are subsequently linked to a range of equally important biases 
including:
 • Illusory correlations, described by Sternberg as where ‘we tend to see par-
ticular events or particular attributes and categories as going together because 
we are predisposed to do so’ (1996, p. 396).
 • Confirmation bias, defined by Nickerson as ‘the seeking or interpreting of 
evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypoth-
esis in hand’ (1998, p. 175).
 • Cognitive dissonance aversion, which refers to how individuals uncon-
sciously avoid or reduce situations of ‘dissonance’ that arise when they are 
presented with information that leads to a conflict or contradiction between 
valued outcomes or ideas (Festinger 1962; Wicklund and Brehm 1976).
However, what is particularly important here for our purposes is to recognise that 
these heuristics and biases are often linked to our existing values and beliefs – 
things that are fundamentally at stake in political debates. As such, our political 
interests can work to predispose us towards biases in the use of policy-relevant evi-
dence through cognitive processes which act to ensure that our values and beliefs 
remain unchallenged or undefeated, even in the face of potentially contradictory 
evidence. Yet, the unconscious nature of much of this cognitive bias makes it a 
much more subtle politics of evidence than the processes explored in the previous 
chapter arising from strategic choices made in the pursuit of political interests.
Motivated reasoning
One of the most well-known applications of the cognitive sciences has been in 
the field of behavioural economics, leading to investigations of how economic 
and behavioural choices can be influenced (or ‘nudged’) by a range of variables 
such as external cues, frames, anchors or other factors that neoclassical or rational 
choice economic theories might otherwise see as irrelevant to assessments of util-
ity (cf. Mullainathan and Thaler 2000; Samson 2015; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). 
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88 The subtle politics of evidence
Yet in this chapter, our interest lies more in policymaking arenas. Nevertheless, 
the field of political psychology is one of the few areas that have applied the 
heuristics and biases work directly to questions of how individuals understand 
political information. In doing so, authors have developed the term ‘motivated 
reasoning’ to capture some of the ways in which our pre-existing political affini-
ties unconsciously lead to biased assessments of policy-relevant evidence (Kahan 
2011; Kunda 1990; Redlawsk, Civettini and Emmerson 2010).
Many motivated reasoning insights have come from experimental studies. In 
one example, Redlawsk and colleagues (2010) undertook experiments to see how 
voters with a pre-existing preference for a candidate would respond to negative 
information about that candidate. They found that presenting prospective voters 
with a small amount of negative information led to their level of support going 
up rather than down – at least until a ‘tipping point’ was reached. The authors 
conclude that: ‘Motivated reasoners strive to maintain existing evaluative affect, 
even in the face of countervailing information’ (2010, p. 589).
In another example, Yeo et al. (2015) studied how a sample of Americans 
would respond to evidence about the relatively obscure field of nanotechnology – 
a subject for which they had little prior interest or knowledge – based on the 
source of information. The information was presented as coming either from 
Fox News (presumed to be conservative in its political orientation) or MSNBC 
(which had a perceived liberal orientation). The experiment found that partici-
pants on both sides of the liberal–conservative political spectrum demonstrated 
defensive avoidance, in which they avoided information when they believed the 
media source to be contrary to their political disposition, as well as confirmation 
bias, in which they searched for information from those sources felt to be congru-
ent with their existing attitudes.
Other experiments have shown that existing political ideology can also lead 
to distrust of science or expertise more generally. Kahan (2014), for instance, 
found that that when individuals were asked to judge the level of expertise of 
a scientist (based on academic and professional qualifications), their judgement 
would be influenced by whether the expert presented statements that aligned or 
disagreed with their political beliefs. Similarly, Nisbet, Cooper and Garrett (2015) 
found that when subjects were presented with scientific information counter to 
their political views (e.g. presenting American conservatives with evidence of 
climate change or presenting liberals with evidence on the advantages of nuclear 
power), they later reported greater suspicion of the scientific community as a 
whole. Findings like this have led Kraft, Lodge and Taber to describe an uncon-
scious ‘hyperskepticism’ towards scientific information by ideologues amongst 
both Republicans and Democrats in the US, arguing that ‘these patterns can be 
understood as part of a general tendency among individuals to defend their prior 
attitudes and actively challenge attitudinally incongruent arguments’ (2015, 
p. 121). Scientific denialism, as mentioned in the previous chapter, can therefore 
be understood not only as an overt strategy pursued to achieve particular interests, 
but as an unconscious intuitive response to situations where scientific evidence 
impinges on deeply held values.
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Finally, motivated reasoning research also shows that it is not simply a lack 
of knowledge about a subject area or reliance on intuitive errors alone that drives 
the biased assessment of evidence. If this were the case, then provision of more 
knowledge or establishing contexts to ensure careful reflection would deal with all 
such errors. Instead, experiments have demonstrated situations where individuals 
with increased levels of knowledge on an issue, or individuals with greater sci-
entific or numerical abilities, were more likely to interpret information in biased 
ways. Taber and Lodge (2006), for instance, showed that for two politically sensi-
tive issues in the US (affirmative action and gun control), individuals with greater 
scientific knowledge demonstrated greater incidence of ‘disconfirmation bias’ – 
effectively using their abilities to search for information to counter-argue the facts 
or figures they disliked.
Kahan et al. (2013) also found that while more cognitively skilled individu-
als made fewer errors in interpreting numerical data about a politically neutral 
intervention (presented as the efficacy of a skin-rash cream), these individuals 
were more likely to come to erroneous (biased) conclusions when the same data 
were presented as the effectiveness of gun control policy. The authors explain this 
result as due to the process of ‘identity protective cognition’, in which individu-
als are motivated to use evidence in ways that are supported by their peer groups 
rather than by fidelity to evidence itself. Writing elsewhere, Kahan (2013) has 
given a further explanation of this phenomenon, stating that:
shared ideological or cultural commitments are likely to be intertwined with 
membership in communities of one sort or another that furnish those indi-
viduals with important forms of support – emotional and psychic as well 
as material . . . If a proposition about some policy-relevant fact comes to be 
commonly associated with membership in such a group, the prospect that one 
might form a contrary position can threaten one’s standing within it. Thus, as 
a form of ‘identity self-defense’, individuals are unconsciously motivated to 
resist empirical assertions . . . if those assertions run contrary to the dominant 
belief within their groups.
(2013, p. 408)
Cognitive insights and the politics of evidence
The research on motivated reasoning summarised above has predominantly con-
sisted of experiments with members of the public in the US, leading to Lodge 
and Taber (2013) developing what they have termed a ‘John Q. Public’ model 
of motivated reasoning. This model describes how the information processing of 
ordinary people follows unconscious steps heavily influenced by existing affec-
tive views and prior attitudes (see also Kraft, Lodge and Taber 2015). Yet, the 
work on heuristics, biases and motivated reasoning can provide insights into the 
origins of technical and issue bias not only in members of the public, but also 
in scientific experts, politicians and technical decision makers, as the following 
sections will explore.
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Experts do it too: the case of the World Bank
In the early 1990s, James Ferguson (1994) critically analysed the policies of the 
World Bank’s development programme in Lesotho, arguing that the approach of 
the programme was based on erroneous assessments of Lesotho’s economy and 
infrastructure. Examples included incorrectly describing the economy as based on 
subsistence farming, stating that the country was reliant on exporting agricultural 
products rather than wage labour and selectively presenting statistics conducive 
to desired programme strategies. By comparing a range of original data sources 
to the World Bank’s assessment of the country, Ferguson argues that ‘these mis-
takes and errors are always of a particular kind, and they almost invariably tend 
in predictable directions. The statistics are wrong, but always wrong in the same 
way; the conceptions are fanciful, but it is always the same fantasy’ (1994, p. 55). 
Ferguson concludes that Lesotho was being portrayed according to a stereotypi-
cal idea of a ‘less developed’ country, needing to be ‘brought into the modern 
economy’, as this concept fit with the World Bank’s existing models of financial 
assistance and African development.
Ferguson’s book describing this example has been a popular case study for 
students in the field of international development for over two decades, but what 
is particularly interesting is not just that the World Bank might have been biased 
in its assessment of evidence, but how that agency has recently reflected on its 
own biases. The annual World Development Report (WDR) is a flagship publica-
tion of the World Bank and, in 2015, the WDR was specifically dedicated to the 
topic of ‘mind, society and behaviour’, with a focus on human decision making 
and development policy. The report includes an overview of the field of cognitive 
psychology, reflecting on how social policy interventions can use behavioural 
insights to better achieve their goals. Examples include how regular reminders 
can improve adherence to medical treatments, how timing cash transfers to fami-
lies at the time of school enrolment can increase the use of these to fund education 
or how a more intuitive provision of information can lead to more effective finan-
cial decisions in poor populations.
Yet a section of the WDR 2015 is also dedicated to discussing biases inherent 
within development professionals themselves, presenting results of a number of 
experiments undertaken with the World Bank’s own staff to explore how they are 
affected by heuristics and biased thinking. So, for example, the organisation repli-
cated Kahan et al.’s (2013) experiment on the interpretation of data depending on 
whether it was presented as showing the effectiveness of either skin-rash cream 
or gun control policy, but they replaced the gun control scenario with one of mini-
mum wage policy. They confirmed that, just as with members of the American 
public, their professional staff were also less likely to interpret the data accurately 
when it was framed as measuring minimum wage policy effectiveness. This was 
particularly influenced by the pre-existing views that staff members had on the 
importance of income inequality as a social concern (World Bank 2015, p. 182). 
The report ends up identifying a range of biases and errors demonstrated in World 
Bank staff, including confirmation bias, sunk cost bias and inaccurate predictions 
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of the beliefs of the poor people that they are meant to be serving with their 
work. The report even discusses some of its failures in the Lesotho programme 
described by Ferguson 20 years earlier, explaining that the mental models of the 
development professionals failed to take account of some of the key features of 
the local economy (2015, p. 187).
Shared values and particularly subtle politics of evidence
Much of the experimental research on motivated reasoning described earlier is 
based on research subjects who disagree over fundamental political values (e.g. 
liberals and conservatives in America). Yet the World Bank experience appears to 
illustrate that biases linked to affective positions can occur when political values 
are shared. These instances of bias are still political, as they derive from our values 
and belief systems, yet they can be particularly subtle, or go unnoticed, due to 
the common nature of the views out of which they originate. This can potentially 
explain the instances of erroneous conclusions about the sources of HIV prevention 
success in Africa described in Chapter 3, for example. That chapter gave examples 
of Uganda and Senegal’s HIV successes attributed to illusory correlations with 
particular policy responses (i.e. the early, inclusive, policy response in Senegal 
or the multisectoral policy in Uganda), with Senegal’s case further demonstrating 
representativeness errors when it was assumed Senegal would naturally have had 
a higher prevalence rate, as was occurring in some other regions in Africa.
However, it is quite possible that these errors have their origins in cognitive 
biases such as affective reasoning. At the time, global health officials working in 
the field of HIV/AIDS held particularly strong beliefs about the benefits of par-
ticular political responses, as there was concern over the stigmatisation of HIV/
AIDS and national denial of HIV epidemics (cf. UNAIDS 2000, 2002). As such, 
it would be quite natural – indeed, intuitive – from these affective positions to 
assume that Senegal’s low prevalence must have been due to its political response 
or that Uganda’s prevalence declines must have been due to the widely promoted 
multisectoral approach, even if these correlations were illusory. Yet, the fact that 
these values were shared in the global community means that the intuitive ten-
dency to this bias would have been particularly common, and particularly subtle, 
with resultant errors persisting over time (Parkhurst 2013).
Another example of this within the global HIV/AIDS community can be 
seen in the long-held assumption that poverty drives the spread of HIV in low-
income settings (cf. Leroy, Ruel and Verhofstadt 2009; Muntaner 1999; Wodak 
and Cooney 2005). This is a commonly heard statement, yet it has been shown 
to be an oversimplification of the epidemiological realities in most cases. Chin 
(2007), for instance, has illustrated that higher-income African countries tend 
to have higher HIV prevalence, while Parkhurst (2010) has illustrated that it 
is wealthier individuals in several low-income African countries who show 
the highest HIV prevalence rates. These findings may appear counter-intuitive 
and, indeed, when they have been presented to public health Master’s degree 
students (from this author’s personal experiences), some have initially looked 
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92 The subtle politics of evidence
for reasons why the data must be wrong. However, such a response is natural 
for an intelligent, but affectively directed, mind, reflecting Taber and Lodge’s 
(2006) findings of ‘disconfirmation bias’ amongst scientifically sophisticated 
individuals. When we have strong affective feelings on an issue (as public 
health Master’s degree students will inevitably have when discussing HIV pre-
vention and poverty), we instinctively use our skills to counter ‘attitudinally 
 incongruent’ evidence (such as data showing HIV associated with wealth).
Deeper analysis helps to understand the more complex relationships between 
wealth, poverty and HIV infection in low-income countries. HIV, of course, does 
not spread directly through having money (or not having money). Rather, there are 
aspects of wealthy lifestyles that can lead to HIV risk – for example, by living in 
urban areas with a higher background HIV prevalence or by being more mobile and 
linking to wider sexual networks (cf. Deane, Parkhurst and Johnston 2010; Lurie et 
al. 2003). There are equally aspects of poverty that lead to HIV risk – for example, 
when women must rely on transactional sex in situations of food insecurity (cf. 
Weiser et al. 2007). These social drivers are also likely to change over time. Just as 
smoking and obesity-related illness first affected wealthy individuals in many coun-
tries before transitioning to the poor, HIV/AIDS may also follow a similar trend as 
lifestyles change. The realities are clearly complex and at times uncertain, but as 
the heuristics and biases work so often shows, individuals are particularly prone to 
biased judgements of information in situations of complexity or uncertainty.
Some might question if such biases are important when our values are shared, 
asking does it matter if we only focus on the poverty-related risks of HIV, consid-
ering we widely agree that both poverty reduction and HIV reduction are worthy 
goals? The answer to this, of course, lies in Chapters 1 and 2, and the reasons for 
all the calls for improved evidence to inform policy in the first place. Poor evidence 
use risks ineffective or even harmful outcomes. In this case, if we attempted to 
prevent HIV by focusing on reducing poverty or if we blindly assumed that pov-
erty reduction reduces HIV risk, we are likely to be unsuccessful in our goals and 
to miss the fact that some individuals brought out of poverty will face changing 
lifestyles that present new risks of infection. This is not to say that we should leave 
people in poverty for the sake of HIV prevention – that would be a fairly inexcus-
able moral position. But a more technically valid understanding of the evidence, 
achieved by overcoming our cognitive biases, can allow us to instead consider other 
options, such as how to mitigate HIV risk as part of poverty reduction programmes 
(see Parkhurst (2012) for a greater discussion of social values and HIV prevention).
Politicians misleading themselves
If members of the public and scientific experts alike demonstrate evidence of sub-
tle politics biasing their use of evidence, we should not be surprised to see it in 
politicians as well. As the early chapters of this book established, evidence mat-
ters in policymaking because it can assist decision makers to achieve social goals. 
Yet some of the most egregious and well-known misuses and manipulations of evi-
dence can be seen to come from politicians who should, in theory, be working to 
serve their populations. While the previous chapter explored how politicians may 
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The subtle politics of evidence 93
face political incentives (e.g. for re-election) leading to biased uses of evidence, 
there can equally be bias introduced through cognitive mechanisms amongst those 
entrusted to make decisions on behalf of the public.
One illustrative example of this can be to return to the example of Chapter 1 of 
the evidence justifying the 2003 war in Iraq. That chapter highlighted President 
George W. Bush’s widely criticised claims of Iraqi efforts to build weapons of 
mass destruction. Yet the US was not the only country supporting the invasion 
using this (disputed) evidence base. The UK was equally supportive, with Prime 
Minister Tony Blair at the time stating: ‘What I believe the assessed intelligence 
has established beyond doubt is that Saddam [Hussein] has continued to pro-
duce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop 
nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic 
missile programme’ (The Guardian 2002).
Soon after the invasion, however, a key British report evaluated the intel-
ligence evidence behind these claims, highlighting a number of weaknesses and 
problems with the evidence (Lord Butler of Brockwell 2004).* The author of 
the report, Lord Butler, was interviewed years later and asked how such prob-
lematic evidence could have led to such certainty, to which he responded that 
those involved ‘misled themselves’ (Taylor 2013). A similar explanation was 
also used by the former UN Weapons Inspector Hans Blix when he explained 
that he did not feel the Bush administration deliberately misled the public, but 
rather ‘they misled themselves’ (Tufts University 2005).
But what does this mean for politicians to ‘mislead themselves’ when evalu-
ating evidence? The subtle politics of evidence explored in this chapter provides 
some potential explanations. Notably, both assessments (by Butler and Blix) 
concluded that the individuals involved were not deliberately trying to mislead. 
If deliberate, it would be a clear case of overt bias – strategic manipulation of 
evidence to achieve pre-set political goals. Instead, these assessments appear 
to indicate that the administrations were subject to unconscious errors, poten-
tially including confirmation bias, illustrated by taking inconclusive evidence 
as ‘proof’ for a decision that was consonant with existing affinities or past expe-
riences, e.g. pre-existing beliefs that Saddam Hussein was the type of person 
who was likely to work to obtain such weapons. Indeed, Blix further stated that 
the Bush administration ‘were not critically thinking. They wanted to come to 
these conclusions’ (Tufts University 2005).
Unconsciously biased towards ‘what works’?
Finally, the cognitive sciences can also provide insights into the widespread, but 
often critiqued, embrace of the language of ‘what works’, and the deference to 
randomised controlled trials and hierarchies of evidence by some in the EBP 
movement. As explained in Chapter 2, there are some important problems with 
* At the time this book was going to press, another report on the UK's participation in the war led by 
Sir John Chilcot was published, which again identified errors in the assessment of evidence in the 
lead up to the war. See: http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/.
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94 The subtle politics of evidence
the idea that we can simply follow evidence of ‘what works’ to guide policymak-
ing. First, this fails to recognise that evidence of effect may not reflect the political 
priority of an intervention. Similarly, the ‘what works’ language can serve to mar-
ginalise more complex social policy goals and strategies – such as those dealing 
with disease prevention, long-term reductions in crime, holistic improvements in 
education, social change to improve gender equality, and the like – in lieu of more 
simplistic approaches such as managing the outcomes of these issues. The what 
works language also confuses the internal and external validity of research evi-
dence – internal validity representing whether an intervention produced the result 
where it was done and external validity addressing whether it would produce the 
same result elsewhere (or specifically in a particular target policy context).
Sanderson has been critical of the reductionism to what works in the EBP 
movement by explaining that this thinking ‘reflects the attractions of instrumental 
rationality as a response to the growing challenge of social complexity’ (2009, 
p. 700). In many ways, then, equating policymaking with questions of ‘what 
works’ serves to replace the challenging, but essential, political question of 
‘what should we do in our situation?’ with the simpler (more attractive) ques-
tion of ‘what produces an effect?’ This replacement, however, can be seen to 
reflect Kahneman’s (2002) description of attribute substitution – unconsciously 
substituting a complicated question with a more easily answerable one. As our 
discussion of issue bias has explored so far, there are genuine political implica-
tions of this substitution, because it can change where policy attention lies or 
which policy choices are prioritised.
Features of policy problems and mechanisms of bias
Just as in the previous chapter, which explored the origins of bias arising from 
the competitive pursuit of political interests, by understanding the unconscious 
mechanisms that manifest in bias, we can again find ourselves better positioned 
to expect when these may arise in policy arenas. Cognition may not be ‘rational’ 
(in the neoclassical economic sense), but as Ariely (2008) has stated, humans, 
and their cognitive errors, are in many ways ‘predictably irrational’. In Chapter 4 
we introduced how three key features of policy problems – the complexity of the 
issue, the level of contestation and the polarisation of the policy debate – could 
result in bias through overt mechanisms. We again use these features to reflect on 
how they may also engender bias through more subtle cognitive routes.
Complexity (and issue complication)
As before, it can be useful to utilise complexity theory’s distinction between 
problems being complicated, when they involve multiple difficult, but solvable, 
elements, and when they are complex, involving some aspects of uncertainty 
(or even unsolvability). This is because each of these two types of problem may 
invoke the use of different heuristics and their associated biases. In difficult 
(complicated) cases, the problems may be answerable with sufficient evidence, 
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but reliance on ‘fast’ thinking can still result in intuitive calculation errors, as 
well as other errors such as attribute substitution, representative bias or illusory 
correlation. As explored above, this may explain the instances of errors in the 
earlier discussions of AIDS in Africa, as ‘slower’ thinking could have potentially 
avoided some unfounded conclusions. In contrast, when faced with problems 
typified by uncertainty, thinking ‘slow’ cannot eliminate all unknowns, and 
other heuristics that deal with situations of partial information may still exist 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1974). The cognitive bias towards a distrust in science, 
for example, appears to be particularly relevant in cases where unknowns exist in 
policy- relevant science. Finally, having multiple social concerns at stake in com-
plicated policy issues can increase the chances of affective reasoning on any one 
relevant concern, as well as the likelihood of situations of cognitive dissonance 
arising when values do not perfectly align between the multiple outcomes at stake.
Contestation/importance of the issue
The level of contestation over policy outcomes can obviously incentivise bias 
in overt ways, but the importance of a policy decision to an individual can also 
influence unconscious biases through what has been termed ‘attitude strength’ 
(Pomerantz, Chaiken and Tordesillas 1995). Studies have shown, for instance, 
that greater attitude strength can increase the utilisation of affective heuristics in 
particular, resulting in associated biases such as a greater misperception of risks or 
selective information gathering (Alhakami and Slovic 1994; Brannon, Tagler and 
Eagly 2007). High attitude strength may again help explain some of the examples 
of unconscious bias seen in the work of experts in the global health and develop-
ment community. Individuals working in these fields have often chosen to do 
so because of strongly held values about social justice and a genuine desire to 
improve people’s lives. Yet the stronger our convictions, the more susceptible 
we may be to particular affective biases – even for expert professionals. Finally, 
attitude strength can also influence the intensity of cognitive dissonance felt when 
evidence does not align with values. This was seen by Taber and Lodge (2006), 
for instance, who found that stronger prior held beliefs on controversial subjects 
(i.e. gun control or affirmative action) would increase confirmation bias to avoid 
cognitive dissonance.
Polarisation
The motivated reasoning research on affective biases, along with that on ‘identity 
protective cognition’, which explores bias deriving from a desire to remain congru-
ent with an existing affinity group, has further implications when policy issues are 
highly polarised. However, we can also distinguish between two features of polari-
sation: the polarisation of the policy issue on the one hand and the polarisation of 
the political environment on the other.
As described in the previous chapter, the polarisation of a policy issue 
can refer to how many possible policy options or compromise positions 
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96 The subtle politics of evidence
are  available within a single policy decision. Polarisation of the political envi-
ronment, on the other hand, would refer to how wide a spectrum of political 
viewpoints and positions is held within a society more broadly. Kahan, for 
instance, describes a ‘ubiquity and ferocity of ideological conflicts over facts 
that turn on empirical evidence’ (2013, p. 407) in the US, which he sees, in part, 
as due to the polarisation of American politics. Indeed, scholars have described 
a tendency for declining political agreement or middle ground between liberals 
and conservatives over time in the American political environment (Layman, 
Carsey and Horowitz 2006; Pew Reseach Center 2014), in contrast to some 
European countries, which may be governed by multi-party coalitions and, as 
such, are more typified by political bargaining and compromise (Laver and 
Schofield 1998).
A polarised policy issue (for example, that of abortion or gay marriage, in 
which there are only two possible choices) could engender technically biased 
uses of evidence because any evidence that is dissonant to a policy position 
would imply support for a radically extreme opposite choice – there is no middle 
ground. This could thus lead to greater negative affective feelings and increased 
disconfirmation bias. In a polarised policy environment, on the other hand, the 
influence of ‘identity protective cognition’ will be particularly strong, as indi-
viduals may find themselves in widely divided social and personal networks split 
along political lines. In such cases, any interpretation of evidence that is in disa-
greement with the affinity group risks more extreme social isolation or ostracism 
than would be the case in a political environment with a range of middle-ground 
political positions.
A highly polarised political environment would also be likely to show high 
levels of clustering of distinct sets of social concerns. This could engender 
issue bias from groups on either side of the debate as they present evidence 
internally consistent with existing views by only including issues belonging 
to their preferred cluster – so, for example, in US health care reform debates, 
liberals may present evidence of how proposed policies address equity or 
the needs of marginalised groups, as these are core values that they typically 
cluster around, while conservatives may present evidence relating to different 
concerns, such as  government spending, individual choice, or the impact on 
employers.
A cognitive political model of evidentiary bias
Combining the insights in the previous chapter with those developed here allows 
a construction of what can be termed a cognitive political model of evidentiary 
bias. This model maps out the features of the policy problem discussed and how 
they can generate both technical and issue bias, recognising that the mechanisms 
that engender bias can be both overt and subtle. The development of such a model, 
summarised in Table 5.1 below, can be used both to predict when bias may arise 
as well as to help inform strategies to mitigate or potentially avoid instances of 
evidentiary bias.
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98 The subtle politics of evidence
Understanding the problem to identify solutions
There are some who feel that the hard-wired nature of cognitive bias and motivated 
reasoning destine us all to a life of political irrationality. Kraft and colleagues are 
particularly pessimistic, speculating that ‘if science denial stems from motivated 
reasoning processes that are fundamental to our basic cognitive architecture, we 
may simply not have the capacity to separate the evaluation of facts and reasons 
in a policy dispute from our hopes for which way the evidence will point’ (2015, 
pp. 130–131). They similarly refer to the work of Bargh (1999), who describes 
unconscious information processing as a ‘cognitive monster’ that is particularly 
hard to control. Others have argued that such biases present a critical challenge to 
the democratic ideal. Taber and Lodge, for instance, state that: ‘From one perspec-
tive the average citizen would appear to be both cognitively and motivationally 
incapable of fulfilling the requirements of rational behaviour in a democracy’ 
(2006, p. 767). Richey (2012) has asked if cognitive bias represents a ‘death knell’ 
for deliberative democracy due to how it can undermine the idealised form of 
rational debate seen as a prerequisite for democratic decision making.
Others, however, are more optimistic, with Sherman arguing that ‘the control-
lability of such biases has been underestimated’ (2008, p. 391). Indeed, there is 
evidence to believe that when sources of bias can be made visible and understood, 
they can be avoided or overcome at times. Lewandowsky et al. (2012), for example, 
describe how correcting misinformation has been found to entrench bias further in 
some experiments, but go on to discuss strategies that may work to offset this pro-
cess in political debates. Bias offsetting has also been implemented in professional 
environments as well. In the medical profession, for example, cognitive biases 
leading to treatment errors have been addressed by formalising procedural check-
lists (Gawande and Lloyd 2010) or through the active consideration of alternative 
outcomes (Arkes 1981). Similarly, in the sport of professional basketball, evi-
dence showing unconscious racial bias by referees was overcome by making them 
aware of the bias in the first place (Pope, Price and Wolfers 2015). Morewedge 
et al. (2015) alternatively found that training interventions could reduce multiple 
cognitive biases relevant to strategic intelligence analysis, while Kahneman and 
colleagues (2011) have devised a checklist to follow before making a ‘big deci-
sion’ to help make individuals consciously consider if they might be influenced by 
biasing tendencies such as the affect heuristic, self-interest or confirmation bias.
Indeed, this chapter’s construction of a cognitive-political model of evi-
dentiary bias aims to provide a more strategic position from which to identify 
where biases arise, so as to help consider the bias mitigation strategies that may 
be useful in evidence-informed policy arenas. So, for example, we can consider 
how to design deliberative spaces which serve to depolarise discussions, such 
as by encouraging direct consideration of challenging positions and creating 
‘safe spaces’ for alternative views, or by ensuring appropriate heterogeneity in 
the makeup of deliberating stakeholders (Sunstein 1999). We can also consider 
how to de-incentivise the evaluation process in order to reduce the importance 
of the issue to individuals involved – e.g. by ensuring autonomy from political 
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interference for evidence advisors or to reduce pressure to show results. It may 
be early to draw firm conclusions, but there is clearly a very large area for future 
work to develop and test strategies to mitigate the many forms of bias mapped 
out in the cognitive political framework in Table 5.1. However, understanding 
the political origins of bias in greater depth is an important first step in this task.
Conclusion
The previous chapter discussed the incentives for biased uses of evidence deriv-
ing from competition within policy arenas. This chapter complements this by 
exploring the subtle politics of evidence that drives bias through cognitive pro-
cesses linked to our values and belief systems. It is of course not new to recognise 
that our values can affect our decisions in both conscious and unconscious ways. 
Awareness of human errors in judgement has been recorded for centuries, and 
political incentives or conflicts of interests driving strategic uses of evidence 
have long been recognised. Yet recent advances in the cognitive sciences provide 
even greater insights into the origins and mechanisms of cognitive bias, particu-
larly in situations of complexity, uncertainty and conflicting motivations.
As much as evidence can help improve the quality and effectiveness of social 
policy, biased uses of evidence risk undermining these goals, leading to inefficient 
policy decisions as well as seeming intractability when debates are unable to get 
beyond contradictory claims about evidence (Schön and Rein 1994). Given all we 
now know about bias, it could be argued that many of these outcomes should no 
longer be accepted as inevitable. Indeed, we can argue that it is inexcusable for 
heads of state to ‘allow themselves to be misled’ or to ‘not critically think’ when 
considering policy decisions as profound as whether to go to war. Similarly, we 
know enough about the incentives driving the overt political manipulation of evi-
dence that we should no longer be surprised when groups with strong incentives to 
do so are found to be ‘cheating’ or manipulating data. The importance of accurate 
evidence use to inform decisions about education, public safety, climate change, 
health care or military action is too important, and the state of knowledge is too 
well established, to continue to perpetuate the eighteenth-century ‘Enlightenment 
thinking’ assumption that we are naturally rational, or to accept a naïve idealism 
that evidence will always be respected and honoured. We are all subject to biases 
and are all subject to incentives, particularly when our values (or the things we 
value) are at stake. There is no need to continue drawing erroneous conclusions 
from data, pursuing ineffective policy options or perpetuating undesirable social 
outcomes based on ignorance of these well-established principles – neither from 
our scientific experts, nor from elected officials who shoulder the responsibility 
of public policymaking.
Avoiding evidentiary errors and mitigating biases in the ways in which evi-
dence is used to inform public policy can therefore be seen as part of the broader 
goal of improving the use of evidence in policymaking and ultimately achieving 
the great potential for evidence use outlined in Chapter 2. However, fully realis-
ing this goal requires a consideration of a number of additional issues in order to 
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100 The subtle politics of evidence
take the next steps beyond the current approaches of the EBP movement. First, 
we need to consider what constitutes good evidence for policy, given the critique 
of oversimplified appeals to hierarchies of evidence. Second, we need to consider 
what constitutes a good use of evidence from a political perspective in terms of 
how multiple values or interests are considered in processes that are reliant on 
evidence. Finally, there is a need to consider how to institutionalise structures, 
rules, norms and practices that serve to improve evidence use in policymaking in 
these ways. Each of these questions is addressed in turn in the final chapters that 
make up Part III of this book. In combination, they serve to construct the idea of 
the good governance of evidence to help address the challenges and issues raised 
so far, describing a normative ideal in which unbiased, rigorous and relevant evi-
dence is used to inform decisions that remain representative of, and accountable 
to, local populations.
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6 What is ‘good evidence for policy’?
From hierarchies to appropriate evidence1
What is evidence for anyway?
It is perhaps worth revisiting some of the early discussions of the initial chapters 
of this book to reflect on the reasons as to why evidence is seen as important 
in policymaking in the first place. A number of claims have been made about 
the benefits of evidence, but perhaps the most common is to hold that more or 
better uses of evidence can improve decision making in terms of policy effective-
ness and programme efficiency (cf. Coalition for Evidence-Based Policy 2015; 
UK Government 2013). From this conceptualisation, when used accurately and 
with fidelity to scientific best practices, evidence tells us ‘what works’ to achieve 
programme goals so as to obtain improved outcomes, to save valuable limited 
resources and to select effective solutions to social problems (see similar discus-
sion in Dhaliwal and Tulloch 2012; Shaxson 2005). Yet the conceptualisation of 
policymaking as an exercise in technical problem solving and discussions of evi-
dence which appear to remove political considerations have led to many criticisms 
of the EBP movement outlined in Chapter 2, including a failure to understand the 
decidedly contested nature of policymaking and the risk of imposing a de facto set 
of policy priorities through the promotion of particular types of evidence.
However, Sanderson (2009) has argued that the realities of the policy process 
need not resign us to accept political manipulation of evidence. Despite the robust 
critique of EBP, he argues that we should retain the pragmatic normative goal 
of using evidence to improve social policy outcomes, while also recognising the 
complexity of the policy process. But given the discussions so far, the pursuit of 
a decidedly normative vision requires explicit consideration of several concerns 
of both evidence champions and their critics alike. Incorporating ideas from both 
camps requires conceptualising an improved use of evidence as one that ensures 
fidelity to scientific good practices, that applies evidence to achieve social goals 
and that also ensures that evidence-informed policy decisions remain democrati-
cally representative of the public’s values. Yet, this conceptualisation compels us 
to more directly ask a set of key questions about how we can judge what better 
1 Several ideas presented here are adapted from a previous paper published in Parkhurst and 
Abeysinghe (2016).
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108 What is ‘good evidence for policy’?
evidence for policy would look like, as well as what a better use of evidence 
in policymaking would be. This chapter begins with the first of these questions, 
revisiting the nature of policy-relevant evidence and asking what constitutes good 
evidence for policymaking given these normative ideals. Chapter 7 then follows 
by addressing the question of ‘what is the good use of evidence?’ with a focus on 
the policymaking process itself.
Beyond gold standards
As Chapter 2 explained, one of the main conceptual holdovers from the field of 
evidence-based medicine has been the widespread, and often uncritical, embrace 
of so-called ‘hierarchies of evidence’ to judge the relevance of evidence to 
inform policy decisions – typically placing methodologies such as randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs) or meta-analyses at the top of such hierarchies and often 
referring to them as the ‘gold standard’ of evidence. However, that chapter noted 
that these hierarchies were principally designed to judge evidence of intervention 
effect, not necessarily to reflect policy importance or relevance per se. Previous 
chapters have also noted that confusing evidentiary rigour with policy importance 
further risks generating issue bias by serving to prioritise those policy concerns 
that happen to be conducive to experimental evaluation.
Even within the health sector, other social concerns such as affordability, accept-
ability, equity or human rights are often key concerns for policy  consideration – 
yet these may not be conducive to study via experimental trials. As Glasziou, 
Vandenbroucke and Chalmers have succinctly noted, ‘different types of question 
require different types of evidence’ (2004, p. 39), which has led Petticrew and 
Roberts (2003) to propose a typology of evidence based on the type of question 
being addressed (acceptability of a health intervention, effectiveness, satisfaction, 
etc.) as an alternative to a single hierarchy for health planning (see also the dis-
cussion in Parkhurst and Abeysinghe 2016). Dobrow et al. have made similar 
observations, also reflecting on the need for health policy-relevant evidence to be 
applicable locally, explaining that: ‘Interpretation of evidence must acknowledge 
the varying nature of evidence for different policy objectives, balancing existing 
emphasis on evidentiary quality with more sophisticated methods for assessing 
the generalizability of evidence’ (2006, p. 1181).
However, if traditional hierarchies do not provide the right tools by which to meas-
ure all policy-relevant evidence (even in the health sector from which they developed), 
this begs the question of how else we can go about judging what constitutes good 
evidence for public policymaking more broadly. This needs to be considered further 
in light of the normative concerns outlined above: that science is used accurately, that 
evidence works to achieve social goals and that evidence is utilised through processes 
that do not undermine the democratic representation of social concerns.
A starting point to consider this question can be taken from an analysis of the 
use of science and technology to inform policymaking within the field of sustain-
able development. As part of a broad research programme, Cash et al. (2003) 
reflected on a set of case studies that each analysed the knowledge systems which 
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What is ‘good evidence for policy’? 109
were used to inform decisions on environmental sustainability across a range of 
countries and regions (ranging from southern Africa to the Arctic). The authors 
found that the effectiveness of science to inform policy rested on three key 
 attributes – credibility, salience and legitimacy – explaining:
Credibility involves the scientific adequacy of the technical evidence and 
arguments. Salience deals with the relevance of the assessment to the needs 
of decision-makers. Legitimacy reflects the perceptions that the production 
of information and technology has been respectful of stakeholders’ divergent 
values and beliefs, unbiased in its conduct, and fair in its treatment of views 
and interest.
(2003, p. 8086)
These findings provide a useful starting point to reflect on how to move beyond hier-
archies of evidence to consider what constitutes both good evidence and the good 
use of evidence from a policy perspective. Good evidence for policy can be seen 
to capture the ideas of credibility and salience identified by Cash and colleagues, 
as these concepts broadly capture the EBP movement’s normative principles of 
fidelity to science and usefulness in order to achieve social goals. The idea of legiti-
macy, on the other hand, would be fundamental to a conceptualisation of what is 
a good use of evidence for policy, as it reflects critical policy scholars’ concerns 
that evidence-informed policy decisions remain democratically representative of 
multiple social interests. Cash et al.’s findings were empirically derived, but we can 
further complement and expand on these insights with deeper conceptual engage-
ment as well. The next chapter will deal with the process of using evidence for 
policy, but here we will first turn to the concerns over the evidence itself.
The appropriateness of evidence for policy needs
There is obviously no point in using ‘high quality’ evidence that is not relevant 
to the policy considerations at hand. As such, the first aspect discussed here of 
what might constitute ‘good evidence for policy’ expands on Cash et al.’s concept 
of salience by drawing on three related disciplinary fields in order to develop a 
framework of what is termed the appropriateness2 of evidence for policy needs. 
The first field utilised is that of policy studies, which understands politics as 
involving multiple competing concerns and allows explicit reflection on which 
bodies of evidence address the political concerns at stake. The second is that of 
2 The term ‘appropriateness’ is one that has also been used in political science to describe the rule-
based logic that is built into political institutions and shapes the political thinking of individuals 
on what is considered correct behaviour – the so-called ‘logic of appropriateness’ of March and 
Olsen (2006). This is a broader interpretation than applied here, but there is an overlap in terms of 
recognition that key concerns or principles will shape thinking on what should be done, thus driving 
subsequent behaviour. Indeed, the concept of a good governance of evidence defined in the final 
chapter similarly can also be seen as constructing a ‘logic of appropriateness’ for the use of evidence 
which can be built into evidence-to-policy institutional arrangements.
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sociology (and the sociology of knowledge), which fundamentally questions the 
way we construct and define data, and allows reflection of whether evidence is 
created in ways that are useful for policy concerns. The final field is that of the 
philosophy of science, which explores the causality and generalisability of social 
interventions in depth and, as such, allows reflection of how well evidence can be 
applied within a particular policy context.
Policy studies: decisions involve multiple concerns
The field of policy studies has informed much of the thinking in this book so far 
and has already provided the first insight into the limitations of existing hierar-
chies to provide a measure of good evidence for policy. Specifically, this relates to 
the recognition that policymaking involves multiple concerns and that outcomes 
of interest are often contested (Heywood 2007; Lasswell 1990 [1936]; Stone 
2002). This of course implies that there are likely to be multiple bodies of relevant 
evidence to consider, depending on which policy outcomes are deemed important.
Indeed, when Harold Lasswell (1970) described the idea of the ‘policy sci-
ences’ in the 1970s as a problem-oriented way to study and address social issues, 
he noted that the first intellectual task involved in this exercise must be that of 
‘goal clarification’. Yet there are no shortages of examples where discussions of 
evidence within social policy fields fail on this first task – by not making explicit 
the goals desired or the ultimate objectives of the programme of work. For many 
authors, the increasing reliance on RCTs or evidence hierarchies to guide policy-
making risks obscuring the fundamental issue of goal clarification even further, 
and an example of this can be seen in the case of international development 
policymaking, presented in Box 6.1 below.
Box 6.1 What is good evidence for development policy?
The field of international development provides a useful example to illustrate the 
importance of being clear on policy goals and on how the embrace of experimen-
tal evidence may risk obscuring these goals as well. The development community, 
like many other social policy fields, has seen an evidence revolution of sorts in the 
past decade. Growing from a recognition that a large amount of aid money may 
have been squandered on ineffective programmes in the past (Court, Hovland and 
Young 2005), we see increasing calls for development policy to be informed by 
research evidence, and for international aid to show evidence of effect. This has 
led to a range of international research bodies and global agencies now embrac-
ing the language of ‘evidence-based’ development policy, similarly reflected in the 
launch of the Journal of Development Effectiveness in 2009 with the aim ‘to support 
evidence-based policy making to enhance development effectiveness’ (Taylor and 
Francis Online 2015).
The discourse of evidence-based development policy has also been accompanied 
by a proliferation of efforts to undertake more rigorous evaluations of interventions 
done in the name of development, including the growing embrace of RCTs to test
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the effects of development interventions (Deaton 2009). Groups such as J-PAL 
(the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab) at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and Innovations for Poverty Action have particularly established 
themselves as leaders in the field of development evaluation through their use of 
experimental methods to evaluate a wide range of interventions, including cash 
transfers to families, access to credit to farmers, grants or performance-based pay 
for school teachers, provision of mass deworming treatments, etc. (Innovations for 
Poverty Action undated, J-PAL undated). 
There is, however, a critical difference between evaluating whether interventions 
produce a beneficial effect and answering the question of what is good evidence 
for development policy (and, as Chapter 5 noted, it risks falling into the trap of 
attribute substitution if these two questions are conflated). This is because there is 
a much larger debate in the development community over what, in fact, are the key 
outcomes of interest for development policy – or, more fundamentally, around the 
question of what international development should look like. Goal clarification in 
this field, is therefore particularly important.
For many development scholars, the answer relates to economics. A number of 
authors evaluating the impact of foreign aid, for instance, have equated the goal of 
development with that of economic growth (cf. Cassen 1986). Indeed, Collier and 
Dollar justify this approach by stating that ‘poverty reduction is the central goal of 
aid programmes’ (2001, p. 3). Others, however, have argued that economic growth 
should not be the sole aim of development. Amartya Sen’s work provides an alterna-
tive conceptualisation of the goal of development as a process of expanding freedoms 
by enhancing human capabilities – working to establish situations where people have 
the choice of which personal and social goals to achieve (Sen 1990, 1999). Others 
have alternatively asked whether foreign aid improves democracy (Knack 2004) and 
more recent critics of development efforts have also raised concerns over inequality 
as a result of aid (Deaton 2013) or over aid perpetuating corruption by undermining 
the responsibility of the state for its own citizens (Moyo 2009).
Whatever one’s position on what is important for development – growth, poverty 
reduction, equality, state responsibility, democracy or freedoms – these considera-
tions must be made explicit if there is any chance for development policy to be well 
informed by evidence. Asking ‘what works for development’ requires some form 
of goal clarification. Experimental evaluations may be methodologically rigorous, 
but they often select a narrow set of outcome indicators to measure – telling us 
whether funding for schools improves enrolment or whether the provision of bed-
nets reduces the number of cases of malaria, for example. Yet there is a broader 
question of whether ‘development’ is achieved by having foreign governments pay 
families to send their children to school or by having philanthropists hand out nets. 
RCT methods are not designed to evaluate those broader questions and their useful-
ness needs to be considered with respect to the broad goals at stake, not just in terms 
of the immediate impacts they are well purposed to evaluate.
In order to be able to judge whether evidence is ‘good’, then, the first ques-
tion we must ask is if it is relevant to the goals or purposes of the policy itself. 
Graphically we can use a simple diagram to illustrate the fact that, of the entire 
field of evidence available, there will be a sub-set of evidence that can be judged 
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112 What is ‘good evidence for policy’?
to be relevant in this way, illustrated simply in Figure 6.1 below. It is worth not-
ing that some evidence outside the smaller circle in Figure 6.1 will be of high 
quality or come from methods commonly held at the top of hierarchies of evi-
dence. But this does not necessarily mean that it is evidence of great usefulness 
to the policy decision at hand.
Good practice in evidence-informed policymaking must therefore start by incor-
porating a principle of goal clarification – making relevant policy concerns explicit. 
Without a clear indication of these, it is impossible to say whether evidence is 
good, or not, from a policy perspective, and it opens the door to issue bias as evi-
dence of effect related to any potential outcome of interest can be  championed on 
the basis of quality alone.
Sociological perspectives: evidence is constructed 
(in more or less useful ways)
A second disciplinary perspective that can help to reflect on what evidence might 
be considered appropriate for policymaking is that of sociology. Sociologists of 
knowledge (or of science) have particularly noted how social norms, ideologies 
Figure 6.1 Evidence may or may not address the policy concerns at hand.
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What is ‘good evidence for policy’? 113
and power relations can be constructed into the creation of knowledge itself 
(cf. Bloor 1991; Longhurst 1989; Merton 1973) – describing data as a ‘social 
product’ (Krieger 1992, p. 413). As such, these perspectives recognise that what 
counts as evidence, including, for example, how variables are defined, will be 
a reflection of the culture or environment in which it is produced. The linked 
field of science and technology studies (STS) has further explored the dynamic 
boundaries between science and policy, illustrating that the ideas of what con-
stitutes expertise, or what is seen as policy-relevant science, can actually be 
continually constructed and redefined throughout the policy process (cf. Gieryn 
1999; Jasanoff 1987).
Many natural scientists and champions of EBP can find such concepts initially 
frustrating, as they appear to undermine the certainty of evidence or to challenge 
the foundations on which they base their reliance on evidence to justify action. 
Yet while epistemological differences no doubt present challenges across dis-
ciplines, from a normative perspective, based on the desire to use evidence to 
improve social welfare, these insights can actually provide a useful additional ele-
ment to reflect on good evidence for policymaking. Fundamentally, they point to 
the fact that if evidence can be constructed in many possible ways (each of which 
may be judged technically valid), this provides a choice of how to construct and 
classify data based on the goals at hand.
So, for example, applied to health care, sociological perspectives have ena-
bled a better understanding of how health outcomes arise from factors other than 
just biology. Krieger (1992) presents the example of Louis René Villermé, an 
epidemiologist working in Paris in the early 1800s, who recategorised data on 
mortality to explore the importance of neighbourhoods on health outcomes. While 
it is perhaps obvious today that neighbourhood residence can shape health, at the 
time, this fundamentally challenged ideas of how to study health determinants 
and helped open the door to a range of new public health policy options. More 
modern studies have similarly shown that patterns of health (or ill health) can be 
shaped through social relations related to gender (Courtenay 2000; Doyal 2000), 
 ethnicity (Krieger et al. 2003) or class (Marmot and Wilkinson 2009; Wilkinson 
2002). This perspective has led Krieger (1992) to note that the ways in which data 
are collected and reported will shape how problems are perceived, with important 
implications for the level of support or opposition that different programmes (i.e. 
policy responses) receive:
Label infant mortality a problem of ‘minorities’ and present data only on 
racial/ethnic differences in rates, and the White poor disappear from view; 
label it as a ‘poverty’ issue and proffer data stratified only by income, and 
the impact of racism on people of colour at each income level is hidden from 
sight; define the ‘race’ or socioeconomic position of the infant solely in terms 
of the mother’s characteristics, and the contributions of the father’s traits 
and household class position to patterns of infant mortality likewise will be 
obscured.
(1992, p. 412)
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114 What is ‘good evidence for policy’?
In these ways, the classification of population groups can affect both the support 
for policy action and the policy options available to the decision maker.
The field of HIV/AIDS prevention provides another example of this. It has been 
known for decades that a primary route of HIV transmission is through sexual 
contact. As such, it is clearly important to gather evidence about sexual practices 
in susceptible populations to help guide prevention efforts, and many low and 
middle-income countries take part in regular population health surveys that pro-
vide such information.3 Yet for years, the sexual behaviour data collected in these 
surveys were limited to questions such as age at sexual initiation, number of past 
partners and use of a condom during the last sex act. However, over time, social 
epidemiologists and epidemiological modellers have questioned the usefulness 
of such evidence alone. So, for instance, it is recognised that HIV spreads more 
quickly through linked sexual networks and multiple concurrent sexual partners 
(Epstein and Morris 2011; Halperin and Epstein 2004). This recognition has led 
to some asking if we need changes to survey questions to attempt to capture con-
currency data (Fishel, Ortiz and Barrère 2012) so as to inform more  appropriate 
policy solutions to address this dynamic (Kalichman and Grebler 2010).
Sociologically informed approaches have further explained how sexual activity 
is not an individual characteristic, but rather a social phenomenon, with practices 
shaped at a group level (Hilber et al. 2012; Kippax, Holt and Friedman 2011; 
Kippax et al. 2013). Such an understanding allows alternative approaches to HIV 
prevention that address things like the social and structural drivers of risk practices 
(Seeley et al. 2012; AIDS2031 Social Drivers Working Group 2010). However, 
these new approaches need alternative evidence than what was provided in early 
surveys, requiring information about things like gender norms, economic drivers of 
sexual patterns or the social meanings associated with protected sex (Blankenship, 
Bray and Merson 2000; Parker, Easton and Klein 2000; Parkhurst 2014; Sumartojo 
2000). In these ways, a critical reflection on the constructed nature of the evidence 
available may, in fact, open up greater policy options to achieve desired goals.
In Figure 6.2 (see following page), a similar figure to Figure 6.1 helps to illus-
trate how only a select range of evidence constructions will provide the most 
appropriate information for the policy goals at hand. As before, there will be con-
structions of evidence that rank highly in hierarchies of evidence that sit outside 
the small circle in this figure, but the lens of appropriateness would require first 
considering how useful the evidence is for particular goals.
Philosophy of science: generalisability and evidence in context 
The philosophy of science provides a final perspective to help develop a con-
ceptualisation of appropriate evidence. Some authors in this discipline have also 
identified that technical language on ‘hierarchies of evidence’ can obscure the 
political nature of policymaking (cf. Goldenberg 2006), but there is a particularly 
strong strand of work in this field that addresses the concepts of causality and 
3 See http://www.dhsprogram.com for examples.
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What is ‘good evidence for policy’? 115
generalisability in evidence production as well. This captures the points noted 
in Chapter 2 in particular about the need to distinguish between the internal 
and external validity of evaluation studies – i.e. showing that an intervention 
that worked in one place does not necessarily mean that the intervention works 
always and everywhere. As Cartwright explains: ‘For policy and practice we do 
not need to know “it works somewhere”. We need evidence for “it-will-work-
for-us”’ (2011, p. 1401).
It was further explained in Chapter 2 that the generalisability assumed with 
most clinical trials arises from pre-existing knowledge about shared features of 
human biochemistry or anatomy, which provide the mechanisms through which 
clinical interventions produce a result. Yet the nature of the social world can 
be quite different, with interventions often working through alternative mecha-
nisms in differing contexts (Cartwright 2011; Cartwright and Hardie 2012; 
Worrall 2010). This can be a particular challenge for the application of the 
method of meta-analysis to social concerns. Meta-analyses typically combine 
findings from multiple experiments to use a larger sample size than any one trial 
in order to have greater certainty of effect. It is a key tool promoted by the EBP 
Figure 6.2 Evidence may be constructed in ways more or less useful for policy goals.
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116 What is ‘good evidence for policy’?
movement, with a graphic presenting the results of a meta-analysis (on the use 
of corticosteroids in women about to give birth prematurely) even serving as the 
logo of the Cochrane Collaboration, the highly regarded global initiative that 
reviews evidence to guide clinical practice.
Yet systematically reviewing experimental trials and combining their results 
into a single point estimate typically relies on the assumption that the identi-
cal mechanism of effect exists across trials. Corticosteroids work in a pregnant 
woman through the same mechanisms in Tampa as in Timbuktu. Yet this is not 
necessarily the case for many social interventions. Chapter 2 illustrated this with 
the example of Robert Martinson’s work that reviewed all published English-
language reports on prisoner rehabilitation from a 20-year period and found ‘no 
clear pattern to indicate the efficacy of any particular method of treatment’ (1974, 
p. 49). Over two decades later, Pawson and Tilley (1997) noted that this was 
the most cited paper in the history of evaluation research and was widely inter-
preted as a conclusion that ‘nothing works’ for prison reform. Yet they explain 
that this study created ‘an impossibly stringent criterion for “success”’ (1997, 
p. 9), requiring studies to show impact across all included populations. Instead, 
they argue that it is more important to consider what works for whom in which 
circumstances, noting that the more useful conclusion to draw from Martinson’s 
review is that ‘most things have been found sometimes to work’ (1997, p. 10).
We can return to the case of HIV prevention described above to see another 
example of this. Just as it was noted how the construction of evidence may be 
important to guide HIV prevention efforts, we can also recognise that the socially 
determined nature of many HIV risk practices means that many interventions 
might only work sometimes, requiring direct consideration of the mechanisms by 
which interventions have their effect in different contexts. A useful illustration of 
this comes in the form of recent experimental trials evaluating the provision of 
cash transfers to prevent HIV in African settings. Johnston has argued that cash 
transfers are a current fashion in Africa, ‘liked by almost everyone, seemingly 
effective and potentially cheap’ (2015, p. 409), yet she explains how evaluation 
of these programmes has shown particularly mixed results for HIV prevention. 
In some interventions, cash transfers resulted in lower HIV incidence (fewer new 
infections) compared to control groups, in others, it resulted in lower incidence 
for some but not all intervention sub-groups and in yet others, there was no sig-
nificant difference for any groups (Johnston 2015). However, no doubt one of the 
main reasons for this is the simple fact that money will be used in different ways 
by people in different settings, which will only occasionally affect their HIV risk 
behaviours.
So, for instance, if women are reliant on selling sex to make ends meet, a cash 
transfer could conceivably reduce this high-risk practice. Yet in situations where 
having access to cash alternatively leads to broader social and sexual networking, 
this might inadvertently increase risk (Parkhurst 2010). Indeed, if a cash transfer 
was given to a population group known to routinely pay money for sex (such as 
travelling businessmen in some contexts), this could have the opposite effect to 
that intended on HIV risk behaviour.
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What is ‘good evidence for policy’? 117
A meta-analysis of cash transfers for HIV prevention might seem a good 
idea, but there would be little usefulness of any point estimate of impact found 
by combining the included studies. Systematically reviewing the literature may 
also be useful, but the lessons to learn from such a review would not come from 
assuming that the mechanism of effect is the same in all people. It is an over-
simplified and erroneous question to ask ‘do cash transfers work?’. Instead, 
reviews would need to look within studies to explore how the intervention was 
delivered and how it brought about an effect. Methods such as ‘process evalua-
tion’ have grown in terms of their use to help investigate some of these elements 
(in particular, looking at which participants received particular components of 
interventions; Saunders, Evans and Joshi 2005) and alternatives such as ‘real-
ist evaluation’ methods have developed to study mechanisms of intervention 
effect in different social contexts (Kazi 2003; Pawson and Tilley 1997). Evidence 
required for these sorts of questions do not necessarily make up the core fea-
tures of experimental trials, but rather they supplement impact evaluations 
with additional methods such as in-depth qualitative or ethnographic analyses, 
Figure 6.3 Evidence may be more or less applicable in the local policy context.
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local surveys or quantitative sub-group analyses to generate evidence about 
mechanisms of effect. Such forms of evidence often rank low in existing hierar-
chies, but they may be particularly appropriate to the central policy question of: 
‘Will it work here?’
Returning to our simple graphics, Figure 6.3 is constructed to illustrate how bod-
ies of evidence may be more or less relevant to the context addressed by the policy 
decision (see Figure 6.3 above). The figure particularly illustrates that there can be 
much evidence ranking highly on hierarchies in terms of quality that may not be 
applicable locally and, as such, may not be appropriate for the given policy needs.
From hierarchies to appropriateness
In combination, the three disciplinary perspectives drawn upon provide clear rea-
sons why hierarchies of evidence, or single methods such as RCTs, should not be 
used as the sole measure of what constitutes ‘good evidence for policy’. However, 
each perspective provides additional insights about which evidence best serves 
policy needs. A lens of appropriateness thus overlaps with Cash et al.’s (2003) 
definition of salience, requiring policy-relevant evidence to address the relevant 
policy concerns at stake, but our discussion above expands on this by identifying 
how appropriate evidence would further consist of evidence constructed in ways 
that are useful to inform those concerns and that is applicable to the local policy 
context. Appropriate evidence, then, can be illustrated by combining the smaller 
inner circles from the three figures above, representing the sub-set of evidence 
that captures when these elements overlap.
Figure 6.4 Appropriate evidence for policy context.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 1
94
.8
0.
22
9.
24
4 
at
 0
4:
48
 0
4 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
 
What is ‘good evidence for policy’? 119
Doesn’t quality matter?
The reader at this point might justifiably ask: but what about evidence quality? 
Indeed, this is the principal concern that hierarchies of evidence have been pro-
moted to address. However, the discussion of appropriateness is not intended to 
diminish the importance of evidentiary quality, merely to supplement it. Simply 
put, quality does still matter, but the way to judge quality should be decided only 
after there is an identification of which evidence is most useful to the policy con-
cern. The fact that certain forms of evidence will be more or less relevant to a 
policy issue does not mean that data variables are purely ‘relative’, with no way 
to judge between them. Rather, methodological pluralism is needed, an approach 
that is ‘based on the principle of choosing the most suitable methods for the 
nature of the problem being researched’ (Payne 2006, p. 174) and for which dif-
fering quality criteria will be relevant depending on the methodologies employed 
(Barker and Pistrang 2005; Dobrow et al. 2006).
So, for example, a relevant policy consideration for a decision maker could 
be the public acceptability of a course of action. Evidence to inform this 
would not rely on experimentation, but might instead involve survey methods. 
However, there are ways to undertake surveys in more (or less) rigorous ways. 
Surveys can be appropriate in terms of their sample size or underpowered. They 
can be biased in their selection of respondents or representative of the popula-
tion. Similarly, another relevant policy concern might be the predicted costs 
over time. Appropriate evidence for this consideration may require economic 
modelling estimates, which in turn will have their own ways to evaluate quality 
and rigour.
Quality judgements can and should be used, but only after the sub-set of appro-
priate evidence is identified. The concern for quality of course overlaps with Cash 
et al.’s (2003) concept of credibility, defined as reflecting the ‘scientific adequacy’ 
of the technical evidence. And while in political debates there may be disagree-
ment over which policy outcomes are most important, there can be agreement 
on the need for fidelity to scientific good practice for any given piece of evi-
dence utilised. As Douglas has explained: ‘While science is neither apolitical nor 
value-free, it can (and should) be pursued with integrity. Detecting science with 
integrity and defining the legitimate roles values play in such science opens the 
space for genuine deliberation and a way forward out of an ideological stalemate’ 
(2015, p. 296).
Bringing the concern with quality and integrity back into our conceptualisa-
tion, then, appropriate evidence for policy can be seen to consist of evidence 
that addresses the political considerations at stake, that is constructed in ways 
that are useful to those considerations and that is applicable to the local policy 
context, while good evidence for policy can subsequently be defined as appro-
priate evidence of high quality. As noted, however, quality must be judged 
by the methodological principles relevant to the evidence base, as well as 
adherence to the broad principles of good scientific practices. So quality still 
matters, even if hierarchies of evidence do not provide the definitive measure 
of it in all cases.
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Being systematic
One particular concern in evidence quality that is worthy of additional discus-
sion is the importance of being systematic in gathering evidence to inform 
policy, particularly given the attention placed on systematic reviews as a tool 
to guide policy action. Being systematic and rigorous, as opposed to selective 
and piecemeal, is obviously an important part of scientific good practice for 
any investigation. Yet systematic reviews are a tool, just as RCTs are. They do 
not necessarily reflect good evidence for policy if they are not applied to the 
most relevant policy concerns or if their use obscures other important issues. 
Systematic reviews are also similar in some ways to meta-analyses in that they 
combine information from multiple sources, and they have been championed 
as better than single RCTs alone in terms of guiding choices between interven-
tions (Chalmers, Hedges and Cooper 2002). But in their methods of combining 
information, they can at times risk stripping out political context and local 
concerns. This has led to Hammersley particularly critiquing the underlying 
assumptions behind systematic reviews, arguing that they may fail to provide 
useful knowledge in many cases (2013, Chapter 8).
Hammersley has been one of the most outspoken critics of the EBP movement, 
but as noted in the introductory chapters, this book is particularly interested in 
finding pragmatic ways forward from these debates. Doing so requires a realistic 
assessment of both the uses and limitations of different methodological tech-
niques. Systematic reviews are one tool of evidence review that has developed to 
help answer particular questions. They do not address all policy-relevant issues 
and they may raise challenges of generalisability for many social policy problems, 
particularly if they focus solely on size of effect rather than on mechanisms of 
effect. But in their favour, they embed in their rules and norms some key principles 
of good scientific practice which should not be ignored. These include concerns 
over transparency, replicability and comprehensiveness, for instance, by listing 
explicitly how studies were found and how inclusion or exclusion criteria were 
used to review evidence (Gough, Oliver and Thomas 2012). Chalmers states quite 
clearly that systematic reviews need to be ‘rigorous, transparent, and up to date’ 
(2003, p. 33). These principles are important, even if systematic reviews, in their 
traditional form, do not address all the policy concerns at stake. The principle of 
being systematic – that is, being thorough, transparent, up to date and consistent 
in approach – is important to almost all forms of evidence generation and review. 
Indeed, these principles are embraced by newer methodologies being developed, 
such as ‘realist review’, which attempts to review literature on social interven-
tions with explicit consideration of how mechanisms of effect work differently in 
different contexts (cf. McCormack et al. 2013; Pawson et al. 2005).
What about gaps in (policy-useful) evidence? 
Perhaps a final caveat worth raising in this discussion of good evidence for policy 
is to recognise that good evidence for policy, as defined here, does not equate to 
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evidence of absolute certainty. Of course, decision makers desire certainty (and 
as Chapter 5 points out, uncertainty can unconsciously drive particular biases), 
but in most real-world settings, many pieces of information of relevance to a deci-
sion may be unknown. Indeed, one of the biggest temptations of RCTs may be 
their allure of providing certainty from their ability to draw conclusions of causal 
effect. Yet only those interventions with simple and direct causal pathways will 
bring such certainty, and this still says nothing of the policy importance of that 
effect.
Some have argued that social policy is more often concerned with questions 
of a complex causal nature than of a simple direct nature (cf. Rittel and Webber 
1973). Long-term and population-wide changes in education, health, crime, 
economic productivity and other fundamental social policy issues will all have 
multiple interacting determinants that are shaped by, or even created by, broader 
contextual factors like the physical environment in which one lives, social cohe-
sion and norms, or the economic opportunities available. These realities can 
therefore result in gaps in knowledge on a regular basis. These realities have been 
highlighted by Davies and Nutley, who have explained:
one observation is clear: the current state of research-based knowledge is 
insufficient to inform many areas of policy and practice. There remain large 
gaps and ambiguities in the knowledge base and the research literature is 
dominated by small, ad hoc studies, often diverse in approach, and of dubious 
methodological quality. In consequence, there is little accumulation from this 
research of a robust knowledge base on which policy makers and practitioners 
can draw.
(2002, p. 6, emphasis in original)
As such, the authors argue that efforts for new knowledge creation must address 
a number of key issues, including identifying which research designs are appro-
priate for specific questions, balancing existing evidence versus new research, 
balancing rigour with timeliness, and a need to prioritise the gaps in knowledge 
relevant to policy decisions.
However, what this also means is that policy makers must often take action 
without perfect or complete information. In doing so, they may wish to choose 
policy options that are less certain, but that are judged more important, than 
lower-priority courses of action with greater predictability. In the field of 
health care, one example of this can be seen in the growing calls for policy 
action to address the social determinants of health (Commission on the Social 
Determinants of Health 2008; Marmot and Friel 2008). As Bonnefoy et al. 
(2007) explain, the relationship between social determinants and ultimate health 
outcomes ‘is not precisely understood in causal pathway terms’. But, instead, 
they argue that: ‘Although the precise causal pathways are not yet fully under-
stood, enough is known in many areas, and the evidence is good enough, for us 
to take effective action’ (2007, p. 11).
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A judgement of when evidence is ‘good enough’ will be down to the individ-
ual decision maker, considering the importance of the issue and other trade-offs 
involved. But this provides another example of where a lens of appropriateness 
can help to guide policy action. The appropriateness framework is specifically 
shaped around policy needs and, as such, it allows more direct reflection on 
whether the existing evidence base (including any gaps) is useful enough when 
the goals and needs of the policy decision are explicitly considered.
Conclusions: a ‘good evidence for policy’ framework
While previous chapters raised concerns with technical and issue bias in the 
use of evidence and explored the political origins of these biases, this chapter 
provides the first contribution to the final section of the book by consider-
ing what constitutes good evidence for policy in the first place. In the field of 
environmental science, Cash et al.’s (2002) model of credibility, salience and 
legitimacy provides a starting point to reflect on this question. Credibility in 
many ways captures the well-established concerns over evidentiary quality, rig-
our and validity. But salience was seen as particularly critical in this chapter’s 
discussion of what constitutes good evidence in terms of its policy relevance. 
It was illustrated that hierarchies of evidence cannot necessarily address this 
concern. Instead, this chapter drew on three disciplinary perspectives to further 
develop the concept of the appropriateness of evidence. The issue of quality was 
then re-introduced, specifically reflecting on the multiple methodological tradi-
tions that will generate policy-relevant evidence. In combination, these ideas 
can work to establish an understanding of what constitutes good evidence for 
policy, as illustrated in Figure 6.5 below.
Critically engaging with the question of what constitutes good evidence for 
policy does not abandon the previous section’s interest in technical and issue 
bias. Indeed, in the framework presented on the following page, there is scope 
to acknowledge and accept the concerns of both sides of the EBP debate – with 
the need for evidence to address multiple social concerns while also adhering to 
principles of scientific best practice as well. It is clear from this perspective that 
RCTs and hierarchies of evidence provide appropriate evidence in some cases, 
but not in others. When the political concern is about impact of an intervention, 
then trials will indeed prove useful. But for many social policy decisions, real-
ity is more complicated, and a lens of appropriateness may provide a way to 
recognise and act on this reality.
Policy is always adapting and changing, and policy considerations equally are 
continually in flux due to changing social interests and values. As such, there will 
be a continual need to clarify which evidence is more appropriate or most relevant 
to the policy issues at stake. However, a better understanding of what might be 
considered good evidence for policy is only one of the components needed to 
clarify how to improve the use of evidence in policymaking. Equally important is 
to think about what constitutes the good use of evidence from a policy perspective, 
to which we turn in the next chapter.
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This chapter continues the discussion of what is needed to improve the use of 
 evidence in policymaking from a political perspective by fundamentally address-
ing the question of what constitutes the ‘good use of evidence’ for policy. 
However, this is a question that is particularly concerned with the process through 
which evidence informs policy decisions, as opposed to the evidentiary content 
per se. Such a perspective aims to move beyond past limitations of the EBP move-
ment discussed in Chapter 2 that has at times equated ‘better’ to simply mean 
‘more’ evidence use (particularly evidence of particular types) and helps to fur-
ther address many of the concerns raised by critical authors about the risk of 
depoliticisation of the policymaking process when evidence is invoked.
Rejecting ‘good’ evidence? The importance of legitimacy
Chapter 6’s conceptualisation of ‘good evidence for policy’ helps to address 
some of the main concerns over both technical and issue bias explored earlier. 
Issue bias was particularly captured within the concept of appropriateness – 
 recognising that in order for evidence to be relevant, it will need to deal with 
the multiple (often competing or contested) concerns of interest to policymak-
ers. Technical bias, on the other hand, was captured through the reiteration of 
the importance of methodological rigour and quality, but with the important 
clarification that quality standards should be set by the scientific practices rel-
evant to each form of evidence most relevant to policy needs. The chapter drew 
upon work by Cash et al. (2002, 2003), who identified three key features of 
scientific evidence that appeared important for influencing policy within a set 
of case studies on sustainable development: credibility, salience and legitimacy. 
Credibility and salience were expanded upon in developing the framework of 
what constitutes good evidence for policy. Here, however, we take up the third 
element – that of legitimacy.
An explicit focus on legitimacy is important because although the conceptu-
alisation of appropriateness notes that evidence should address multiple social 
concerns, there are still important questions about the processes through which 
those concerns are elucidated, selected or ultimately acted upon. Furthermore, we 
can find examples where seemingly rigorous and appropriate pieces of evidence 
7 What is the ‘good use of evidence’  
for policy?
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have been rejected by decision makers, not necessarily due to perceived flaws in 
the evidence or to a belief that the evidence speaks to the wrong policy concerns 
(in other words, not due to perceived technical or issue bias), but rather because 
the process through which the evidence was brought to bear was somehow seen 
to be illegitimate.
This concern is arguably particularly important in the field of international 
development, where there has been a long history of concern about outside influ-
ence over national policies and political agendas (Chabal 1992). Many low-income 
settings have been subject to historical colonial rule, but a range of authors further 
critique modern aid and development efforts that can appear to impose foreign 
ideas or agendas on countries, potentially to the detriment of state sovereignty or 
local decision-making processes (cf. Okuonzi and Macrae 1995; Whitfield 2009). 
This concern specifically speaks to the legitimacy of policy processes involved 
and not necessarily the final policy content.
One example of this can be seen in the resistance shown by Malawi’s gov-
ernment to global calls to scale up provision of male circumcision as an HIV 
prevention intervention. From an epidemiological perspective, the procedure 
was identified in the mid-2000s to be an effective mechanism to reduce the 
spread of HIV in heterosexual epidemics, based on three independent ran-
domised trials that each found significantly lower rates of HIV infection in 
circumcised compared to non-circumcised men (Mills et al. 2008). As a result, 
the World Health Organization and the UNAIDS programme have described 
male circumcision as an ‘evidence-based’ prevention strategy, calling for a 
number of African countries to scale up access to the procedure (World Health 
Organization and UNAIDS 2011). Yet while some countries, such as Kenya, 
have made significant efforts to make the procedure available, in Malawi there 
was a great deal of political resistance to the provision of male circumcision 
for HIV prevention. However, an investigation into this situation found that 
the resistance derived, in part, from a perception that the procedure was being 
demanded by international aid donors (Parkhurst, Chilongozi and Hutchinson 
2015). The study describes a ‘narrative of defiance’ through which local poli-
ticians opposed its uptake by framing it as a case of external domination, 
with one official quoted as saying: ‘Donors must not force male circumcision 
onto the Ministry . . . say do it! No, that is irresponsible science’ (quoted in 
Parkhurst, Chilongozi and Hutchinson 2015, p. 18).
The term ‘irresponsible science’ is particularly relevant in this quote. The 
science in this case is judged irresponsible not because the evidence itself was 
necessarily flawed, but rather because of the idea that international agencies 
would impose the issue on a country. And yet this is not the only case where we 
can see a concern over the process through which evidence is used. Knapp and 
Trainor, for instance studied how climate science was used to inform decision 
making in the US state of Alaska, finding that while there was a need for rapid 
assessment of changing information: ‘Information may be seen as illegitimate if 
the processes or the application of knowledge are seen as unfair’ (2003, p. 1297). 
The authors further noted that stakeholders and laypersons could be concerned 
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when the processes of using evidence was felt to exclude local knowledge or if 
expert scientific information was only provided in a top-down manner.
However, even amongst scientific experts who sit within specialised technical 
bodies, perceptions about the process of evidence utilisation may be important 
for the final acceptance of decisions. The World Health Organization’s Global 
Malaria Programme, for instance, is an expert body based in Geneva that pro-
duces global guidelines for the treatment and prevention of malaria. A recent 
analysis of work undertaken by this body attempted to explain why the guideline 
development process could at times appear smooth and agreeable, while at other 
times it could stagnate or face opposition. The analysis found that an important 
element to explain this was whether the experts involved judged the guideline 
development process itself to be fair. For some members of this highly technical 
body, the transparency of the steps taken was critical and potentially more impor-
tant than achieving consensus over the evidence itself. As one individual stated:
There should be a way in which recommendations are made, it should be seen 
as open, fair, that everyone has a chance to contribute, and that their contribu-
tion will be given due weight. Not that you can always accommodate every 
view, you can’t always get consensus, but people should say it was an open 
fair transparent process, even if they disagree with the conclusion.
(Quoted in D’Souza 2014, p. 24)
Legitimacy in an evidence-informed policy process
These examples clearly highlight the importance of the perceived legitimacy of 
the process through which evidence is used to inform policy decisions. Yet the 
concept of political legitimacy is a broader one in the academic literature, with 
political scientist Fritz Scharpf, for instance, distinguishing between two key 
forms: input legitimacy and output legitimacy. For Scharpf, input legitimacy refers 
to ‘trust in institutional arrangements that are thought to ensure that governing 
processes are generally responsive to the manifest preferences of the governed’ – 
or ‘government by the people’, while output legitimacy represents ‘effective solu-
tions to common problems of the governed’ – or ‘government for the people’ 
(2006, p. 1). Others have expanded on this by adding a third element, termed 
throughput legitimacy (Bekkers and Edwards 2007; Lieberherr 2013; Schmidt 
2013). While input legitimacy reflects the need to have policymaking bodies 
that are broadly representative of the people, throughput legitimacy reflects how 
those bodies work in practice, which Schmidt explains captures their ‘efficacy, 
accountability, and transparency . . . along with their inclusiveness and openness 
to consultation with the people’ (2013, p. 2, emphasis in original).
Both Scharpf and Schmidt developed their ideas by writing about the European 
Union, specifically considering the challenges that transnational decision making 
can bring when responsibility for social policy is delegated to an external author-
ity (i.e. other than the nation-state). The political scientist Robert Dahl (1994) 
also looked at this question of delegation to transnational bodies and coined the 
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term ‘democratic dilemma’ to refer to the trade-off between what he described as 
‘system effectiveness’ and ‘democratic deliberation’ that can arise in such cases. 
Yet in many ways, the issues involved in transnational policymaking parallels the 
challenges that arise when elements of social policy decision making are delegated 
to scientific expert bodies or technical agencies within countries as well, with a 
number of authors raising analogous questions about the nature of democratic 
representation, accountability or deliberation when policymakers defer to expert 
advice to inform decisions (cf. Collins and Evans 2002; Fischer 2009; Jasanoff 
2011; Liberatore and Funtowicz 2003; Nowotny 2003; Weale 2001).
A number of authors reflecting on the balance between scientific expert advice 
and democratic principles draw on the work of Jürgen Habermas, a social theo-
rist who is particularly known for his discussions of democracy and deliberation 
within the ‘public space’ (Habermas 1989) and who has described a continuum 
over which science can be seen to either dominate politics or to play a merely 
informative role (Habermas 1971). Scholten, for instance, reflects on Habermas’ 
insights that the relationship between science and policy ‘is often structured in 
such a way that the rationality of the expert dominates political decision-making 
and reduces value choices and goal-setting to technical and rational issues’ (2011, 
p. 48). However, this ‘technocratic model’ reflects some of the core objections 
by critics of the EBP movement who are concerned with the depoliticisation of 
decision making. Hoppe similarly notes that at the end of the spectrum where 
technocratic ideas have primacy, ‘science dominates or displaces politics’, yet: 
‘From a democratic point of view, the technocratic stance is considered politi-
cally objectionable, if not taboo’ (2005, p. 207).
Yet a concern over technocracy and its impact on democratic principles was 
also raised nearly a century ago by John Dewey. His widely cited work The Public 
and its Problems is particularly concerned with the idea of achieving democratic 
ideals, seeing governmental institutions as a means to do so (1954 [1927], p. 143). 
Yet Dewey recognised that reliance on experts arising from the ‘technically com-
plicated’ nature of government affairs can present a key challenge to these ideals 
(1954 [1927], p. 124). According to Fischer, Dewey’s approach to this challenge 
was to delineate a division of labour where ‘experts would identify and analyse 
basic social and economic problems’, while ‘citizens and their political representa-
tives would democratically set out an agenda for dealing with them’ (2009, p. 5). 
Rogers further explains that: ‘[Dewey] specifically ties the idea of representative 
government to deliberation among the citizenry . . . he believes this will ensure that 
justification of one’s actions remains accountable to the public . . . [and] will miti-
gate any blind faith we might otherwise place in political institutions’ (2012, p. 4).
These discussions particularly highlight two key concepts as important to keep 
technocratic tendencies at bay: those of democratic representation and public 
deliberation. However, these elements will need to be built into what Scharpf 
refers to as the ‘institutional arrangements’, which ensure that governing pro-
cesses reflect popular preferences. Yet institutional theorising in the policy 
sciences recognises that institutions can be thought of broadly – not just in terms 
of formal structures, but also the rules that shape how decisions are made, as well 
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as the established practices (or norms) in existence that further direct outcomes 
(Lowndes and Roberts 2013; Peters 2005). Applied to the issue of evidence use 
for policymaking, then, we can use an institutional lens to discuss what can be 
termed the evidence advisory system in place, consisting of the structures, rules 
and norms that dictate which evidence is used, how and by whom – and we can 
further ask how these systems can ensure public representation and political 
 legitimacy in the use of evidence.
Input legitimacy: constructing a legitimate evidence  
advisory system
Applying the three elements of political legitimacy described above, the first 
aspect we can consider within evidence advisory systems can be that of input 
legitimacy, described by Scharpf as government ‘by the people’, and which is 
particularly captured within formal system arrangements. These are important, 
of course, because the structures, rules and norms through which evidence is 
provided will fundamentally determine which bodies of evidence are considered 
relevant, who is given the right to speak, whether appeals can be made and a host 
of other factors with implications for how (or whether) the public’s interests are 
represented in the evidence-utilisation process.
However, there are two key ways in which public representation can be 
considered within formal system arrangements. The first is when agents take 
responsibility to design the institutional features of the evidence-advisory sys-
tem, while the second concerns who holds ultimate responsibility or authority for 
policy decisions informed by evidence. In other words, we can argue that demo-
cratic input legitimacy can be strengthened for evidence advisory systems if they 
are designed by an agent with a mandate to represent the population served, but 
also when final decision-making authority rests with representatives of the public.
Representation in the designers of evidence advisory systems
One of the biggest challenges for those aiming to improve evidence use is the fact 
that there is a huge array of structures that can serve to provide evidence within a 
policy system. Halligan (1995), for instance, discusses ‘policy advisory systems’ 
more broadly and classifies them according to two administrative features: the 
location of the advice provider in terms of whether it is internal or external to 
government; and the degree of control government has over the policy advice. 
He explains that three principles are central to ‘good advisory systems’: the pro-
vision of multiple sources of advice; flexibility to choose a mix of advisors and 
processes suitable to particular policy issues; and an ability to review the effec-
tiveness of advice given. Yet Halligan also notes that there is no consensus on 
which structure works best to achieve these, stating that ‘the verdict is still out on 
what structure works best for policy advice’ (1995, p. 162).
However, what is critical to recognise from the perspective of input legiti-
macy is that someone or some group must take responsibility to choose which 
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set of arrangements will be utilised or which responsibilities are allocated to 
different agencies in the first place. Yet, to build legitimacy, these decisions 
will most likely need to be made by a political agent with an official mandate to 
represent the public – undertaking what can be described as a ‘stewardship’ role 
in the shaping of these evidentiary arrangements (Alvarez-Rosette, Hawkins and 
Parkhurst 2013).
The idea that national administrative systems (of which evidence providing 
systems could be seen as a sub-set) should be constructed or shaped by repre-
sentatives of the people may seem self-evident to some readers, but the colonial 
experience of many low-income countries can again be illustrative of instances 
where this has not always been the case. Indeed, the mismatch between the 
bureaucratic structures inherited from the colonial administration and local civil 
society has been hypothesised to be a key barrier to socio-economic development 
in these settings (Haque 1997). As such, it may not only be policies imposed from 
outside that are seen as illegitimate, but administrative systems that face legiti-
macy challenges as well (Chazan et al. 1999; Mamdani 1997).
In recent years, we have also started seeing international donor aid being 
spent on efforts designed to improve the use of evidence in policy in low and 
middle-income countries. Examples include: the Australian government’s estab-
lishment of a 15-year ‘knowledge support initiative’ with Indonesia which aims 
‘to improve the quality of public policies . . . through the use of research, analy-
sis, and evidence’(ODI 2013); the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) investing £13 million in its Building Capacity to Use Research Evidence 
programme, which aims ‘to improve development interventions through bet-
ter decision making processes’ (BCURE undated); and the support given by 
the Gates and Rockefeller Foundations to the International Decision Support 
Initiative, which provides training and capacity building for government bod-
ies to increase their use of health economics tools such as cost-utility analysis 
for priority setting (iDSI undated). Such efforts are typically justified in terms 
of improving decision-making quality or effectiveness. Yet if these efforts alter 
the underlying administrative structures, rules or processes by which evidence 
informs decisions – fundamentally changing evidence advisory systems – there 
will be an important need to consider the implications on how interests are repre-
sented and to ask whether such institutional changes are perceived as legitimate 
by local populations.
However, outside of official government bureaucracies, there will obviously 
also be a range of independent bodies providing policy-relevant evidence to deci-
sion makers. Indeed, there can be huge numbers of think tanks, research institutes, 
academic bodies and civil society groups serving this role, with one review of 
knowledge brokers for health systems in Europe, for example, identifying 398 
such bodies in an initial analysis (Lavis et al. 2013). Yet while most non-state 
evidence-providing bodies may be outside of direct government control, there 
will likely be formal and informal arrangements in place that shape when and how 
they inform government decision making. Again, choices will need to be made 
as to the exact arrangements in place, but the legitimacy of the evidence advisory 
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system may rest on whether there is an accepted mandate in place for the agent 
who sets those arrangements.
Final decision authority represents the people
However, a second important element in ensuring input legitimacy from a per-
spective of democratic representation will be to ensure that final decision authority 
remains in the hands of bodies representative of, and accountable to, local popu-
lations. Within evidence advisory systems, there will obviously be a need to rely 
on expertise and to place some decision-making responsibility in the hands of 
expert bodies – to identify relevant evidence, to rank evidentiary quality or to 
independently provide summaries or develop guidelines, for example. Yet the 
tension between technocracy and democracy points to a need to ensure that sci-
entific expertise does not replace public values in political decisions. In addition 
to the conceptual discussions of this tension noted above, corresponding debates 
have been raised across a number of empirical cases, including in discussions 
of food policy (Kimura 2010), monetary policy (Freeman 2002), environmental 
policy (Fine and Owen 2005) and pharmaceutical policy (Abraham and Sheppard 
1997), amongst others.
Ensuring that final authority over social policy decisions is in the hands of 
public representatives can thus serve as a way to draw a line between techni-
cal expertise serving policy maker needs and technical interests replacing public 
values. There will, of course, be cases where technical bodies are asked to make 
definitive judgements in policy processes, but in such cases it may also be impor-
tant to ensure there are still mechanisms by which public representatives can 
over-rule decisions otherwise allocated to expert bodies if those decisions are felt 
to be outside the public interest. One example of how this plays out in the UK is 
presented in Box 7.1 below.
Box 7.1  Decision authority over cancer drug provision  
in the UK
In the UK, the National Institute for Health Care and Excellence (NICE) serves as a 
semi-autonomous body with an official government mandate to undertake evidence 
reviews and make assessments of the affordability of treatments provided in the 
government-run National Health Service (NHS) (NICE 2013b). The establishment 
of NICE by the government in 1999 clearly reflects input legitimacy in the fact 
that those agents establishing the structures and rules of NICE had a mandate as 
part of the democratically elected government of the time. Yet of particular interest 
is that the agency has been granted binding decision-making authority over some 
elements of health service provision in parts of the UK – with the governments of 
England and Wales, for example, mandated to provide treatments if they have been 
recommended by NICE (Sorenson et al. 2008). This may at first appear to stand in 
contrast to the second aspect of input legitimacy discussed above, which argues that
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 1
94
.8
0.
22
9.
24
4 
at
 0
4:
48
 0
4 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
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final decision-making authority should rest with representatives of the public. 
However, within the British political system, the legislature (Parliament) does, in 
fact, maintain ultimate authority as the highest power to decide how to allocate public 
resources and, as such, can over-ride or bypass decisions otherwise allocated to NICE.
An example of this can be seen in the case of how Parliament responded to a 
number of high-profile cases in which NICE recommended against providing new, 
costly cancer drugs on the NHS. The mechanism NICE uses for making such deci-
sions is an assessment of cost-effectiveness (specifically cost per ‘quality-adjusted 
life-year’) (NICE 2013a, 2013a). The driving rationale for this system is one of 
equity, based on the idea that health impacts (premature death, illness, disabil-
ity) occurring from different conditions should be valued in the same way. So, in 
theory, the system would spend the same amount to extend the life of a patient with 
renal failure as it would for one with heart disease (in otherwise equal individuals). 
Yet, in the UK, there appears to be particularly vocal support for cancer treatment 
and high levels of media attention if cancer drugs are deemed to be too expensive 
to justify their provision within the NHS. While the public and politicians do not 
necessarily believe that the calculations within the NICE decisions are flawed in 
these cases, there is still clearly dissatisfaction with the result of that expert body’s 
decision-making process. As such, in 2011 the government established a special 
earmarked ‘Cancer Drug Fund’ to allocate additional government resources for 
cancer treatments judged to be outside the cost-effective thresholds set by NICE 
(UK Department of Health 2011). In this case, the democratically elected govern-
ment decided to essentially bypass the rules of the legitimately established evidence 
advisory system, but did so in response to perceptions of public demand or chang-
ing social values (Linley and Hughes 2013). In this example, the ‘social values’ at 
stake could be seen as unfair from the perspective of some scientific experts (as it 
excludes people requiring more expensive treatments for non-cancer-related condi-
tions), but retaining input legitimacy and avoiding technocracy requires structures 
that can allow the public to change its reasoning and its decision-making priorities, 
even if the legitimate expert advisory bodies disagrees.
Accepting irrationality
However, placing final decision authority in political representatives can cause 
particular worry to advocates of EBP who are concerned with the perceived 
misuse of evidence by politicians and other pubic representatives. Indeed, some 
might argue that the UK government example presented in Box 7.1 represents 
‘irrationality’ on the part of the government, giving into social whims against 
a scientific consensus. Yet this cuts to the core of the tension between democ-
racy and technocracy, and the recognition that democratic choices may not fit 
technical ideals at all times. Indeed, Mulgan has argued that: ‘In a democracy, 
the people, and the politicians who represent them, have every right to ignore 
evidence’ (2005, p. 224).
Nevertheless, ignoring evidence can take a number of meanings and it is worth 
unpacking this concept further. In some cases, bodies of evidence will be ignored 
because they have little relevance to the policy considerations at hand or they speak 
to policy considerations of a low priority. As such, it would be widely accepted 
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for a government to ignore those bodies of evidence that are not appropriate to the 
policy consideration at hand. The example of the robust evidence on the effective-
ness of Viagra was presented in Chapter 2 to show an obvious case where a strong 
evidence base might not be the most relevant to inform health planning. Indeed, 
in such a case, most evidence advocates would accept it if a government chose to 
ignore the evidence on Viagra’s effectiveness based on an explicit consideration 
of the relative importance of that piece of evidence vis-à-vis other policy goals. 
The shift in language some authors have made to discuss ‘evidence-informed poli-
cymaking’ (rather than ‘evidence-based policymaking’) demonstrates recognition 
of this dynamic (cf. Hawkins and Parkhurst 2015; Langer, Tripney and Gough 
2016; Ongolo-Zogo et al. 2014). A government aware of, but dismissing, the evi-
dence of Viagra’s effectiveness could be said to be making an ‘informed’ decision 
by such definitions.
Yet this logic still assumes rationality in decision making. ‘Non-use’ of evi-
dence is accepted in this case presumably because there are other evidence bases at 
hand that are judged to be more relevant or because an explicit decision was made 
about how much priority should be given to that piece of evidence. However, the 
more challenging point that is raised by appeals to democratic legitimacy is that 
such appeals also imply that people in a democracy have the right to be irrational 
as well – that is, they have the right to simply ignore evidence altogether and make 
decisions for any other reasons they so choose.
A recurring frustration for advocates of evidence has unsurprisingly been 
when decision makers or the public select options simply because they seem 
to ‘feel’ right, regardless of, or even counter to, the indications of a body of 
evidence. Indeed, not only are choices at times made in democracies that ignore 
evidence, but according to Caplan, a result is that: ‘Democracies frequently 
adopt and maintain policies harmful for most people’ (2011, p. 1). Such situa-
tions may appear to justify a call for technocracy – the idea that people need to 
be protected from their own self-destructive irrationalities. Yet, as noted above, 
sacrificing democratic principles on an altar of technical effectiveness is widely 
held to be unacceptable. In many ways, this seems to imply that we must accept 
irrationality at times if we are to maintain key democratic principles in our uses 
of evidence.
That said, the cognitive sciences that were so helpful in understanding the 
subtle origins of political bias in Chapter 5 can also help to explain so-called 
irrational situations when people pursue what ‘feels right’ in the face of evidence. 
Indeed, while these cases may be frustrating from a technocratic perspective, 
it is actually well understood that individuals hold affinity to particular ideas – 
including policy choices – not because of analytical evaluations of outcomes, 
but because of how the construction of those ideas align with other deeply held 
worldviews or ideologies (Caplan 2011; Lakoff 2008; Westen 2007).
Lakoff (2002), for instance, has explored how a great deal of policy reason-
ing in the US is not analytical, but metaphorical, and can be traced to how well 
policy concepts align with one of two contrasting moral belief systems: either 
a ‘strict father morality’, which holds that people should take responsibility for 
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themselves and that children should adhere to strict rules through  discipline 
(so as to behave correctly in the future); or a ‘nurturant parent morality’, which 
emphasises caring for others and being cared for, with children’s ideas embraced 
(so as to be caring in the future). Lakoff demonstrates that these moral founda-
tions can explain many instances of potential irrationality – for example, when 
individuals who oppose abortion, presumably based on an argument about the 
sanctity of life, will also support capital punishment. ‘Evidence’ of the num-
ber of deaths involved obviously does not convince in this case, but rather the 
policy positions can be better explained by the shared moral principle they 
reflect – punishing wrongdoing (criminals being seen to do wrong by breaking 
laws and mothers of unwanted pregnancies being seen to do wrong by breaking 
behavioural fiats). Lakoff gives another example of the seeming rejection of an 
otherwise ‘rational’ argument in the following anecdote:
A liberal supporter of California’s 1994 single-payer [health care] initia-
tive was speaking to a conservative audience and decided to appeal to their 
financial self-interest. He pointed out that the savings in administrative costs 
would get them the same health benefits for less money while also paying for 
health care for the indigent. A woman responded, ‘It just sounds wrong to me. 
I would be paying for somebody else’.
(2002, p. 25)
Again, this quote would likely frustrate many advocates of EBP, yet it reflects the 
reality of many political decision-making processes. Ultimately people and their 
representatives make decisions based on what they feel to be right rather than 
what experts tell them is optimal. In economics and decision science, such forms 
of decision making are referred to as ‘irrational’. Yet the cognitive sciences drawn 
upon in Chapter 5 in particular have explored how human irrationality is not an 
exception, but rather a quite common occurrence, with Caplan (2001) going so 
far as to term the phenomenon ‘rational irrationality’ to reflect its natural origins. 
Understanding these mechanisms can be useful to consider how we may build 
evidence advisory systems to address these aspects of irrationality, or at least 
make them as transparent as possible in the policy process.
Output legitimacy: dealing with bias and irrationality
One way to start to address the irrationality that can arise in policy decision mak-
ing is to establish norms or expectations for output legitimacy alongside those 
of input legitimacy. Output legitimacy fundamentally can be seen as linked to 
the outcomes that result from the operation of the evidence advisory system or, 
repeating Scharpf’s definition, involving ‘effective solutions to common prob-
lems of the governed’ (2006, p. 1). This concern for effectiveness reminds us that 
evidence can indeed be a tool to achieve desired social outcomes and that robust 
and valid uses of evidence remain important, even if public representatives have 
a right to irrationality.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 1
94
.8
0.
22
9.
24
4 
at
 0
4:
48
 0
4 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
 
138 What is the ‘good use of evidence’ for policy?
Achieving output legitimacy requires efforts to avoid both technical bias and 
issue bias as well. The former is perhaps more obvious, as the use of techni-
cally biased evidence would naturally lead to inefficient policy choices for any 
given goal, yet our political concern in this book recognises that the ‘problems of 
the governed’ are often multiple and competing. As such, developing ‘effective 
solutions’ for these problems will require what was discussed in the previous 
chapter as good evidence for policy – not just evidence of technical quality, but 
appropriate evidence which ensures that the high-quality evidence used is rel-
evant to the policy concerns, is constructed in useful ways and is applicable to 
the local context.
So, while ensuring input legitimacy may open the door for irrational uses of 
evidence, working to achieve output legitimacy requires thinking about how 
to structure the organisations, rules and norms of evidence advisory systems 
to make such irrationality less likely and more obvious. Democratic societies 
may have a right to ignore evidence, but legitimate evidence advisory systems 
could make this harder to do or at least more evident when it does happen. 
So, for example, systems can build in the use of fact-checking structures that 
require decision makers to think twice about a decision that may instinctively 
‘feel right’ – forcing them to at least look at relevant evidence they might 
initially have ignored. Alternatively, formal government evidence authori-
ties may decide to publish principles of evidentiary good practice (such as 
what a rigorous review of evidence looks like or what a cherry-picked review 
looks like) that can serve as clear templates to judge whether policy decisions 
are taken in contradiction to scientific principles –  effectively allowing pub-
lic scrutiny over political uses of evidence with reference to an established 
scientific authority. The following chapter will explore other examples of 
institutional structures or rules that can address forms of evidentiary bias, but 
what is critical here is to recognise that while input legitimacy may require 
final decision authority to rest in the hands of public representatives, output 
legitimacy enables reflection on how to actively design systems to mitigate 
instances of irrationality.
Throughput legitimacy: representation as  
evidence is being used
The final element of legitimacy to consider within systems of evidence advice is 
that of throughput legitimacy, which can be seen as focused on the actual func-
tioning of advisory systems. Throughput legitimacy is important because even 
if final decision-making authority lies in public representatives (as part of input 
legitimacy), there can still be legitimacy challenges if technical considerations 
utilised throughout the process of evidence identification, review and provision 
do not perfectly align with the goals or values of the public.
In an editorial in the journal Evidence & Policy, for instance, Boaz, Locock 
and Ward (2015) lament the absence of direct representation of people affected 
by the evidence used to inform policy. They ask: ‘isn’t the point of acquiring all 
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this knowledge, and mobilising it, to make things better for people on the receiving 
end? Where is their voice in what knowledge is mobilised and how?’ The authors 
further note that ‘it is . . . possible that researchers make unfounded assumptions 
about what matters to the public and users, and seek to mobilise knowledge which 
is marginal to their interests’ (2015, p. 147). Similarly, Sanderson (2009) is critical 
of how the modern EBP discourse removes political realities from the policy sphere, 
arguing that what is needed instead is a dynamic system of ‘policy learning’ that is 
fundamentally based on processes of deliberation in the form of channels of com-
munication between government and civil society.
However, reliance on deliberation to provide political legitimacy is a key 
principle within a broader body of work on the concept of ‘deliberative democ-
racy’ in the academic literature. Writing on this subject, Fishkin and Luskin 
define deliberation as ‘a weighing of competing considerations’ and explain that 
it is achieved through discussions that have particular characteristics, including 
a need to be informed by ‘accurate factual claims’ and that need to be compre-
hensive in terms of giving attention to ‘all points of view held by significant 
proportions of the population’ (2005, p. 40). Cohen has further stated that ‘out-
comes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a 
free and reasoned agreement among equals’ (2003, p. xv), while Weale notes 
that the work of Habermas provides a theoretical foundation for the impor-
tance of deliberation in democracy, seeing ‘the legitimacy of a legal system as 
depending upon the engagement of citizens communicating with one another’ 
(2007, p. 79).
Some have seen the need for deliberation (and deliberative democratic princi-
ples) as particularly important when public policy relies on delegation to outside 
agencies, including expert bodies providing scientific advice (cf. Gutmann and 
Thompson 2009; van Eeten 2001). Authors in the field of  science and  technology 
studies (STS) in particular have considered these issues by investigating how 
the science–policy interface works to integrate public interests, values or needs 
through a dynamic and ongoing process that delineates what constitutes policy-
relevant science and expertise (Gieryn 1999; Hoppe 2005; Jasanoff 1987, 1996).
So, for example, Liberatore and Funtowicz have argued that the ‘democra-
tisation of expertise’ requires transparency through ‘processes enabling the 
“tracking” of how decisions are made, by whom, on what basis’ (2003, p. 147) 
(see also Jasanoff 2006). Public participation and deliberation, on the other hand, 
are widely promoted to resist the ‘scientization’ of politics (De Jong and Mentzel 
2001; Fischer 2003; Habermas 1971; Wynne 2007). Jasanoff, for instance, has 
pointed to an instrumental need to consider the practices of governance that 
best serve to solicit public input in matters to do with science and technology, 
although she warns against simply ‘placating citizens with rituals of participa-
tion’ (2011, p. 624). Rayner (2003) further explains that public participation in 
the form of community advisory bodies, consensus conferences and other such 
arrangements have particularly emerged to increase representation to the public 
in an era of electoral (voting) decline (but he notes that there has not yet been 
 sufficient evaluation of their impact).
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A need for more direct deliberation with the public in the process of evidence 
use was also seen in the empirical work of Cash et al. (2003), whose initial 
framework provided a springboard for much of the discussion in this and the 
previous chapter. In their analysis of the use of science and technology to inform 
sustainable development planning, for instance, they found that:
[Knowledge systems] that made a serious commitment to managing bound-
aries between expertise and decision making more effectively linked 
knowledge to action than those that did not. Such systems invested in com-
munication, translation, and/or mediation and, thereby, more effectively bal-
anced salience, credibility, and legitimacy in the information they produced.
(2003, p. 8089, emphasis added)
Efforts of these kinds – active communication, public consultation and partici-
pation, and transparency throughout the evidence-utilisation process – can be 
seen as contributing to throughput legitimacy. Ultimately, just as there are no 
right or wrong answers about how to build the structures that govern the evi-
dence advisory system, there is equally no single answer to the question of how 
to structure deliberation into the processes of evidence utilisation or how much 
deliberation is required per se. Rather, the goal here has been to identify the 
principles that can guide decisions in these areas, which will ultimately be taken 
up to different extents and in different forms, depending on the local political 
culture and context.
Discussion: a legitimacy framework for the  
good use of evidence
There can be obvious tensions between a desire to achieve the best possible social 
goals from a body of evidence and respect for a democratic decision-making pro-
cess. This tension cuts to the core of the question of what constitutes the ‘good 
use of evidence’ when a desire to avoid technical bias and maximise the poten-
tial of evidence to achieve social goals risks depoliticisation and a trend towards 
technocracy. As discussed in the introductory chapters, the approach taken in this 
book has been to recognise the importance and validity of both sets of normative 
concerns in our thinking about how to improve the use of evidence in policymak-
ing. That said, at times trade-offs will exist or a balance will need to be struck 
between conflicting ideas within local decision-making contexts. This chapter has 
explained that many aspects of this balance will be shaped by the institutional 
features making up local evidence advisory systems – systems of structures, rules 
and norms that will direct how evidence is used within policymaking.
The good use of evidence for policymaking ultimately reflects judgements on 
the legitimacy of the establishment and operation of evidence advisory systems, 
with three key aspects of legitimacy – input, output and throughput – being used 
to explore these ideas. The discussion in the previous chapter of ‘good evidence 
for policy’ covered the need to ensure the utilisation of high-quality evidence that 
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is appropriate to policy needs. This was shown to capture much of the idea of 
output legitimacy as it is commonly understood. But the exploration of input and 
throughput legitimacy further highlighted the central importance of democratic 
principles within the construction and operation of decision-making systems.
Input legitimacy was captured by ensuring that evidence advisory systems 
themselves are developed by those groups who hold some official public mandate 
(with government officials typically taking a stewardship role) and by ensuring 
that final policy decision authority lies with public representatives. Throughput 
legitimacy, on the other hand, was seen to capture aspects of legitimacy arising 
from the operation of those systems in practice. Drawing on scholars of delibera-
tive democracy and STS, the importance of transparency and public deliberation 
was particularly promoted due to a need to have a public check in place over 
systems that delegate some forms of decision authority to outside expert bodies.
Taken in combination, these ideas can construct a ‘legitimacy framework’ for 
evidence-informed policy processes, presented in Table 7.1 below.
Table 7.1 Legitimacy framework for evidence-informed policy processes
Legitimacy 
dimension
Concerned with Represented in Achieved via
Input Democratic 
representation 
within the 
system.
Structures of the 
evidence advisory 
system (EAS):
• formal structures – 
evidence advisory 
bodies;
• established rules –  
which evidence is 
consulted, when 
and how;
• norms of practice – 
de facto rules and 
functions.
Stewardship: structures 
developed by a 
stewardship body 
with a popular 
mandate to establish 
the institutional form 
of the EAS.
Authority: final 
decision-making 
authority lies with 
democratically 
representative bodies. 
Throughput Democratic 
deliberation 
in the 
operation of 
the system.
Operational processes: 
the process and the 
functioning of the 
EAS, e.g.:
• the choice of 
evidence;
• the application of 
evidence;
• the process 
through which 
evidence is used 
within the EAS.
Deliberation
• active 
communication;
• public consultation/ 
engagement;
• advisory bodies;
• transparency rules;
• appeals processes.
(continued)
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Legitimacy 
dimension
Concerned with Represented in Achieved via
Output Scientific fidelity 
in operation 
and outcomes 
(avoiding 
technical and 
issue bias).
Outcomes: the 
resultant use of 
good evidence for 
policy – captured by 
appropriateness:
• evidence relevant 
to those policy 
concerns;
• evidence 
constructed in 
ways useful 
in relation to 
decision-makers’ 
goals;
• evidence 
applicable to 
the local policy 
context.
Goal clarification
• explicit identification 
of policy concerns;
• critical reflection on 
evidentiary needs in 
reference to policy 
goals.
Applying quality 
criteria for multiple 
forms of evidence:
• unbiased;
• methodologically 
rigorous;
• systematic.
Reducing bias or 
making bias more 
evident: structures 
and rules that make 
technical bias, issue 
bias and irrationality 
less likely, more 
evident and/or open 
to scrutiny. 
Table 7.1 (continued)
The political perspective drawn upon throughout this book has provided a range 
of insights into how evidence use for policymaking is fundamentally different 
from evidence use from a purely technical perspective. If we accept the premises 
that (a) policymaking involves choices between competing interests and trade-
offs amongst social values, (b) political decision-making processes are structured 
within institutional arrangements, and (c) political processes require legitimacy to 
be accepted, then we can apply the frameworks developed so far to address many 
of the overlapping normative concerns at stake in the use of evidence to inform 
policy. Rather than simply working to increase scientific communication or the 
‘uptake’ of research findings, improving the use of evidence for policymaking 
can be seen as involving the establishment of formal evidence advisory systems, 
designed by a legitimate representative body, which serves to reduce both techni-
cal and issue bias in the evidence utilised. It also requires decision authority to 
rest in the hands of those who are representative of, and accountable to, local 
populations, and processes to be in place that produce some form of transparency 
and deliberation with the public. However, taken in combination, these principles 
reflect a set of normative concerns that can establish an overarching concept of the 
good governance of evidence – to which the next and final chapter will now turn.
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Building institutions to improve evidence use
Chapter 2 laid out a number of limitations with many current efforts to promote 
evidence use in policymaking. These served as springboards for subsequent chap-
ter discussions, including the need to address the political sources of evidentiary 
bias, the need to consider good evidence from a policy perspective and the need 
to consider political legitimacy in the process of evidence utilisation. A final 
challenge identified in that chapter was captured in the recognition that the vast 
majority of work discussing how to improve evidence focuses on  individuals – 
exploring strategies such as linking researchers and policymakers, bringing evi-
dence to decision makers or training individuals to broker knowledge. It was 
noted that such efforts place undue expectations on researchers, who may not 
see it as their role or skill set to transfer knowledge. Furthermore, a focus on 
individuals also risks having limited potential to engender long-term or system-
wide change, as individuals naturally leave their positions or change roles over 
time. This individualistic focus has led Nutley, Walter and Bland to argue that 
insufficient attention has been paid to the institutional arrangements that connect 
evidence to policy, defining institutions as ‘the formal organisations established 
to connect evidence and policy, particularly focusing on their roles, structures, 
and modes of operation’ (2002, p. 78). The authors further argue that this lack 
of attention to institutions serves as one of the main explanations for the lack of 
utilisation of social research in policymaking.
In political science, there has been a much deeper engagement with the concept 
of institutions, even if it has had limited application within the EBP field to date. 
The early years of the discipline have been described as particularly institutionally 
oriented, with a great deal of scholarship analysing the differences and functions 
of the organisational arrangements of government bodies (Lowndes and Roberts 
2013; Peters 2005). However, newer institutional approaches within political 
science have particularly linked institutional analysis to questions of how social 
values influence policy choices, including consideration of the roles that institu-
tions play in both shaping and embedding values and arrangements of political 
power (March and Olsen 1984; Peters 2005). In these ways, attention has been 
paid to the ways in which institutions affect democratic representation and collec-
tive decision making in particular. March and Olsen (2006) explain:
8 From evidence-based policy to the 
good governance of evidence
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Democratic political life is ordered by institutions . . . An institution is a 
relatively stable collection of rules and practices, embedded in structures 
of resources that make action possible – organizational, financial and staff 
capabilities, and structures of meaning that explain and justify behaviour – 
roles, identities and belongings, common purposes, and casual and normative 
beliefs.
(2006, p. 691, emphasis in original)
Lowndes and Roberts (2013) further explain that institutions in modern con-
ceptualisations are understood as more than just the physical structures or 
organisational bodies within a system, but are also captured in the rules by which 
such bodies operate, the practices they undertake in their operation and the 
 discursive narratives by which their work is understood.
These insights allow us to consider two key ways that institutional change, or 
processes of institutionalisation, can work to shape the use of evidence in policy-
making. First, this can involve building or altering the actual structures in place 
that are involved in evidence utilisation (including the resources and arrange-
ments of what were termed ‘evidence advisory systems’ in the previous chapter). 
Second, they can involve changes to the principles by which those institutions 
operate – with principles particularly reflected by, and embedded within, the 
rules, incentives or practices through which institutions operate.
Government institutions: evidence advisory systems
For many, the first place to look for building institutions that influence the use 
of evidence for policy will be within the mechanisms of government decision 
making itself. Halligan (1995) has noted that there are, in fact, a very large 
number of structures and arrangements that can make up government advisory 
systems, presenting one framework that classifies advisory bodies based on their 
location (within the public service, internal to government or external) and the 
level of governmental control over their activities. Similarly, the World Health 
Organization’s Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research has developed a 
framework of ‘embeddedness’ to reflect the strength of the institutional arrange-
ments that provide research evidence to health policymakers. This framework 
describes the location of evidentiary advice as lying in a series of concentric 
circles around the government – with ‘government organisations’ (such as offi-
cial research institutions and advisory bodies) being most central, followed 
by ‘government-supported organisations’ (think tanks, consultants, sponsored 
academics, etc.) and finally ‘independent organisations’ (e.g. non-government 
organisations, international donors and independent academics) being most dis-
tant. In addition, however, the framework also sees embeddedness as reflecting 
some measure of the depth and strength of links, captured by four factors in par-
ticular: the quality of connections, the quantity of connections, agency capacity 
and the reputation of the evidence provider (Koon et al. 2013; Koon, Nambiar, 
and Rao 2012).
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 1
94
.8
0.
22
9.
24
4 
at
 0
4:
48
 0
4 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
 
From EBP to the good governance of evidence 149
The concept of stewardship over the evidence advisory system discussed in 
the previous chapter pointed to a need for officials with a formal mandate to take 
responsibility for designing or altering evidence advisory arrangements to achieve 
input legitimacy. Yet, clearly, governments may officially authorise evidence to 
be provided in a large number of ways. Undertaking changes to improve evidence 
advisory systems will most likely require some critical reflection, then, on where 
pieces of evidence advice can enter the system and how strong or well integrated 
those evidence advisory structures should be.
Some ministries may wish to keep these roles within the bureaucracy, estab-
lishing their own offices of policy advice and employing technical advisors 
tasked with gathering or synthesising evidence. These strategies may provide 
the most direct and well-integrated channels for evidentiary advice, yet such 
bodies face capacity challenges in resource constrained settings, limiting the 
scope of issues for which they can actually function. Delegating evidence 
advice to non- government or semi-autonomous bodies can therefore be a prac-
tical strategy to increase capacity, but there are numerous other reasons why 
evidence advice may be delegated to outside bodies as well, including a per-
ceived need for independence or a desire to draw on different forms of expertise 
outside the bureaucracy.
Many governments convene meetings of expert panels or ‘technical work-
ing groups’, for instance, to inform specific decisions, granting such groups 
varying levels of autonomy (Fouilleux, Maillard and Smith 2005; Gornitzka 
and Sverdrup 2008). Similarly, positions such as ‘Chief Scientific Advisor’ 
have been embedded within some government agencies to provide a formally 
recognised role for an expert providing a scientific perspective on government 
policy processes. However, the independence of roles such as these may be 
critical in determining how they work and if their use can address eviden-
tiary bias. For example, the chief medical officer appointed to the UK Ministry 
of Health has publicly criticised the government’s provision of homeopathy 
on the National Health Service (Silverman 2013). This independent critical 
voice stands in contrast to reports about the US Surgeon General in the past. 
According to Duncan (2007), during the George W. Bush administration, the 
Surgeon General was directed not to mention evidence contrary to government 
policy, to mention the President three times per page in every other speech and 
to speak in support of Republican political candidates. Such practices clearly 
challenge the ability for such an appointment to provide independent policy 
advice on technical issues.
Particular attention in recent years has also focused on the establishment of 
formal agencies with an official mandate to provide or synthesise evidence for 
policy. In the health sector, one of the most widely cited examples of this is the 
UK’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) (mentioned in 
Chapter 7), which provides clinical guidelines, evidence summaries and technol-
ogy appraisals to inform decision making and resource allocation for the National 
Health Service (NICE 2013; Sorenson et al. 2008). However, NICE’s role in 
rationalising the use of evidence has been so well regarded nationally that it has 
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served as a key model for the development of a series of ‘what works’ centres 
in other areas of UK public policymaking (UK Government 2013) and has been 
described as a ‘national treasure’ by one commentator (Godlee 2009). NICE has 
also been emulated in other countries. One example of this has been the estab-
lishment of Colombia’s Instituto de Evaluación Tecnológica en Salud (IETS), 
which was designed specifically to emulate NICE by undertaking similar activi-
ties (NICE International 2011).
In the education sector, a similar example would be the Norwegian govern-
ment’s establishment of the Knowledge Centre for Education, which is tasked 
‘to produce, gather, synthesise and disseminate knowledge from research on 
issues of relevance to the education sector’. The Centre states that it ‘adheres 
to internationally recognised standards on how to synthesise research on educa-
tion, and to show how research can be practically applied by practitioners and 
policy-makers’ (Knowledge Centre for Education 2015).
Establishing practices to mitigate bias
However, in addition to establishing formal structures, institutional change 
importantly involves establishing rules and norms that direct practices as 
well. All of the institutional bodies noted above will have their own working 
arrangements, but it is of further interest to identify cases where govern-
ments have created procedures, rules or even laws that serve to reduce bias 
or improve scientific good practice. Indeed, by embedding good practice in 
such ways, we can consider how systems may evolve such that their ongo-
ing or continuous operational processes increasingly reflect principles of 
improved evidence utilisation. One well-regarded example of this is Mexico’s 
2004 Social Development Law, which requires new social development poli-
cies and interventions to be formally monitored and evaluated. A World Bank 
report described this law as representing the ‘institutionalisation of evaluation’ 
(Castro et al. 2009), establishing an expectation of good practice to generate 
evidence on the effects of social interventions, with the law further establish-
ing an autonomous National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development 
Policy (CONEVAL) to undertake such evaluations (Lopez 2012). Another 
more common example of government legislation that may address sources of 
bias comes in the form of freedom of information legislation. While freedom 
of information laws obviously work to improve the transparency of govern-
ance processes, they also allow direct scrutiny of decision making and allow 
civil society or the media to challenge cases where evidence appears to be 
being misused or where decision making can be shown to be based on a selec-
tive body of evidence.
Outside of passing laws, governments may also institutionalise internal rules 
and procedures that serve to address sources of bias. So, for example, there can 
be expectations that planners follow processes akin to multi-criteria decision 
analysis, a decision-making approach that requires explicitly listing the multiple 
issues of relevance to a decision in order to assign them relative weight or priority 
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(Baltussen and Niessen 2006; Belton and Stewart 2002). Institutionalising such 
steps can help to address issue bias by effectively mandating ‘goal clarification’, 
thereby making it clear which bodies of evidence would be considered relevant 
to a decision. Governments can also institutionalise deliberative practices that 
invite multiple stakeholders to speak on issues and present arguments to techni-
cal committees, with such deliberation serving to ensure that technical agencies 
do not lose sight of the multiple issues relevant to a decision. Again, the UK’s 
NICE provides a useful example. While that agency evaluates clinical treatments 
on the basis of cost-effectiveness, it also undertakes public consultations to iden-
tify other relevant social values to assist decision making. One result of this has 
been an ‘end of life care’ premium that the agency applies based on stakeholder 
demands – essentially using a higher cost-effectiveness threshold to judge the 
affordability of treatments which can extend life for someone with less than two 
years to live (Cookson 2013).
Another example of procedural efforts to overcome technical bias can be seen 
in the forms of ‘alternative analysis’ that have developed in the field of military 
and intelligence planning and that specifically work to address cognitive errors 
that can lead to premature conclusions or incorrect factual assessments. Fishbein 
and Treverton explain:
Traditional intelligence analysis generates forecasts or explanations based on 
logical processing of available evidence, whereas alternative analysis seeks 
to help analysts and policy-makers stretch their thinking through structured 
techniques that challenge underlying assumptions and broaden the range of 
possible outcomes considered. Properly applied, it serves as a hedge against 
the natural tendencies of analysts – like all human beings – to perceive infor-
mation selectively through the lens of preconceptions, to search too narrowly 
for facts that would confirm rather than discredit existing hypotheses, and to 
be unduly influenced by premature consensus within analytic groups close 
at hand.
(2004, p. 1)
The authors list approaches such as ‘divergent thinking exercises’, structured 
dialogues to consider alternative possibilities, or undertaking simulations to help 
understand uncertainty in planning decisions. Establishing rules or norms that 
expect planners to explicitly question their potential unconscious errors can there-
fore be yet another way to institutionalise change that serves to address the biases 
arising from the politics of evidence.
Non-state institutions: experts and broader civil society
However, there are a number of other institutions outside government that also 
play important roles in shaping how evidence is either provided to, or utilised 
by, policymakers. Professional associations of scientists and national academies, 
 academic bodies, civil society organisations and the media can all make up a 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 1
94
.8
0.
22
9.
24
4 
at
 0
4:
48
 0
4 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
 
152 From EBP to the good governance of evidence
broader institutional landscape influencing evidence use, and many of these can 
work in ways that serve to reduce or counter various forms of evidentiary bias.
National academies of science represent one such important structure in a 
number of countries. Typically, these aim to be independent collectives of scien-
tists that can provide advice, guidance or norms of best practice from a scientific 
perspective and that can similarly serve as a critical voice against the misuse of 
evidence in policy debates. The US National Academies of Sciences, for example, 
has published informational materials that aim to provide scientific consensus on 
major policy areas such as stem cells, energy, transportation and drinking water, 
amongst others (National Academies of Sciences 2016). In another case, in order 
to respond to the political debates over climate change, a collective consensus 
statement was developed by a set of 11 such national academies (from Brazil, 
Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the US), 
stating outright their position that ‘climate change is real’ (Joint Academies of 
Science undated). Such efforts are aimed to serve as a bulwark against forms of 
bias such as cherry-picking or selective uses of evidence, or indeed outright denial 
of science as well.
Expert collectives can also serve as evidence providers and synthesising bodies 
to help promote more systematic uses of evidence. The Cochrane Collaboration 
in health care has already been mentioned and stands out as a global expert body 
that has established a set of best practices on systematic reviews of data, as well 
as serving as a repository of evidence to guide health practice (Starr et al. 2009). 
At times, universities can also take on evidence synthesising roles. For example, 
in the UK, the Evidence for Policy and Practice Information and Co-ordinating 
Centre (EPPI-Centre) at University College London’s Institute of Education 
undertakes systematic reviews on policy-relevant topics related to education, 
health, social welfare and international development, while also providing guid-
ance, teaching and publications on how to undertake such reviews (EPPI-Centre 
undated). In Uganda, alternatively, the Makerere University College of Health 
Sciences has developed a ‘rapid response service’ that can quickly synthesise 
evidence to inform pressing health policy decisions (Makerere University College 
of Health Sciences undated), while in Canada, the McMaster Health Forum serves 
multiple roles: as an evidence repository (i.e. hosting www.healthsystemsevi 
dence.org), as an evidence synthesising hub and as a forum for collective problem 
solving (McMaster Health Forum undated).
In addition to these examples of bodies synthesising evidence, stand-alone 
efforts have also been established to counter specific forms of evidentiary 
bias that are seen to be widespread and/or problematic. One example of this is 
the COMPare programme at Oxford University’s Centre for Evidence-Based 
Medicine, which was set up to address ‘outcome switching’ in clinical trials 
 (discussed in Chapter 3). The project reviews previously published trials to 
identify cases of switched outcomes and flags these up to journal editors. The 
website for the programme notes what proportion of its included trials ‘per-
fectly’ reported all their pre-specified outcomes (less than 15 per cent of cases 
at the time of writing) and notes other key  measures of bias, such as how many 
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 outcomes were ‘silently added’ (COMPare 2016). There are also academic 
efforts to promote public deliberation, such as at Stanford University (Center for 
Deliberative Democracy undated) or Carnegie Mellon University (Program for 
Deliberative Democracy 2005), which can be seen as providing resources that 
can potentially address issue bias when deliberative strategies work to ensure 
that multiple relevant social concerns are considered in  evidence-informed 
 policy decisions.
Think tanks and similar organisations also clearly play knowledge broker-
ing roles (cf. Lavis et al. 2013; Mendizabal and Sample 2009; Smith 1991; van 
Kammen, de Savigny and Sewankambo 2006), although their independence may 
prove an important consideration in affecting whether they reflect or counter 
one or more forms of bias. In order to reduce issue bias in particular, it may 
be particularly important to identify those think tanks that take a non-partisan 
approach in providing policy-relevant evidence. The Pew Research Center in 
the US provides one example, stating that it aims not to take political positions 
and describes itself as ‘a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about 
the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world (Pew Research 
Center 2016).
A final sector that plays an important role in the broader institutional land-
scape influencing evidence use is that of the media. Nisbet and Fahy point to the 
importance of what Patterson (2013) has called ‘knowledge-based journalism’ 
to ‘contextualize and critically evaluate expert knowledge, facilitate discus-
sion that bridges entrenched ideological divisions, and promote consideration 
of a broader menu of policy options and technologies’ (Nisbet and Fahy 2015, 
p. 224). Science writing and science journalism may then serve as one strategy to 
bring public attention and debate to evidentiary matters, although there have been 
concerns raised about the fall in relevance of science journalists in recent years. 
Dunwoody (2014), for example, argues that the shift to the digital age has under-
mined the roles or perceived need of science writers noting that weekly science 
sections of US newspapers numbered 95 in 1989, but fell to only 19 by 2013.
However, in contrast to the fall in science writing, there has been a trend in the 
opposite direction for the proliferation of fact-checking projects. Such efforts typ-
ically subject the claims of politicians to scrutiny and, in doing so, can highlight 
cases of biased uses of evidence (Graves, Nyhan and Reifler 2016). Some of these 
projects are linked to academic or independent institutions (e.g. www.factcheck.
org), but many are now integral parts of major news outlets, such as the New York 
Times and Germany’s Der Spiegel (Silverman 2010). One fact- checking initia-
tive, PolitiFact of the Tampa Bay Times (and formerly the St Petersburg Times) 
was even awarded a Pulitzer Prize for its efforts in highlighting errors of fact in 
the 2008 US presidential election (Weiss 2010). However, the effectiveness of 
these efforts may depend on a number of factors, including the level of public 
understanding of policy-relevant information, as well as the political implications 
of having been identified as making misleading statements. Nyhan and Reifler, 
for example, have undertaken experiments which have found that providing 
lay-persons with corrections to political misstatements did not seem to reduce 
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misconceptions (Nyhan and Reifler 2010 – see also Lewandowsky et al. 2012), 
but informing politicians that their work will be fact-checked did reduce the inci-
dence of misstatements in the first place (Nyhan and Reifler 2014).
In all these ways, then, non-state institutions can supplement institutional 
efforts within government advisory systems to overcome bias: by serving as 
expert authorities on evidence, by synthesising evidence and by checking or high-
lighting cases when evidence is misused. Table 8.1 (see next pages) provides 
a summary of the various governmental and non-governmental arrangements 
discussed above, linking them to many of the specific manifestations of bias men-
tioned throughout this book. This can in no way serve as a comprehensive list of 
institutional forms that can address bias, but instead aims to provide an indication 
of the wide range of structures, rules or norms that may be considered in different 
settings.
Institutions govern the use of evidence 
As noted earlier, a focus on the institutionalisation of bias mitigation efforts such 
as these can help to overcome the limitations of many past efforts in the EBP 
movement that have targeted individuals alone. Yet merely working to address a 
specific form of evidentiary bias may raise other challenges if our ultimate goal 
remains to improve the use of evidence in policymaking more broadly. This is, of 
course, because there are multiple principles that are at stake when we consider 
evidence use in political processes, as discussed throughout this book, and, as 
such, reducing bias in any one way cannot be promoted to the exclusion of all 
other values.
The rules and norms built into the institutions affecting evidence use will 
end up determining a large number of outcomes beyond simply if bias occurs. 
Evidence systems will decide things such as: who has the right to speak on expert 
matters; when and for which sorts of decisions evidence will be invoked; where 
budgets will be utilised to generate new evidence; and, ultimately, whose inter-
ests are represented and promoted from the operation of the evidence advisory 
system. In these ways, we can therefore state that such institutions work to govern 
the use of evidence in policymaking. However, understanding this leads to the 
recognition that governments looking to make changes to their evidence advisory 
systems, or civil society and expert bodies wishing to improve evidence use, will 
need to consider more than simply which strategies can minimise particular forms 
of bias. Instead, there is a need to engage with the question of what the good 
governance of evidence might look like, which requires an explicitly normative 
framework that can integrate the multiple principles and values held to be impor-
tant for evidence use in the policy arena.
Governance and good governance of evidence
While there are many definitions of ‘governance’ in the policy studies litera-
ture (cf. Bevir 2008), here we utilise the term in a broad sense as capturing the 
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From EBP to the good governance of evidence 159
‘art of governing’ (Enroth 2014), referring to the multiple arrangements and 
processes by which collective decisions are made and outcomes are reached in 
a particular context (Chhotray and Stoker 2009). This definition can be applied 
across a range of issues, of course – be it corporate management in the private 
sector, political representation in the public sector or, indeed, the arrangements 
governing the operation of non-human systems such as the internet. Therefore, 
it can also be used to capture the arrangements governing the use of evidence 
and further permits a direct engagement with the concept of good governance, 
which captures the normative principles held to be important within a set of 
governing arrangements.
The term ‘good governance’ has also been used in a range of settings, and the 
choice of elements within any definition of the term will typically reflect its particu-
lar context. In corporate settings, for instance, the term can capture concerns over 
behaviour of the management or board of directors of corporations (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra 2009). In the international development literature, on the other 
hand, there has been particularly widespread engagement with the concept, using 
the term more directly to consider the interests of the public (Chhotray and Stoker 
2009). So, for example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
has specifically equated ‘good governance’ with ‘democratic governance’, which 
is said to be captured by systems being ‘capable, responsive, inclusive, and trans-
parent’ (Clark 2011). The UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific, on the other hand, defines good governance as being ‘participatory, 
consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, 
equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law’ (2014). Meanwhile, the World 
Bank identified three elements in an early definition of the concept of good gov-
ernance: ‘(i) the form of the political regime . . . (ii) the process by which authority 
is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources; and 
(iii) the capacity of government to design, formulate and implement policies, and, 
in general, to discharge government functions’ (1991, p. 23). This last definition 
reflects a much greater focus on economic management and the achievement of 
desired outcomes, no doubt influenced by the World Bank’s historical concern 
with macroeconomic growth and stability.
In general, the principles included in lists of good governance criteria can be 
seen to fall into two categories: those addressing the outcomes of decision making 
(e.g. the effectiveness or efficiency of decision making) and those speaking to the 
processes of decision making (e.g. accountability, transparency and adherence 
to the rules of law). Thinking about the good governance of evidence therefore 
requires identifying the set of values dealing with both processes and outcomes 
that are of particular relevance to the use of evidence within a political process. 
Good governance is inherently a normative concept, and this book began with 
two particular broad overarching normative concerns of advocates of EBP and 
their critics: one to do with fidelity to science and the other to do with democratic 
representation. However, through the course of this book, these concepts have 
been explored in greater depth, with additional elements discussed. This final sec-
tion therefore integrates the multiple normative principles identified so far into an 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 1
94
.8
0.
22
9.
24
4 
at
 0
4:
48
 0
4 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
17
 
160 From EBP to the good governance of evidence
overarching framework of the good governance of evidence – a framework that 
can in particular be used to guide institutional changes aiming to improve the use 
of evidence in policymaking.
A framework for the good governance of evidence
This section builds on an earlier paper published jointly with a colleague (Hawkins 
and Parkhurst 2015) that similarly considered how elements of ‘good governance’ 
could be applied more specifically to thinking about evidence use in health poli-
cymaking. It identified four components in particular:
 • The need to consider appropriate evidence – defined as addressing the mul-
tiple political considerations relevant to a policy decision.
 • The need for accountability in evidence use – to ensure that the use of evi-
dence reaches back to citizens.
 • The need for transparency – in order to open evidence utilisation to scrutiny.
 • The need for contestability – in the form of appeals processes and opportu-
nity for public debate, based on the principle that having data and arguments 
open to questioning and challenge is a key element of the scientific process 
(Hawkins and Parkhurst 2015).
Many of these ideas have been addressed so far in earlier chapters of this book. 
Obviously, the idea of appropriate evidence mirrors the discussion in Chapter 6, 
although that chapter undertakes greater elaboration of the concept, going beyond 
the idea of evidence that is relevant to multiple concerns, and adding additional 
reflection on how evidence needs to be constructed in policy-useful ways and 
applicable in a local setting. The element of accountability is similarly reflected 
in multiple points made in Chapter 7 about democratic representation in the evi-
dence advisory system. The first such point was that evidence advisory systems 
should be designed by actors who have an official public mandate (taking a stew-
ardship role) and second was reflection on the need for final decision authority 
to rest with individuals who are representative of (and accountable to) the public. 
Transparency was similarly captured in the discussions of Chapter 7, which also 
explored the importance of direct public deliberation to ensure that public values 
are well represented in highly technical decision processes. The idea of contest-
ability was not directly discussed in earlier chapters, but it can be seen as falling 
into the broader concern over adherence to scientific best practices, given the 
importance of peer critique and replicability in scientific pursuits. Other related 
scientific practices explored more directly in this book include discussions of rig-
orous (or systematic) uses of evidence and the need to use evidence judged to be 
of high quality (depending on the relevant methods to address the problems).
With these ideas in mind, we can therefore construct an expanded frame-
work to capture eight key principles seen as constituting a good governance of 
evidence. These elements are described in Table 8.2 below and are graphically 
illustrated in Figure 8.1.
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From EBP to the good governance of evidence 163
Taken in combination, this framework ultimately reflects a view that rigorous, 
relevant and unbiased pieces of evidence should be used to inform policy deci-
sions that remain representative of, and accountable to, local populations.
Achieving the good governance of evidence through  
a process of guided evolution
The good governance of evidence framework assembles the multiple principles 
and concerns addressed throughout this book into a structure to inform processes 
of institution building that aim to improve the use of evidence in policymaking. It 
is of course quite intuitive when pursuing a goal to ask the question of ‘what works’ 
to get there, and some may directly ask which institutional structures indeed ‘work’ 
to achieve the good governance of evidence. However, Chapter 2’s caveats about 
Figure 8.1 Elements of the good governance of evidence.
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164 From EBP to the good governance of evidence
seeking ‘what works’ out of context remain pertinent. Table 8.1 of course provides 
a large number of examples of institutional forms that prove informative. But, just 
as most policy interventions will need consideration of how applicable they are to 
local contexts, so too will there be a need to reflect on how any suggested insti-
tutional structure, rule or practice will work to achieve desired goals when it is 
adopted in a local setting.
Building institutions is rarely a simple process of copying templates or choos-
ing from a menu of alternatives. In an early and widely cited work, Selznick 
explains that:
Institutionalization is a process. It is something that happens to an organiza-
tion over time, reflecting the organization’s own distinctive history, the peo-
ple who have been in it, the groups it embodies and the vested interests they 
have created, and the way it has adapted to its environment.
(1957, p. 16, emphasis in original)
Institutional change therefore necessarily takes place within an existing and his-
torically dependent organisational context. This, in turn, means that most cases of 
institutionalisation will be incremental (North 1990). There may of course be some 
cases where entirely new institutional arrangements are developed. Government 
bureaucracies do get re-designed at times and political revolutions are not unheard 
of. We can also recognise the particular opportunities presented in middle-income 
countries experiencing rapid growth, where governments may be quickly designing 
new public administrative structures to provide social services where few admin-
istrative arrangements existed in the past (Ginsburg 2014). Such cases may indeed 
permit the larger-scale adoption of institutional change in the structures, rules and 
practices that govern the use of evidence. Yet these are likely to be rare. More often, 
we will see the implementation of changes within a well-established system and a 
need for institutions to adapt their functions and values in line with existing political 
arrangements. Indeed, while Colombia’s IETS programme was explicitly modelled 
on NICE in the UK, as noted earlier, the agency is located in a different administra-
tive position from NICE, undertaking slightly different functions and roles, with 
subsequent implications for how much it can (or cannot) influence health policy 
decision making and health service provision (Castro 2014).
Selznick (1957) is also widely recognised for describing institutionalisation as 
including the processes by which organisations are ‘infused with values’ – values 
that go beyond their operational requirements and instead link to their broader 
goals (von Maravić and Dudek 2013). However, if the broader goal is to build 
institutions to improve the use of evidence, we must directly address this question 
of what principles we use to judge improvement and which values to therefore 
infuse. The good governance of evidence framework provides us with just such 
a normative template that can inform this thinking. Taken as such, the process of 
institutional change to improve the use of evidence can be defined as a process of 
guided evolution – guided because it requires a normative set of goals to direct 
change efforts in line with efforts for improvement, and evolutionary in the way 
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From EBP to the good governance of evidence 165
in which it incrementally shapes or alters institutional arrangements within an 
existing political system.1
It is not common to find published cases illustrating such deliberate processes 
of guided evolution, whereby an agency such as a government department has 
attempted to institutionalise improved uses of evidence in line with explicitly 
stated principles. But one example can be seen in the experience of the UK’s 
Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), which did under-
take just such a process in the mid-2000s and whose experience was written up 
to inform the Australian aid agency’s ‘Knowledge Sector Initiative’, which funds 
efforts to improve evidence use in Indonesia. The experience and approach of 
DEFRA is summarised in Box 8.1 below.
Box 8.1  Guided evolution to institutionalise evidence  
improvements: the case of DEFRA
Much of the text in this example has been summarised  
from Shaxson (2014)
DEFRA is the UK government department (ministry) responsible for issues such as 
environmental protection, agriculture, forests and marine environments, and rural 
services (DEFRA 2015). As described by Shaxson (2014), in 2004, the Department 
was responsible for a research budget of £325 million (just under US$600 million at 
the time) and identified a need to more systematically ensure that these funds were 
used to help the Department achieve its strategic priorities and goals. An internal 
Science Strategy Team, which had been tasked with ensuring the technical quality 
of the evidence base, decided to develop an ‘Evidence Investment Strategy’ to serve 
this purpose. Three particular ideas initially informed the creation of this strategy: 
(1) that different types of evidence from different disciplines were needed to make 
effective policy; (2) that there was need for a clear ‘line of sight’ between evidence 
and the Department’s policy priorities and objectives; and (3) that the quality of 
the process of using evidence was as important as the quality of the evidence itself. 
DEFRA’s first Evidence Investment Strategy (which ran from 2006 to 2010) was 
designed primarily to change how evidence budgets were allocated and managed, 
(continued)
1 A similar idea comes from the field of international development in the form of ‘Problem-Driven 
Iterative Adaption’. This approach was intended to move beyond past failures of organisational 
reform, which simply shifted what organisations look like, to actually change what they do in prac-
tice. The approach is said to require locally defined problem-driven approaches that occur through 
‘positive deviance and experimentation’, which in turn facilitates experiential learning that can 
feedback into further experiments and changes (Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock 2012). In these 
ways, this approach parallels many of the ideas of guided evolution presented here, although guided 
by problems rather than governance principles per se. It further speaks to the need for locally owned 
and demanded changes occurring from within existing institutional contexts rather than simply 
assuming that structures and solutions can be imported from elsewhere.
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166 From EBP to the good governance of evidence
(continued)
yet undertaking the process led to critical reflection on the role of evidence within 
the Department as a whole. This resulted in DEFRA adopting what was described 
as a ‘systematic approach to improving how it sources and uses evidence to inform 
policymaking’ (Shaxson 2014, p. iii). 
Louise Shaxson, who served as an advisor to the Science Strategy Team (and 
authored the report summarised here), explained that the goal of the Evidence 
Investment Strategy process was to make evidence-informed decision making ‘busi-
ness as usual’ within DEFRA (personal communication, 29 April 2016). Doing so, 
however, meant explicitly identifying what an improved use of evidence would look 
like. A set of key principles was elucidated on which to base the initial strategy – 
principles that overlap with several elements of the good governance of evidence 
framework described in this chapter. These were described as follows:
1 A need for evidence that specifically responded to policy goals and priorities 
(recognising the importance of evidence challenging these goals as well).
2 Policymakers to recognise a range of different types of evidence as relevant 
(statistical data, stakeholder perspectives, evidence from monitoring and 
 evaluation, etc.).
3 A balance to be struck between short-term needs and long-term priorities.
4 A commitment to re-analysis of older evidence as well as commissioning new 
evidence.
A fifth principle, seen as underlying all the others, was that of ‘transparency in the 
evidence base’ – specifically embraced due to a recognition of a need for ‘good 
governance of the evidence base’ so as to ensure that stakeholders were well repre-
sented and bought into the evidence-utilisation process (see Shaxson 2014, p. vii).
The first Evidence Investment Strategy was further developed in two sub-
sequent iterations. The result has been that DEFRA has been incrementally 
experimenting with its institutional arrangements over time to embed its key prin-
ciples and mainstream them within operational processes. So, for example, during 
the second strategy process (which ran from 2010 to 2013), the agency moved 
evidence specialists from a central directorate into different policy teams, where 
they held their own research budgets. However, it was soon learned that this could 
increase the likelihood of duplication in research efforts, so changes were made 
whereby the evidence specialists remained in place, but budgetary control moved 
back to a central body. Other changes have been seen as well, such as shifting 
work previously allocated to external consultants to the central evidence directo-
rate or taking steps to increasingly link departmental business plans with evidence 
procurement. 
DEFRA developed explicit principles concerned with evidence relevance, qual-
ity and public representation that have steered a decade of gradual administrative 
changes to improve evidentiary practice. In doing so, its experience provides a rare 
documented example of a government agency undertaking a deliberate process of 
guided evolution to institutionalise aspects of the good governance of evidence, 
reflecting many of the ideas described throughout this chapter.
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Conclusion
In many ways, this book has followed a path that has touched on a series of 
normative concerns linked with conceptual discussions. In Part I, Chapters 1 
and 2 introduced the EBP movement as both important and limited in key ways: 
important in how it embraces laudable goals such as a desire to ensure that sci-
ence is used accurately with the ultimate aim to improve social outcomes, but 
limited in its conceptualisation of the policy process. This limitation then led 
to the identification of a set of challenges in evidence utilisation within policy-
making. Two distinct forms of bias were identified: technical bias, reflecting a 
need for scientific fidelity; and issue bias, reflecting a competing concern over 
democratic representation. It was noted that ‘improving’ the use of evidence in 
policy with both of these in mind requires a decidedly political approach – one 
that recognises the realities of decision making in contested policy arenas. In 
Part II of the book, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 moved on to explore these biases, work-
ing to identify their forms, origins and manifestations, particularly in relation to 
our political values. This was undertaken based on the premise that by develop-
ing a more rigorous conceptual understanding of how these forms of bias arise, 
we might have greater success in mitigating or avoiding them in the future. In 
Part III of the book, Chapters 6 and 7 followed by undertaking further normative 
discussions, reconceptualising what might constitute ‘good evidence for policy’ 
(Chapter 6) and what might be judged as a ‘good use of evidence’ within a 
policy process (Chapter 7). This has then led to this final chapter, which returned 
to the initial question of how to improve the use of evidence in policymaking. In 
particular, it discussed the need to build institutional structures that help reduce 
bias and that serve to govern the use of evidence. This overall path taken is illus-
trated in Figure 8.2 below.
The direct engagement with normative concerns throughout many of the pre-
vious chapters helps to distinguish this book from several other contemporary 
works on evidence use that employ a policy perspective. While sharing much 
of the same theoretical basis and no doubt overlapping at times, other authors 
have particularly been concerned with describing the many meanings and mani-
festations of evidence ‘use’ (cf. Nutley, Walter and Davies 2007; Weiss 1979) or 
exploring the utilisation of evidence in particular policy case studies (cf. Cairney 
2015; Smith 2013). Here, however, we have kept at the fore the primary question 
of what it means to improve the use of evidence in policymaking. This starting 
point derives from the overarching goal of the EBP movement to achieve better 
social outcomes, while recognising the limitations that movement has faced in 
applying its ideas within political settings. As noted previously, the idea of using 
scientific research, evidence and tools of policy analysis to help achieve social 
and political goals has a long history in the field of public policy (DeLeon 2006). 
Many see its roots in Harold Lasswell’s concept of the policy sciences developed 
in the 1970s (DeLeon 2006; Lasswell 1970, 1971). Others have noted similar 
thinking in the work of John Dewey, who saw the usefulness of science in solving 
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Figure 8.2 The conceptual path taken.
social problems, but who raised concerns over reductionism of policy to scien-
tific method as early as the 1920s (Dewey 1954 [1927]; Johnston 2002). In many 
ways, this book has revisited these ideas, bringing their pragmatism and political 
orientation to the current EBP debates.
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From EBP to the good governance of evidence 169
Although based around a set of normative discussions, this book makes no 
claim to ideological perfection or moral authority. The reader is free to agree 
or disagree with the values stated or implicit in any of the chapters or, indeed, 
within any elements of the good governance of evidence framework proposed. 
Yet effort has been made to avoid taking sides on the specific policy issues dis-
cussed. Instead, the book has drawn upon widely shared value positions to address 
the broader cross-cutting questions of evidence use. So, for example, the idea that 
science should be used faithfully and accurately does underlie many chapter dis-
cussions, but few would argue that incorrect, cherry-picked or misused evidence 
is preferable to accurate, rigorous and valid examples. Other principles embedded 
in the book relate more specifically to the needs and realities of policy making, 
of course, over which there is no shortage of disagreement. Indeed, defining good 
evidence as based around a lens of appropriateness serves to establish a relative 
value claim. Again, though, the normative position taken in Chapter 6 is hardly 
controversial, arguing that better evidence can be judged against how well it 
addresses the multiple policy goals or concerns at hand (whichever they happen to 
be). It is much harder to justify a contrary position – that the inappropriate appli-
cation of evidence to situations where it is not relevant is somehow preferable. 
Chapter 7 perhaps raises the biggest questions, as it starts from a basic assump-
tion that democratic representation is an important value to pursue in political 
systems dealing with evidence. Some might alternatively argue that transparency 
or public deliberation can be justified without this – for example, because they are 
necessary to ensure that policy outcomes are reached effectively. However, such a 
view accepts democratic inclusion only in situations when it improves outcomes. 
The position taken in Chapter 7 goes beyond this and does so by drawing on 
authors who promote democratic representation in technical decision processes as 
an important value in and of itself. Indeed, public consultation can at times slow 
down decision processes or increase their costs, yet the importance of consulting 
the public is widely held to come from the fundamental importance of ensuring 
appropriate consideration of public needs and wants in political decisions.
Regardless of whether the reader agrees with each proposition, it is important 
to recognise why this book has been so explicitly concerned with principles of 
evidence use. As noted in Chapter 2, much past work coming out of the EBP 
movement has assumed that more evidence use is inherently better evidence use 
(Smith 2013). Such a belief appears to rest on an assumption that evidence works 
to serve a problem solving role in situations where all outcomes have been agreed. 
But such situations are the exception, rather than the rule, in policymaking (Weiss 
1979). As such, many evidence utilisation concepts and strategies arising from 
this position have typically been under-specified – failing to ask which evidence 
for what goals in particular. The EBP community has had an explicit concern with 
the politicisation of science, yet it has generally not considered the depoliticisa-
tion of politics when promoting certain forms of evidence uptake – a blind spot 
that cannot continue to be unaddressed given the decidedly political nature of 
public policymaking.
The alternative approach promoted here has been to explore the key principles 
relevant to the realms of both evidence utilisation and political decision making. 
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170 From EBP to the good governance of evidence
To improve the use of evidence in policy requires an explicit engagement with the 
question of what constitutes better use from a political perspective. Attempting to 
answer this question has led to the recognition that long-term improvement requires 
building institutional arrangements that can address key forms of evidentiary bias 
while simultaneously incorporating principles of democratic representation. This 
involves the institutionalisation of structures, rules, processes and practices that 
work to ensure that rigorous, valid and relevant bodies of evidence are utilised 
through transparent and deliberative processes to inform decisions that ultimately 
remain representative of, and accountable to, local populations. Achieving this 
would constitute an important step towards establishing the good governance of 
evidence and could help to better realise the full potential of evidence to accom-
plish our collective social policy goals.
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